Detect REDCap Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-90817) in IBM QRadar
Detects possible exploitation of CVE-2026-90817, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Vanderbilt University's Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap). The flaw is in the survey passthrough routing and Data Import processing logic. An attacker can manipulate HTTP requests to reach an unintended controller route from a public survey context and supply a crafted file-path or stream parameter during import handling, which can lead to arbitrary code execution on the REDCap server (CWE-73, CWE-94; CVSS 9.8; listed in the CISA KEV catalog). Exploitation does not require authentication, but it does require knowledge of a valid public survey hash. The vulnerability affects REDCap 13.3.0 and higher. This detection focuses on web and endpoint telemetry: suspicious POST requests to REDCap endpoints, references to executable file extensions in request paths or parameters, and PHP or web-server processes spawning OS shells on the REDCap host.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
QRadar Detection Query
-- df00tech DF00-144307ea50 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90817 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
SELECT QIDNAME(qid) AS event, sourceip, destinationip, "URL" AS url, "HTTP Method" AS method, "Request Payload" AS payload, starttime
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Apache HTTP Server', 'Microsoft IIS', 'Web Server')
AND "HTTP Method" = 'POST'
AND ("URL" ILIKE '%redcap%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%DataEntry%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%edocs%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%Upload%')
AND ("URL" IMATCHES '.*\.(php5?|phtml|phar|inc)([\?&/]|$).*' OR "Request Payload" ILIKE '%<?php%')
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LAST 24 HOURS Returns REDCap upload and data-entry POSTs that reference PHP extensions or carry inline PHP (<?php) in the payload.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized plugin uploads containing PHP source
- Penetration testing or scanning activity against REDCap
- Content migration tooling carrying PHP snippets in request bodies
Other platforms for CVE-2026-90817
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Simulated REDCap PHP upload POST
Expected signal: Web server access log records a POST to a REDCap upload endpoint with a .php filename reference.
- Test 2 Drop PHP webshell into edocs directory
Expected signal: File creation event for a .php file under the REDCap edocs directory captured by EDR/FIM.
- Test 3 PHP process spawns OS shell
Expected signal: Process-execution telemetry shows sh/id/whoami with parent process php (or php-fpm).
References (6)
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90817
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-90817
- https://projectredcap.org/resources/community
- https://www.securifera.com/advisories/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the targeted host runs REDCap and identify its version; the vulnerability affects REDCap 13.3.0 and higher. Determine whether the KEV-required patch has been applied.
- Pull the full request and response for the flagged POST(s): inspect any uploaded filename, destination path, and whether the server returned 200/302 indicating a successful write.
- Review the REDCap web root and any edocs or temp directories for recently created or modified .php/.phtml/.phar files and correlate their timestamps with the alert.
- Check the authentication context (csUsername or session) of the request. Note that exploitation does not require authentication but does require a valid public survey hash.
Containment
- Place the REDCap web server behind a WAF rule blocking POSTs with PHP extensions to upload and data-entry endpoints while remediation proceeds.
- Remove or quarantine any attacker-written PHP files from the web root and temp directories, and revoke sessions or API tokens for any implicated account.
- Apply the vendor-supplied REDCap update that remediates CVE-2026-90817 (per CISA BOD 26-04 KEV timelines) and restart the web service.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve web server access and error logs (IIS W3C or Apache) covering the exploitation window, including request bodies if captured.
- Image or snapshot the edocs and temp directories and any dropped PHP files before deletion for forensic analysis.
- Export process-execution telemetry showing any shell or child processes spawned by php, php-fpm, or httpd on the host.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if a dropped PHP file was successfully executed (shell spawned, outbound C2, or data access confirmed).
- !Escalate to the data-protection or compliance team if REDCap project data was accessed or exfiltrated.
- !Escalate to the KEV remediation owner if the host cannot be patched within the CISA BOD 26-04 due date.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Newly created or modified PHP files in the REDCap web root and any edocs or temp directories - >
Web server access-log entries showing POSTs with PHP extensions to upload or data-entry endpoints - >
Child processes (sh/bash/whoami/id) parented to php, php-fpm, or httpd in EDR process telemetry - >
REDCap application logs and database rows referencing an uploaded edoc_id and stored_name
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate REDCap plugin and module uploads and known administrator IPs, then exclude those sources from the PHP-extension match. Tighten the match to the specific upload endpoints used in your deployment and to extensions your web server will actually execute. If request-body capture is unavailable, rely on the correlated EDR shell-spawn rule (elastic_eql and crowdstrike_cql) to confirm true positives and reduce scanner noise.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for bursts of PHP-referencing POSTs against REDCap endpoints from a single source, which can indicate automated exploitation attempts for CVE-2026-90817.
// df00tech DF00-144307ea50 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90817 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csMethod == "POST" | where csUriStem has "redcap" or csUriStem has "edocs" | where csUriQuery has ".php" or csUriStem has ".php" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | where count_ > 5 ``` df00tech DF00-144307ea50 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-90817 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web method=POST (uri_path="*redcap*" OR uri_path="*edocs*") | regex _raw="(?i)\.(php5?|phtml|phar)" | stats count by clientip uri_path | where count > 5 Atomic Red Team Tests
Sends a POST to a lab REDCap upload endpoint with a PHP-extension filename to generate web-log telemetry.
Command
curl -s -X POST 'http://redcap.lab.local/redcap/DataEntry/file_upload.php?pid=1' -F 'file=@/tmp/shell.php;filename=shell.php' -F 'field_name=upload' -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/shell.php; curl -s -X POST 'http://redcap.lab.local/redcap/edocs/delete.php?name=shell.php' -o /dev/null || true Expected Telemetry
Web server access log records a POST to a REDCap upload endpoint with a .php filename reference.
Expected Detection
The kql, spl, qradar_aql, sumo_logic and chronicle_yaral rules match the PHP-extension POST to the REDCap endpoint.
Writes a minimal PHP webshell into a simulated REDCap web root to emulate a post-exploitation file artifact.
Command
printf '<?php system($_GET["c"]); ?>' > /var/www/redcap/edocs/shell.php && echo 'written' Cleanup
rm -f /var/www/redcap/edocs/shell.php Expected Telemetry
File creation event for a .php file under the REDCap edocs directory captured by EDR/FIM.
Expected Detection
Forensic-artifact hunt for new PHP files in edocs surfaces the dropped shell; FIM/EDR file-write alerts fire.
Emulates a web shell executing an OS command by having the PHP interpreter spawn a shell, matching post-exploitation process behavior.
Command
php -r 'system("id; whoami");' Cleanup
echo 'no cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
Process-execution telemetry shows sh/id/whoami with parent process php (or php-fpm).
Expected Detection
The elastic_eql sequence and crowdstrike_cql rules match the shell or recon process spawned by php.