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CVE-2026-77363

obsidian-tc Loopback HTTP Transport DNS-Rebinding / Missing Origin Validation (CVE-2026-77363)

Initial Access Collection Last updated:

Detects exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-77363, a missing Origin/DNS-rebinding protection flaw (CWE-346, CWE-1385) in the npm package obsidian-tc prior to version 1.3.1. The HTTP transport binds to loopback but does not validate the Origin header or guard against DNS rebinding, allowing a malicious web page the victim visits to issue cross-origin requests to the local obsidian-tc HTTP server and read/write the user's Obsidian vault (drive-by vault access). Detection focuses on local HTTP listeners spawned by Node/Electron processes on loopback ports receiving requests bearing external or mismatched Origin/Host headers, unexpected cross-origin reads of vault contents, and the presence of vulnerable package versions on endpoints. Because no public PoC exists and exploitation is theoretical, detection emphasizes vulnerability-state identification and anomalous loopback access patterns rather than a single known exploit signature.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

What is CVE-2026-77363 obsidian-tc Loopback HTTP Transport DNS-Rebinding / Missing Origin Validation (CVE-2026-77363)?

obsidian-tc Loopback HTTP Transport DNS-Rebinding / Missing Origin Validation (CVE-2026-77363) (CVE-2026-77363) maps to the Initial Access and Collection tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for obsidian-tc Loopback HTTP Transport DNS-Rebinding / Missing Origin Validation (CVE-2026-77363), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceProcessEvents. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Collection
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-e8e9162ee5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-77363 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Detect loopback HTTP requests to a Node/Electron-hosted obsidian-tc server bearing an external or mismatched Origin/Host (DNS-rebinding / cross-origin vault access)
let suspiciousOrigins = dynamic(["http://", "https://"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in ("127.0.0.1", "::1") or LocalIP in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "obsidian.exe", "electron.exe")
| extend ProcCmd = tostring(InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where ProcCmd has "obsidian-tc" or ProcCmd has "obsidian"
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where FileName in~ ("node.exe", "obsidian.exe", "electron.exe")
    | project DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId = ProcessId, VaultProc = ProcessCommandLine
  ) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcCmd, ActionType
| sort by Timestamp desc

Flags loopback-bound HTTP activity initiated by Node/Electron processes associated with obsidian-tc, where a cross-origin browser-driven request may be reaching the local vault server. Pair with web/proxy logs for Origin-header validation.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint DeviceNetworkEvents DeviceProcessEvents

Required Tables

DeviceNetworkEvents DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate Obsidian plugins or local integrations intentionally calling the obsidian-tc loopback API from the same host.
  • Developer testing of obsidian-tc against localhost during plugin development.
  • Local automation or sync tooling that connects to the loopback HTTP transport by design.

Query fingerprint DF00-e8e9162ee5 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for obsidian-tc Loopback HTTP Transport DNS-Rebinding / Missing Origin Validation (CVE-2026-77363) (CVE-2026-77363) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Cross-origin request to obsidian-tc loopback server with spoofed Origin

    Expected signal: Loopback HTTP request event with a non-localhost Origin/Host header toward the obsidian-tc listener.

  2. Test 2 Enumerate vulnerable obsidian-tc version

    Expected signal: Process execution of npm/grep inspecting obsidian-tc version metadata.

  3. Test 3 Simulated DNS-rebinding fetch from browser context

    Expected signal: Node.exe making a loopback HTTP connection carrying a non-localhost Origin header.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the endpoint has obsidian-tc installed and determine the version (`npm ls obsidian-tc` or inspect the plugin's package.json); versions < 1.3.1 are vulnerable.
  2. Determine whether the obsidian-tc HTTP transport was enabled and which loopback port it bound to, and whether that port was reachable during the alert window.
  3. Review captured Origin/Referer and Host headers on requests to the loopback server; any non-localhost Origin or a Host that resolves externally indicates a DNS-rebinding / cross-origin attempt.
  4. Correlate with the user's browser history around the alert time to identify a web page that could have initiated drive-by requests to localhost.

