Flyto2 Core Arbitrary File Write via Unguarded data.*/file.* Modules (CVE-2026-77312)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-77312, a critical (CVSS 10.0) path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the pip package flyto-core (<= 2.26.7). The vulnerability is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-67429: the data.* and file.* modules fail to sanitise attacker-controlled destination paths, allowing '..' sequences or absolute paths to write arbitrary files outside the intended directory. Successful exploitation enables webshell drops, cron/systemd persistence, SSH key injection, or overwrite of application code leading to remote code execution. Detection focuses on Python processes loading flyto-core writing files to sensitive paths, traversal patterns in request bodies to flyto endpoints, and newly created executable/config files by the application service account.
Vulnerability Intelligence
Public PoCAffected Software
- Vendor
- pip
- Product
- flyto-core
- Versions
- <= 2.26.7
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 20, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-77312 Flyto2 Core Arbitrary File Write via Unguarded data.*/file.* Modules (CVE-2026-77312)?
Flyto2 Core Arbitrary File Write via Unguarded data.*/file.* Modules (CVE-2026-77312) (CVE-2026-77312) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Persistence tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Flyto2 Core Arbitrary File Write via Unguarded data.*/file.* Modules (CVE-2026-77312), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution Persistence
// df00tech DF00-9b5c572b8d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-77312 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let sensitivePaths = dynamic(["/etc/cron", "/etc/systemd", "/var/www", "/.ssh/", "authorized_keys", "/usr/lib/python", "site-packages", "wwwroot", "\\startup\\"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("python", "python3", "gunicorn", "uwsgi", "uvicorn") or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "flyto"
| where (FolderPath has_any (sensitivePaths)) or (FolderPath has "..")
| where FileName endswith ".py" or FileName endswith ".sh" or FileName endswith ".php" or FileName endswith ".jsp" or FileName endswith ".service" or FileName has "authorized_keys" or FileName endswith ".aspx"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessId
| order by Timestamp desc Flags file create/modify events by Python/WSGI processes running flyto-core that land in sensitive OS, web-root, SSH or python-package paths, or whose path contains traversal sequences.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate flyto-core data export jobs writing to a configured output directory
- Application deployment or package upgrade processes writing to site-packages
- Backup or sync agents impersonating the service account
Query fingerprint DF00-9b5c572b8d · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Flyto2 Core Arbitrary File Write via Unguarded data.*/file.* Modules (CVE-2026-77312) (CVE-2026-77312) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-77312
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Simulated path traversal file write via flyto-core file module
Expected signal: File creation event for /tmp/flyto_poc_shell.php with initiating process python3 and a path containing '..'.
- Test 2 Cron persistence via flyto-core arbitrary write
Expected signal: File creation under /etc/cron.d by a python3 process.
- Test 3 SSH key injection via traversal write
Expected signal: File modification of /root/.ssh/authorized_keys by a python3 process.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the affected host runs flyto-core and determine its version with `pip show flyto-core`; any version <= 2.26.7 is vulnerable.
- Review the written file identified in the alert: inspect path, owner, timestamps and contents for webshell, persistence or key-injection indicators.
- Correlate the file write with inbound HTTP requests to flyto data.* / file.* endpoints in the same time window, looking for '..', URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e) or absolute destination paths in request bodies.
- Determine whether the written file was subsequently executed or loaded (process spawn, cron fire, service start, SSH auth using the dropped key).
Containment
- Isolate the affected host from the network to prevent webshell interaction or lateral movement.
- Upgrade flyto-core to 2.26.8 or later; if immediate patching is impossible, restrict the data.*/file.* endpoints at the reverse proxy/WAF and run the service as an unprivileged user with a read-only code directory.
- Remove or quarantine any attacker-dropped files (webshells, cron entries, systemd units, authorized_keys additions).
Evidence Collection
- Preserve the dropped file(s), auditd/Sysmon file-event records, and the flyto-core application/access logs covering the write.
- Capture the full HTTP request that triggered the write, including headers and body, from the web server or WAF logs.
- Snapshot process listings, cron tables, systemd units, and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys for the service account before remediation.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to IR if the dropped file was executed, a webshell responded, or a reverse shell/outbound C2 was observed.
- ! Escalate if traversal reached system-critical paths (/etc, site-packages, SSH keys) or if multiple hosts show the same pattern indicating active campaign exploitation.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Newly created or modified files with mismatched owner/timestamp in web root, /etc/cron*, /etc/systemd, site-packages or ~/.ssh. - >
flyto-core application logs containing data.*/file.* calls with traversal or absolute destination paths. - >
Web server access logs showing requests with %2e%2e or absolute paths to flyto endpoints.
Tuning Guidance
Baseline the legitimate output directories that flyto-core data export jobs write to and exclude those exact paths while keeping traversal ('..') and sensitive-path matches active. Scope the process list to the actual WSGI server used in your environment to cut noise, and whitelist your deployment pipeline's service account when it writes to the code directory on release.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for flyto-core traversal file writes and inbound traversal requests to flyto endpoints across endpoint and web telemetry.
// df00tech DF00-9b5c572b8d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-77312 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("python","python3","gunicorn","uwsgi") | where FolderPath has ".." or FolderPath has_any ("/etc/cron","authorized_keys","site-packages") | summarize count() by DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, bin(Timestamp, 1h) ``` df00tech DF00-9b5c572b8d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-77312 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web sourcetype=*access* uri="*flyto*" (uri="*..*" OR uri="*%2e%2e*" OR form_data="*../*") | stats count by src_ip, uri, status Atomic Red Team Tests
Emulates the vulnerable file.* module writing an attacker-controlled path containing traversal to drop a marker file outside the intended directory.
Command
mkdir -p /tmp/flyto_data && cd /tmp/flyto_data && python3 -c "dest='../../../../tmp/flyto_poc_shell.php'; open(dest,'w').write('<?php echo \"poc\"; ?>'); print('wrote', dest)" Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/flyto_poc_shell.php; rm -rf /tmp/flyto_data Expected Telemetry
File creation event for /tmp/flyto_poc_shell.php with initiating process python3 and a path containing '..'.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules match on python3 writing a .php file with traversal in the path.
Simulates abusing the traversal write to drop a cron job for persistence.
Command
python3 -c "open('/etc/cron.d/flyto_poc','w').write('* * * * * root /bin/true\n')" Cleanup
rm -f /etc/cron.d/flyto_poc Expected Telemetry
File creation under /etc/cron.d by a python3 process.
Expected Detection
Detection fires on python-initiated write to /etc/cron* sensitive path.
Simulates writing to authorized_keys via the unguarded file module to enable persistent access.
Command
mkdir -p /root/.ssh && python3 -c "open('/root/.ssh/authorized_keys','a').write('ssh-ed25519 AAAATESTPOCKEY poc@attacker\n')" Cleanup
sed -i '/poc@attacker/d' /root/.ssh/authorized_keys Expected Telemetry
File modification of /root/.ssh/authorized_keys by a python3 process.
Expected Detection
Rules match on python writing/modifying an authorized_keys file.
Related Detections
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040