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CVE-2026-88092

CVE-2026-88092 - ASP.NET Core HTTP Request Smuggling / Security Feature Bypass

Initial Access Stealth Last updated:

Detects potential exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-88092, an ASP.NET Core security feature bypass (CWE-444, HTTP request/response smuggling) with CVSS 9.4. Vulnerable Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime packages (8.0.0-8.0.31, 9.0.0-9.0.20, 10.0.0-10.0.12, 11.0.0-preview.1 through 11.0.0-rc.1) inconsistently interpret HTTP message boundaries, allowing an attacker to smuggle requests past front-end security controls (WAF, auth proxies, routing). Exploitation is theoretical at disclosure; detection focuses on inventorying vulnerable runtimes and on HTTP traffic anomalies indicative of request smuggling (ambiguous Content-Length/Transfer-Encoding, duplicated headers, desync-style request pairs).

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Affected Software

Vendor
nuget
Product
Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.linux-arm64, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-arm64, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.linux-musl-x64, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.linux-x64, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.osx-arm64, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.osx-x64, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.win-arm64, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.win-x64, Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.win-x86
Versions
>= 8.0.0, <= 8.0.31, >= 10.0.0, <= 10.0.12, >= 11.0.0-preview.1, <= 11.0.0-rc.1, >= 9.0.0, <= 9.0.20

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
October 13, 2026

CVSS

9.4
Critical (9.0–10)

What is CVE-2026-88092 CVE-2026-88092 - ASP.NET Core HTTP Request Smuggling / Security Feature Bypass?

CVE-2026-88092 - ASP.NET Core HTTP Request Smuggling / Security Feature Bypass (CVE-2026-88092) maps to the Initial Access and Stealth tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2026-88092 - ASP.NET Core HTTP Request Smuggling / Security Feature Bypass, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, IIS Logs. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Stealth
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-d17b1f3c73 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-88092 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Hunt for vulnerable ASP.NET Core runtime inventory and HTTP smuggling indicators
let vulnAssemblies = dynamic(["8.0.0","8.0.31","9.0.0","9.0.20","10.0.0","10.0.12"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where FileName in~ ("Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.dll","aspnetcorev2.dll","Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime.dll")
| extend ver = tostring(parse_version(tostring(AdditionalFields.FileVersion)))
| where isnotempty(ver)
| where (ver startswith "8.0." and toint(split(ver,".")[2]) <= 31)
    or (ver startswith "9.0." and toint(split(ver,".")[2]) <= 20)
    or (ver startswith "10.0." and toint(split(ver,".")[2]) <= 12)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, FileVersion=AdditionalFields.FileVersion, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| union (
  // Request smuggling signal from web logs: ambiguous length framing
  W3CIISLog
  | where csUriStem != "" and (csReferer has "Transfer-Encoding" or scStatus in (400,501))
  | summarize Count=count() by csMethod, csUriStem, cIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
  | where Count > 20
  | project Timestamp=TimeGenerated, DeviceName="IIS", FolderPath=csUriStem, FileName=csMethod, FileVersion=tostring(Count), InitiatingProcessAccountName=cIP
)

Inventories vulnerable ASP.NET Core Kestrel/runtime assemblies on managed devices and flags IIS/front-end HTTP framing anomalies consistent with request smuggling against vulnerable backends.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint IIS Logs

Required Tables

DeviceFileEvents W3CIISLog

False Positives

  • Patched runtime DLLs whose file version string has not refreshed in the inventory cache
  • High-volume legitimate API clients triggering 400/501 responses during schema changes
  • Security scanners and WAF test traffic deliberately probing header framing

Query fingerprint DF00-d17b1f3c73 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for CVE-2026-88092 - ASP.NET Core HTTP Request Smuggling / Security Feature Bypass (CVE-2026-88092) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Enumerate ASP.NET Core runtime versions

    Expected signal: Process execution of dotnet with --list-runtimes; output lines containing Microsoft.AspNetCore.App versions.

  2. Test 2 Send ambiguously-framed HTTP request (CL.TE)

    Expected signal: Web/Kestrel log entry showing both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers; likely 400/501 response.

