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CVE-2026-52889

Formie Hidden Field Default Server-Side Template Injection (CVE-2026-52889)

Initial Access Execution Last updated:

Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-52889, a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI, CWE-1336) vulnerability in the Formie plugin (verbb/formie) for Craft CMS. The vulnerability exists in how Formie processes 'default value' expressions for Hidden form fields, allowing an unauthenticated or low-privileged attacker to inject Twig template syntax that is evaluated server-side, potentially leading to remote code execution. Affects verbb/formie < 3.1.27. Detection focuses on Twig/Craft template injection payload patterns in form submission requests, anomalous POST bodies to Formie submission endpoints, and resulting web shell / RCE indicators (process spawning from PHP-FPM/Craft, outbound connections, file writes to web root).

Vulnerability Intelligence

Public PoC

Affected Software

Vendor
composer
Product
verbb/formie
Versions
< 3.1.27

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
July 6, 2026

CVSS

9.8
Critical (9.0–10)

CVSS vector not yet published

Read the write-up →

What is CVE-2026-52889 Formie Hidden Field Default Server-Side Template Injection (CVE-2026-52889)?

Formie Hidden Field Default Server-Side Template Injection (CVE-2026-52889) (CVE-2026-52889) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Formie Hidden Field Default Server-Side Template Injection (CVE-2026-52889), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: W3CIISLog, AzureDiagnostics (Application Gateway WAF). The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
let SSTIPatterns = dynamic(['{{', '}}', '{%', 'system(', 'exec(', 'passthru(', '_self.env', 'getFilter', 'RCE', 'file_get_contents', 'proc_open']);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any ("/actions/formie", "/formie/", "/submit")
| where csMethod == "POST"
| extend DecodedQuery = url_decode(csUriQuery)
| where DecodedQuery has_any (SSTIPatterns) or csUriQuery has_any (SSTIPatterns)
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csUriStem, csUriQuery, csUserAgent, scStatus
| union (
  AzureDiagnostics
  | where Category == "ApplicationGatewayFirewallLog"
  | where requestUri_s has_any ("/actions/formie", "/formie/")
  | where details_data_s has_any (SSTIPatterns)
  | project TimeGenerated, cIP=clientIp_s, csUriStem=requestUri_s, csUriQuery=details_data_s, csUserAgent="", scStatus=toint(0)
)
| summarize AttemptCount = count(), Payloads = make_set(csUriQuery, 10) by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
| where AttemptCount >= 1

Detects HTTP POST requests to Formie form submission endpoints containing Twig/PHP SSTI payload markers indicative of CVE-2026-52889 exploitation attempts.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

W3CIISLog AzureDiagnostics (Application Gateway WAF)

Required Tables

W3CIISLog AzureDiagnostics

False Positives

  • Security scanners or QA fuzz testing legitimately probing form fields with template-like strings
  • Legitimate Formie users pasting Twig-like documentation examples into free-text fields
  • Automated vulnerability scanners (e.g. Burp, Nuclei) run by the organization's own red team

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for Formie Hidden Field Default Server-Side Template Injection (CVE-2026-52889) (CVE-2026-52889) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: azure

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Formie Hidden Field SSTI Payload Submission

    Expected signal: Web server access log entry recording a POST to /actions/formie/submissions/submit containing the Twig SSTI payload string in the request body.

  2. Test 2Formie SSTI to Command Execution Simulation

    Expected signal: EDR/auditd process creation events showing 'bash' spawned as a child of a process running under the www-data (or equivalent web server) user, executing 'id', 'whoami', and 'uname -a'.

  3. Test 3Formie Malicious Webshell Drop Simulation

    Expected signal: File integrity monitoring / EDR file-creation event for a new .php file written under the web root by the web server process user shortly after a Formie form submission.

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