Detect LSASS Memory in IBM QRadar
Adversaries access credential material stored in the LSASS process memory. After logon, Windows stores credentials (NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets, plaintext passwords via WDigest) in LSASS. Tools used include Mimikatz, ProcDump, comsvcs.dll MiniDump (rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump), WerFault silent process exit, and Cobalt Strike's sekurlsa module. Used extensively by APT1, APT33, OilRig, HAFNIUM, Volt Typhoon, NotPetya, Cobalt Strike operators, and many others. Highest-frequency credential dumping technique observed in the wild.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- Sub-technique
- T1003.001 LSASS Memory
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source,
username,
sourceip,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
"SourceImage",
"TargetImage",
"CommandLine",
"GrantedAccess"
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) = 12 /* Microsoft Windows Security Event Log / Sysmon */
AND (
(
/* Sysmon EID 10: LSASS process access with high-privilege access masks */
qid = 5001010 /* Sysmon ProcessAccess */
AND "TargetImage" ILIKE '%lsass.exe'
AND "SourceImage" NOT ILIKE '%MsMpEng.exe'
AND "SourceImage" NOT ILIKE '%csrss.exe'
AND "SourceImage" NOT ILIKE '%services.exe'
AND "SourceImage" NOT ILIKE '%lsm.exe'
AND "SourceImage" NOT ILIKE '%svchost.exe'
AND "SourceImage" NOT ILIKE '%winlogon.exe'
AND "SourceImage" NOT ILIKE '%wininit.exe'
AND "SourceImage" NOT ILIKE '%SecurityHealthService.exe'
AND (
"GrantedAccess" IN ('0x1fffff', '0x1f3fff', '0x143a', '0x1410', '0x1010', '0x40')
)
)
OR
(
/* Sysmon EID 1: rundll32 comsvcs MiniDump or procdump against lsass */
qid = 5001001 /* Sysmon ProcessCreate */
AND (
(
"Image" ILIKE '%rundll32.exe'
AND "CommandLine" ILIKE '%comsvcs%'
AND "CommandLine" ILIKE '%MiniDump%'
)
OR
(
("Image" ILIKE '%procdump.exe' OR "Image" ILIKE '%procdump64.exe')
AND "CommandLine" ILIKE '%lsass%'
)
)
)
)
AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LIMIT 500Detects LSASS credential dumping in IBM QRadar via Sysmon process access events (EID 10) with suspicious access masks against lsass.exe, and process creation events (EID 1) for comsvcs MiniDump via rundll32 or ProcDump targeting lsass. Filters out known legitimate processes to reduce noise.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Windows Task Manager running as administrator may legitimately access LSASS memory during process inspection — validate against user role and time of access
- Legitimate memory forensics tools used by the security team (e.g., WinPmem, Volatility acquisition) — maintain an allowlist of authorized forensics hosts
- SQL Server sqldumper.exe accessing LSASS during SQL dump operations on database servers — correlate with SQL Server activity on known DB hosts
Other platforms for T1003.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1LSASS Dump via comsvcs.dll MiniDump (LOLBin)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for rundll32.exe with CommandLine containing comsvcs.dll MiniDump. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess for lsass.exe from rundll32.exe with GrantedAccess=0x1fffff. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for the .dmp file in C:\Windows\Temp\.
- Test 2LSASS Access via PowerShell Reflection (Mimikatz-Style)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess with TargetImage=lsass.exe, SourceImage=powershell.exe. The GrantedAccess value depends on the access requested by Get-Process. Security Event ID 4656/4663 if process object auditing is enabled.
- Test 3LSASS Dump via ProcDump
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess with TargetImage=lsass.exe, SourceImage=procdump.exe, GrantedAccess=0x1fffff. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for lsass_pd_test.dmp. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for procdump.exe with lsass.exe in CommandLine.
References (7)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
- https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection
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