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CVE-2026-68791

Azure Machine Learning Incorrect Authorization Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-68791)

Discovery Collection Credential Access Last updated:

Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-68791, a critical (CVSS 10.0) incorrect authorization flaw (CWE-863) in Azure Machine Learning that allows an unauthorized remote attacker to disclose information over a network. Detection focuses on anomalous access to Azure ML workspace resources, data-plane API calls returning data to unexpected principals, cross-tenant or unauthenticated access patterns, and bulk retrieval of model artifacts, datastores, and compute secrets without corresponding RBAC role assignments. Because the flaw is a server-side authorization bypass, detection relies on Azure Monitor / activity and diagnostic logs showing successful reads from principals lacking appropriate permissions.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Affected Software

Vendor
microsoft
Product
azure_machine_learning

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
September 17, 2026

CVSS

10.0
Critical (9.0–10)

What is CVE-2026-68791 Azure Machine Learning Incorrect Authorization Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-68791)?

Azure Machine Learning Incorrect Authorization Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-68791) (CVE-2026-68791) maps to the Discovery and Collection and Credential Access tactics — the adversary is trying to figure out your environment in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Azure Machine Learning Incorrect Authorization Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-68791), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Azure Monitor Diagnostic Logs, Azure Activity Logs, Microsoft Defender for Cloud. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Discovery Collection Credential Access
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-6882a24dd9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-68791 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Azure ML workspace data-plane reads by principals without a workspace RBAC assignment
let lookback = 7d;
let knownAssignees = AzureActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where OperationNameValue has "Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write"
| where _ResourceId has "/providers/Microsoft.MachineLearningServices/workspaces/"
| extend assignee = tostring(parse_json(Properties_d).requestbody)
| summarize by Caller;
AzureDiagnostics
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where ResourceProvider == "MICROSOFT.MACHINELEARNINGSERVICES"
| where OperationName has_any ("DataStore", "Model", "Dataset", "Workspace", "ListKeys", "ListSecrets", "Download", "Read")
| where ResultType == "Success" or ResultSignature startswith "200"
| extend caller = coalesce(column_ifexists("identity_claim_appid_g", ""), column_ifexists("CallerIPAddress", ""))
| where isnotempty(caller) and caller !in (knownAssignees)
| summarize count(), reads = make_set(OperationName, 20), ips = make_set(CallerIPAddress, 10) by caller, Resource, _ResourceId, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where count_ > 10
| sort by count_ desc

Finds successful Azure ML data-plane read/list operations (datastores, models, datasets, keys) from callers that do not appear in recent workspace role-assignment events, indicating possible authorization-bypass data disclosure.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Azure Monitor Diagnostic Logs Azure Activity Logs Microsoft Defender for Cloud

Required Tables

AzureDiagnostics AzureActivity

False Positives

  • Automation service principals or managed identities with workspace access granted outside the observed role-assignment window (e.g. inherited from a parent scope).
  • Data scientists performing legitimate high-volume dataset or model downloads during training runs.
  • CI/CD pipelines (Azure DevOps / GitHub Actions) enumerating ML artifacts for deployment.

Query fingerprint DF00-6882a24dd9 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Azure Machine Learning Incorrect Authorization Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-68791) (CVE-2026-68791) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: azure

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Enumerate Azure ML workspace datastores via REST

    Expected signal: AzureDiagnostics event with OperationName containing 'DataStore' and a List/Read action from the executing principal.

  2. Test 2 Retrieve datastore secrets (ListKeys/ListSecrets)

    Expected signal: AzureDiagnostics event with OperationName containing 'ListSecrets' and ResultType Success.

  3. Test 3 Bulk model artifact download

    Expected signal: Multiple AzureDiagnostics 'Model' Download events within a short window from one principal.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the calling principal (appId/objectId) and source IP from the alert, then check Azure AD sign-in and audit logs to determine whether the identity is a known managed identity, service principal, or external/unknown actor.
  2. Enumerate the actual Azure RBAC role assignments on the affected ML workspace and its scope chain; confirm whether the principal legitimately holds read permissions (Reader, AzureML Data Scientist, etc.) or accessed data without an entitlement.
  3. Review the specific operations performed (ListKeys, ListSecrets, datastore/model Download) and the resources touched to assess the sensitivity and volume of data potentially disclosed.
  4. Determine whether the access originated from an unexpected tenant, IP range, or geography inconsistent with normal workspace usage.