  3. Test 3 Locate vulnerable Kestrel DLL on Windows host

    Expected signal: DeviceFileEvents/FileWritten access to Kestrel DLL; PowerShell process execution reading file version.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the affected host runs a vulnerable Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime version (8.0.0-8.0.31, 9.0.0-9.0.20, 10.0.0-10.0.12, or 11.0.0-preview.1 to rc.1) via the endpoint inventory query.
  2. Determine whether the host is internet-facing or behind a shared front-end proxy/WAF, since request smuggling impact depends on an intermediary that re-interprets boundaries.
  3. Review web/Kestrel logs for the flagged source IPs for requests containing both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers or duplicated length headers correlated with 400/501 responses.

Containment

  1. Apply the patched runtime (8.0.32 / 9.0.21 / 10.0.13 / 11.0.0-rc.2 or later) and restart the affected Kestrel/IIS services.
  2. If immediate patching is not possible, configure the front-end proxy/WAF to reject requests containing both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length, and normalize/strip ambiguous framing headers.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture full web server and Kestrel request logs for the implicated time window, preserving raw headers and response codes.
  2. Export the endpoint file inventory showing the exact DLL file version and path for chain-of-custody and patch verification.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to IR if smuggled requests correlate with authentication bypass, access to restricted endpoints, or cache poisoning of shared responses.
  • ! Escalate if the vulnerable runtime is confirmed on internet-facing production hosts behind a shared proxy before patching can be completed.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > Kestrel and IIS raw request logs showing conflicting Content-Length/Transfer-Encoding headers
  • > File version metadata of Microsoft.AspNetCore.App.Runtime / Kestrel DLLs on the host
  • > Proxy/WAF logs showing request/response desynchronization or unexpected response pairing

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate intermediaries that legitimately re-chunk traffic and exclude their IPs. Raise the 400/501 count thresholds for high-traffic APIs, and prioritize alerts on hosts confirmed to run vulnerable runtime versions behind a shared front-end proxy. Suppress endpoint-inventory matches once patched versions are confirmed deployed.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for HTTP requests carrying both framing headers or elevated protocol errors against ASP.NET Core/IIS hosts.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-d17b1f3c73 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-88092 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csReferer has "Transfer-Encoding" or scStatus in (400,501) | summarize c=count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated,10m) | where c > 20
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-d17b1f3c73 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-88092 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web sourcetype=iis | regex _raw="(?i)(Transfer-Encoding.*Content-Length|Content-Length.*Transfer-Encoding)" | stats count by c_ip, host

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Enumerate ASP.NET Core runtime versions
linux

List installed .NET/ASP.NET Core runtimes to identify vulnerable versions in a lab host.

Command

bash
dotnet --list-runtimes | grep -i 'Microsoft.AspNetCore.App'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required - read-only enumeration'

Expected Telemetry

Process execution of dotnet with --list-runtimes; output lines containing Microsoft.AspNetCore.App versions.

Expected Detection

Endpoint inventory query flags any listed version within 8.0.0-8.0.31, 9.0.0-9.0.20, or 10.0.0-10.0.12.

Test 2 Send ambiguously-framed HTTP request (CL.TE)
linux

Send a request containing both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers to a lab ASP.NET Core endpoint to simulate a smuggling probe.

Command

bash
printf 'POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: lab.local\r\nContent-Length: 6\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nG' | nc lab.local 80

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required - transient network request'

Expected Telemetry

Web/Kestrel log entry showing both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers; likely 400/501 response.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL framing-anomaly queries flag the dual-header request and protocol-error response.

Test 3 Locate vulnerable Kestrel DLL on Windows host
windows

Find and read the file version of the Kestrel core assembly to confirm exposure.

Command

powershell
Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Program Files\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.AspNetCore.App' -Recurse -Filter 'Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.dll' | ForEach-Object { $_.VersionInfo.FileVersion }

Cleanup

powershell
echo 'no cleanup required - read-only'

Expected Telemetry

DeviceFileEvents/FileWritten access to Kestrel DLL; PowerShell process execution reading file version.

Expected Detection

Endpoint inventory query (KQL/CQL) flags the DLL if its version is within the vulnerable ranges.

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