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CVE-2026-91569

Oracle WebLogic Server TopLink Integration Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-91569)

Initial Access Execution Last updated:

Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2026-91569, a CVSS 10.0 vulnerability in the TopLink Integration component of Oracle WebLogic Server (Oracle Fusion Middleware). The affected supported versions are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0, 14.1.2.0.0 and 15.1.1.0.0. The flaw is remotely exploitable without authentication and can result in full compromise of the WebLogic Server. This detection looks for anomalous requests to WebLogic/TopLink-related endpoints, Java deserialization and object-marshalling indicators (e.g. T3/IIOP traffic, serialized Java payload markers), and post-exploitation behaviour such as the WebLogic Java process spawning OS command interpreters. No public exploitation has been confirmed. Tune carefully in your environment.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Timeline

Disclosed
November 17, 2026

CVSS

10.0
Critical (9.0–10)

What is CVE-2026-91569 Oracle WebLogic Server TopLink Integration Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-91569)?

Oracle WebLogic Server TopLink Integration Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-91569) (CVE-2026-91569) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Oracle WebLogic Server TopLink Integration Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-91569), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Web server logs, Load balancer logs, WAF/proxy logs. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-af5ff151dd · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91569 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let weblogicPaths = dynamic(["/console", "/wls-wsat", "/_async", "/bea_wls_internal", "/wls-exporter", "/TopLink", "/em"]);
union isfuzzy=true W3CIISLog, AWSELBLogs, CommonSecurityLog
| extend RequestURI = coalesce(column_ifexists("csUriStem", ""), column_ifexists("RequestURL", ""), column_ifexists("RequestURI", ""))
| extend ClientIP = coalesce(column_ifexists("cIP", ""), column_ifexists("ClientIP", ""), column_ifexists("SourceIP", ""))
| extend HttpStatus = coalesce(column_ifexists("scStatus", ""), column_ifexists("HttpStatus", ""))
| where RequestURI has_any (weblogicPaths)
| where RequestURI has_any ("wsdl", "CoordinatorPortType", "RegistrationPortTypeRPC", "TopLink", "deserial", "xmldecode")
| summarize RequestCount = count(), Paths = make_set(RequestURI, 20), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by ClientIP
| where RequestCount > 3
| order by RequestCount desc

Identifies bursts of requests to WebLogic internal and TopLink/WSAT endpoints associated with deserialization exploitation of CVE-2026-91569 across IIS/ELB/proxy logs.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Web server logs Load balancer logs WAF/proxy logs

Required Tables

W3CIISLog AWSELBLogs CommonSecurityLog

False Positives

  • Legitimate administrators accessing the WebLogic Administration Console (/console) or Enterprise Manager (/em)
  • Automated monitoring/health-check tooling polling WebLogic web service endpoints
  • Vulnerability scanners run by the internal security team against WebLogic hosts

Query fingerprint DF00-af5ff151dd · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Oracle WebLogic Server TopLink Integration Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-91569) (CVE-2026-91569) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:

Research depth: standard
References (1)

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Simulated WSAT deserialization request to WebLogic endpoint

    Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry showing a POST to /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType with an XMLDecode/ProcessBuilder payload body from the test source IP.

  2. Test 2 Simulate WebLogic Java process spawning shell (Linux)

    Expected signal: Process-creation event showing a java/weblogic.Server parent spawning sh/id.

  3. Test 3 Simulate WebLogic Java process spawning cmd/powershell (Windows)

    Expected signal: ProcessRollup2/DeviceProcessEvents record of cmd.exe/powershell.exe spawned under the WebLogic Java process.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the affected host is running Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0, 14.1.2.0.0 or 15.1.1.0.0 and whether the TopLink Integration component is enabled/exposed.
  2. Review the source IP(s) in the alert: are they internal administrators, known scanners, or unknown/external addresses? Check geolocation and threat-intel reputation.
  3. Correlate the web/proxy request timeline against endpoint process telemetry on the WebLogic host for any child process spawns (cmd, powershell, sh, curl) from the Java process.
  4. Inspect the full request bodies for serialized Java payload markers (e.g. 'aced 0005' hex, 'rO0AB' base64, XMLDecode/xmldecode constructs, or TopLink marshalling objects).