Containment

  1. Disable the obsidian-tc HTTP transport or stop the local server until the package is upgraded.
  2. Upgrade obsidian-tc to version 1.3.1 or later, which adds Origin validation and DNS-rebinding protection.
  3. If vault exposure is suspected, restrict loopback service access via host firewall rules pending remediation.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve HTTP/proxy and packet-capture logs showing requests to the loopback port, including full Origin, Referer and Host headers.
  2. Collect the obsidian-tc version, configuration, and any server access logs that record cross-origin requests.
  3. Capture browser history and any suspicious page content/JavaScript that may have performed the rebinding attack.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate if requests with a non-localhost Origin successfully read or wrote vault files (evidence of actual data access).
  • ! Escalate if the same cross-origin access pattern appears across multiple users or endpoints, suggesting a targeted campaign.
  • ! Escalate to IR if sensitive vault contents are confirmed exfiltrated to an external destination.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > obsidian-tc version and configuration (package.json / plugin manifest).
  • > HTTP server access logs and proxy/packet captures containing Origin and Host headers for loopback requests.
  • > Browser history and cache entries for the page that triggered the drive-by request.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the legitimate local clients and Origin values that normally interact with the obsidian-tc loopback API, then alert only on Origin/Host headers outside that allowlist. Reduce noise by scoping to hosts where obsidian-tc < 1.3.1 is actually installed, and by requiring a non-localhost Origin or an externally-resolving Host rather than merely any loopback traffic.


Hunting Queries

Surfaces loopback obsidian-tc listeners and any cross-origin requests reaching them, for retrospective hunting across the fleet.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-e8e9162ee5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-77363 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceNetworkEvents | where (RemoteIP in ("127.0.0.1", "::1") or LocalIP in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")) | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "obsidian.exe", "electron.exe") | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "obsidian-tc" | summarize count() by DeviceName, LocalPort, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-e8e9162ee5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-77363 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web OR index=proxy (dest_ip="127.0.0.1" OR dest="localhost") uri_path="*obsidian*" | regex origin!="^https?:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)" | stats count by src_ip origin uri_path

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Cross-origin request to obsidian-tc loopback server with spoofed Origin
linux

Simulates a drive-by / DNS-rebinding request by sending an HTTP request to the local obsidian-tc port with an external Origin header.

Command

bash
curl -s -H 'Origin: http://evil.example.com' -H 'Host: attacker.rebind.example' http://127.0.0.1:27123/vault/ -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No persistent artifacts created by this test'

Expected Telemetry

Loopback HTTP request event with a non-localhost Origin/Host header toward the obsidian-tc listener.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/network rules flag the cross-origin loopback request to the obsidian-tc port.

Test 2 Enumerate vulnerable obsidian-tc version
linux

Detects presence of a vulnerable obsidian-tc version on the endpoint.

Command

bash
npm ls obsidian-tc 2>/dev/null || grep -R '"obsidian-tc"' ~/.config/obsidian 2>/dev/null

Cleanup

bash
echo 'Read-only enumeration; nothing to clean up'

Expected Telemetry

Process execution of npm/grep inspecting obsidian-tc version metadata.

Expected Detection

Vulnerability-state identification of obsidian-tc < 1.3.1.

Test 3 Simulated DNS-rebinding fetch from browser context
windows

Runs a Node one-liner that issues a cross-origin fetch to the loopback transport as a browser-driven attack would, verifying missing Origin enforcement.

Command

powershell
node -e "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:27123/vault/',{headers:{Origin:'http://malicious.rebind.test'}}).then(r=>console.log(r.status)).catch(e=>console.log(e.message))"

Cleanup

powershell
echo No cleanup required

Expected Telemetry

Node.exe making a loopback HTTP connection carrying a non-localhost Origin header.

Expected Detection

EDR/network correlation of Node-initiated loopback request with spoofed Origin to obsidian-tc.

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