Containment

  1. Apply or tighten RBAC: remove any erroneous assignments and, if an unauthorized principal is confirmed, disable or delete the service principal / revoke its credentials.
  2. Rotate any secrets, datastore access keys, and storage account keys exposed via ListKeys/ListSecrets operations, and restrict workspace network access with Private Endpoint / IP allowlists.
  3. If exploitation is confirmed and patch status is unknown, place the workspace behind a managed VNet and block public data-plane access pending Microsoft remediation guidance.

Evidence Collection

  1. Export AzureDiagnostics and AzureActivity records for the affected workspace covering the attack window, preserving operationName, caller, callerIPAddress, resultType and resourceId fields.
  2. Capture Azure AD sign-in/audit logs for the implicated principal and snapshot the current RBAC role-assignment state of the workspace and parent scopes.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if secrets or datastore keys were retrieved (ListKeys/ListSecrets success) or if the principal is confirmed unauthorized/external.
  • ! Escalate to the cloud security and data governance teams if sensitive training data, models, or customer datasets were downloaded, triggering breach-notification assessment.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > AzureDiagnostics entries for MICROSOFT.MACHINELEARNINGSERVICES with caller, operationName and resultType.
  • > Azure AD sign-in logs and service-principal credential usage for the implicated principal.
  • > Workspace RBAC role-assignment history and Activity Log roleAssignments events.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the set of managed identities and service principals that routinely access each ML workspace and exclude them from the unexpected-principal logic. Adjust the reads>10 threshold to match legitimate training-job download volumes in your environment, and prioritise alerts involving ListKeys/ListSecrets or access from IPs outside your corporate/VNet ranges.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for successful secret/key enumeration against Azure ML workspaces, the highest-impact variant of the disclosure.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-6882a24dd9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-68791 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
AzureDiagnostics | where ResourceProvider == "MICROSOFT.MACHINELEARNINGSERVICES" | where OperationName has_any ("ListKeys","ListSecrets") | where ResultType == "Success" | summarize count() by CallerIPAddress, OperationName, _ResourceId, bin(TimeGenerated,1h) | sort by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-6882a24dd9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-68791 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=azure ResourceProvider="MICROSOFT.MACHINELEARNINGSERVICES" (operationName="*ListKeys*" OR operationName="*ListSecrets*") resultType=Success | stats count by callerIpAddress operationName resourceId

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Enumerate Azure ML workspace datastores via REST
linux

Simulates reconnaissance of ML datastores using the management API; in a lab, run with and without appropriate RBAC to validate telemetry.

Command

bash
az ml datastore list --workspace-name lab-mlws --resource-group lab-rg -o table

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No state change; read-only enumeration.'

Expected Telemetry

AzureDiagnostics event with OperationName containing 'DataStore' and a List/Read action from the executing principal.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rule records the list operation; correlation fires if followed by downloads.

Test 2 Retrieve datastore secrets (ListKeys/ListSecrets)
linux

Attempts to list datastore credentials, the key disclosure behaviour of CVE-2026-68791.

Command

bash
az rest --method post --url "https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$SUB/resourceGroups/lab-rg/providers/Microsoft.MachineLearningServices/workspaces/lab-mlws/datastores/default/listSecrets?api-version=2023-10-01"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'Read-only; rotate any keys retrieved in production labs.'

Expected Telemetry

AzureDiagnostics event with OperationName containing 'ListSecrets' and ResultType Success.

Expected Detection

Hunting query for ListKeys/ListSecrets fires on successful secret retrieval.

Test 3 Bulk model artifact download
windows

Downloads multiple registered models to simulate bulk data disclosure.

Command

powershell
for ($i=1; $i -le 15; $i++) { az ml model download --name testmodel$i --version 1 --workspace-name lab-mlws --resource-group lab-rg --download-path C:\temp\models }

Cleanup

powershell
Remove-Item -Recurse -Force C:\temp\models

Expected Telemetry

Multiple AzureDiagnostics 'Model' Download events within a short window from one principal.

Expected Detection

reads>10 threshold in the KQL/SPL/CQL rules triggers on the bulk-download volume.

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