Containment

  1. Block the identified malicious source IP(s) at the perimeter firewall/WAF and restrict access to WebLogic internal endpoints (/wls-wsat, /_async, /bea_wls_internal) to trusted management networks.
  2. If exploitation is confirmed, isolate the affected WebLogic host from the network and preserve it for forensic imaging.
  3. Apply the Oracle Critical Patch Update referenced in the Oracle security alert and disable or remove the WSAT/async web services if not required.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture WebLogic access logs, server logs (AdminServer.log, managed server logs) and stdout/stderr for the relevant time window.
  2. Collect full packet capture or proxy request/response bodies for the suspicious requests, and image the host memory/disk if RCE is suspected.
  3. Export the endpoint process tree and command-line history for the WebLogic Java process and any children.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response immediately if the WebLogic Java process is observed spawning a shell, downloader, or unexpected binary.
  • ! Escalate if serialized Java payloads or successful 200/500 responses to crafted TopLink/WSAT requests are confirmed from an untrusted source.
  • ! Escalate if lateral movement, new local accounts, or outbound C2 connections are observed from the WebLogic host following the suspicious requests.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > WebLogic AdminServer/managed-server logs and access logs showing requests to WSAT/async/TopLink endpoints
  • > New or modified JSP/WAR files in the WebLogic domain's autodeploy or servletapp directories (webshell indicators)
  • > Process-creation records of the Java process spawning cmd/powershell/sh and subsequent network connections
  • > Serialized Java object artifacts (aced0005 / rO0AB markers) captured in proxy or PCAP data

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate administrative access to /console and /em from known management subnets and exclude those source IPs. Whitelist sanctioned vulnerability scanners and synthetic monitors. Because no public exploitation has been confirmed, favour the endpoint-based process-spawn detections (high confidence) for alerting and use the web-log detections (medium confidence) for hunting and enrichment. Adjust the request_count threshold to match normal traffic volumes for each WebLogic host.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for WebLogic server processes spawning command interpreters and for repeated access to vulnerable WebLogic endpoints.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-af5ff151dd · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91569 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java.exe","beasvc.exe") and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("weblogic.Server","Dweblogic") | where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","sh","bash","curl","wget","certutil.exe") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-af5ff151dd · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91569 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web sourcetype IN ("iis","access_combined") uri="*/wls-wsat*" OR uri="*/_async*" OR uri="*/TopLink*" | stats count BY src_ip, uri, status | where count > 3

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulated WSAT deserialization request to WebLogic endpoint
linux

Sends a crafted POST to the /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType endpoint with an XMLDecode-style body to simulate CVE-2026-91569 exploitation traffic for detection validation. Lab use only.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST "http://weblogic-lab.internal:7001/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType" -H "Content-Type: text/xml" --data '<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soapenv:Header><work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/"><java version="1.8" class="java.beans.XMLDecode"><void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"><array class="java.lang.String" length="1"><void index="0"><string>touch /tmp/cve-2026-91569-test</string></void></array></void></java></work:WorkContext></soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/cve-2026-91569-test

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy log entry showing a POST to /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType with an XMLDecode/ProcessBuilder payload body from the test source IP.

Expected Detection

The KQL/SPL/QRadar/Sumo web-log detections fire on repeated access to the WSAT/TopLink endpoint containing deserialization markers.

Test 2 Simulate WebLogic Java process spawning shell (Linux)
linux

Emulates post-exploitation RCE by launching a shell command from a process whose command line mimics the WebLogic server, to validate endpoint detections. Lab use only.

Command

bash
bash -c 'exec -a "java -Dweblogic.Name=AdminServer weblogic.Server" sleep 1 & sleep 0.2; sh -c "id > /tmp/cve-2026-91569-rce"'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/cve-2026-91569-rce

Expected Telemetry

Process-creation event showing a java/weblogic.Server parent spawning sh/id.

Expected Detection

The Elastic EQL, Chronicle YARA-L and CrowdStrike CQL detections fire on the WebLogic process spawning a shell.

Test 3 Simulate WebLogic Java process spawning cmd/powershell (Windows)
windows

Emulates post-exploitation command execution on Windows by spawning powershell from a process tree labelled as WebLogic, to validate endpoint detections. Lab use only.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "Start-Process -FilePath 'cmd.exe' -ArgumentList '/c whoami > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\cve-2026-91569-rce.txt'"

Cleanup

powershell
powershell -Command "Remove-Item -Force C:\\Windows\\Temp\\cve-2026-91569-rce.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue"

Expected Telemetry

ProcessRollup2/DeviceProcessEvents record of cmd.exe/powershell.exe spawned under the WebLogic Java process.

Expected Detection

The CrowdStrike CQL, Chronicle YARA-L and Elastic EQL detections fire on the WebLogic parent spawning a command interpreter.

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