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CVE-2026-90817 Splunk · SPL

Detect REDCap Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-90817) in Splunk

Detects possible exploitation of CVE-2026-90817, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Vanderbilt University's Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap). The flaw is in the survey passthrough routing and Data Import processing logic. An attacker can manipulate HTTP requests to reach an unintended controller route from a public survey context and supply a crafted file-path or stream parameter during import handling, which can lead to arbitrary code execution on the REDCap server (CWE-73, CWE-94; CVSS 9.8; listed in the CISA KEV catalog). Exploitation does not require authentication, but it does require knowledge of a valid public survey hash. The vulnerability affects REDCap 13.3.0 and higher. This detection focuses on web and endpoint telemetry: suspicious POST requests to REDCap endpoints, references to executable file extensions in request paths or parameters, and PHP or web-server processes spawning OS shells on the REDCap host.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
``` df00tech DF00-144307ea50 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90817 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype=ms:iis OR sourcetype=access_combined OR sourcetype=apache:access)
  method=POST
  (uri_path="*redcap*" OR uri_path="*DataEntry*" OR uri_path="*Upload*" OR uri_path="*edocs*")
| eval payload=uri_path."?".uri_query
| where match(payload, "(?i)\.(php5?|phtml|phar|inc)([\?&/]|$)")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(uri_path) as paths values(status) as statuses by host clientip useragent
| where count > 0
| sort - last_seen
critical severity medium confidence

Identifies POST requests to REDCap upload and data-entry URIs that reference PHP or executable extensions, and aggregates by source IP and host.

Data Sources

IIS LogsApache Access LogsWeb Proxy

Required Sourcetypes

ms:iisaccess_combinedapache:access

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized REDCap module/plugin installations that upload PHP files
  • Vulnerability scanners generating .php request patterns
  • Internal QA or staging traffic replaying upload requests

Other platforms for CVE-2026-90817


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Simulated REDCap PHP upload POST

    Expected signal: Web server access log records a POST to a REDCap upload endpoint with a .php filename reference.

  2. Test 2 Drop PHP webshell into edocs directory

    Expected signal: File creation event for a .php file under the REDCap edocs directory captured by EDR/FIM.

  3. Test 3 PHP process spawns OS shell

    Expected signal: Process-execution telemetry shows sh/id/whoami with parent process php (or php-fpm).


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the targeted host runs REDCap and identify its version; the vulnerability affects REDCap 13.3.0 and higher. Determine whether the KEV-required patch has been applied.
  2. Pull the full request and response for the flagged POST(s): inspect any uploaded filename, destination path, and whether the server returned 200/302 indicating a successful write.
  3. Review the REDCap web root and any edocs or temp directories for recently created or modified .php/.phtml/.phar files and correlate their timestamps with the alert.
  4. Check the authentication context (csUsername or session) of the request. Note that exploitation does not require authentication but does require a valid public survey hash.

Containment

  1. Place the REDCap web server behind a WAF rule blocking POSTs with PHP extensions to upload and data-entry endpoints while remediation proceeds.
  2. Remove or quarantine any attacker-written PHP files from the web root and temp directories, and revoke sessions or API tokens for any implicated account.
  3. Apply the vendor-supplied REDCap update that remediates CVE-2026-90817 (per CISA BOD 26-04 KEV timelines) and restart the web service.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web server access and error logs (IIS W3C or Apache) covering the exploitation window, including request bodies if captured.
  2. Image or snapshot the edocs and temp directories and any dropped PHP files before deletion for forensic analysis.
  3. Export process-execution telemetry showing any shell or child processes spawned by php, php-fpm, or httpd on the host.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if a dropped PHP file was successfully executed (shell spawned, outbound C2, or data access confirmed).
  • !Escalate to the data-protection or compliance team if REDCap project data was accessed or exfiltrated.
  • !Escalate to the KEV remediation owner if the host cannot be patched within the CISA BOD 26-04 due date.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Newly created or modified PHP files in the REDCap web root and any edocs or temp directories
  • >Web server access-log entries showing POSTs with PHP extensions to upload or data-entry endpoints
  • >Child processes (sh/bash/whoami/id) parented to php, php-fpm, or httpd in EDR process telemetry
  • >REDCap application logs and database rows referencing an uploaded edoc_id and stored_name

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate REDCap plugin and module uploads and known administrator IPs, then exclude those sources from the PHP-extension match. Tighten the match to the specific upload endpoints used in your deployment and to extensions your web server will actually execute. If request-body capture is unavailable, rely on the correlated EDR shell-spawn rule (elastic_eql and crowdstrike_cql) to confirm true positives and reduce scanner noise.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for bursts of PHP-referencing POSTs against REDCap endpoints from a single source, which can indicate automated exploitation attempts for CVE-2026-90817.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-144307ea50 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90817 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csMethod == "POST" | where csUriStem has "redcap" or csUriStem has "edocs" | where csUriQuery has ".php" or csUriStem has ".php" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | where count_ > 5
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-144307ea50 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90817 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web method=POST (uri_path="*redcap*" OR uri_path="*edocs*") | regex _raw="(?i)\.(php5?|phtml|phar)" | stats count by clientip uri_path | where count > 5

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulated REDCap PHP upload POST
linux

Sends a POST to a lab REDCap upload endpoint with a PHP-extension filename to generate web-log telemetry.

Command

bash
curl -s -X POST 'http://redcap.lab.local/redcap/DataEntry/file_upload.php?pid=1' -F 'file=@/tmp/shell.php;filename=shell.php' -F 'field_name=upload' -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/shell.php; curl -s -X POST 'http://redcap.lab.local/redcap/edocs/delete.php?name=shell.php' -o /dev/null || true

Expected Telemetry

Web server access log records a POST to a REDCap upload endpoint with a .php filename reference.

Expected Detection

The kql, spl, qradar_aql, sumo_logic and chronicle_yaral rules match the PHP-extension POST to the REDCap endpoint.

Test 2 Drop PHP webshell into edocs directory
linux

Writes a minimal PHP webshell into a simulated REDCap web root to emulate a post-exploitation file artifact.

Command

bash
printf '<?php system($_GET["c"]); ?>' > /var/www/redcap/edocs/shell.php && echo 'written'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /var/www/redcap/edocs/shell.php

Expected Telemetry

File creation event for a .php file under the REDCap edocs directory captured by EDR/FIM.

Expected Detection

Forensic-artifact hunt for new PHP files in edocs surfaces the dropped shell; FIM/EDR file-write alerts fire.

Test 3 PHP process spawns OS shell
linux

Emulates a web shell executing an OS command by having the PHP interpreter spawn a shell, matching post-exploitation process behavior.

Command

bash
php -r 'system("id; whoami");'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Process-execution telemetry shows sh/id/whoami with parent process php (or php-fpm).

Expected Detection

The elastic_eql sequence and crowdstrike_cql rules match the shell or recon process spawned by php.

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