Detect Nx Console Embedded Malicious Code Execution (CVE-2026-48027) in Elastic Security
CVE-2026-48027 describes an embedded malicious code vulnerability (CWE-506) in Nx Console, a popular VS Code and JetBrains IDE extension for managing Nx monorepos. A compromised or trojanized version of Nx Console contains backdoored code that executes at extension load time within the developer IDE process, enabling attacker-controlled behavior including credential harvesting, reverse shells, or supply chain lateral movement into CI/CD pipelines. This vulnerability is listed in CISA KEV, indicating active exploitation in the wild. Detection focuses on anomalous process spawning from IDE extension host processes, unexpected network connections originating from VS Code or JetBrains runtimes, and suspicious file writes consistent with embedded malicious payloads.
MITRE ATT&CK
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.name, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=30s
[process where event.type == "start"
and process.parent.name : ("code", "code-insiders", "webstorm", "idea64", "rider")
and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "bash", "sh", "python*", "curl", "wget", "certutil.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "nc", "ncat", "socat")]
[any where event.category : ("network", "file")
and (
(event.category == "network" and network.direction : ("outbound", "egress") and not destination.ip : ("127.0.0.0/8", "::1", "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"))
or
(event.category == "file" and file.path : ("/tmp/*", "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*", "/var/tmp/*") and file.extension : ("sh", "ps1", "py", "exe", "elf"))
)]EQL sequence detection correlating IDE extension host process spawning a suspicious interpreter or network utility, followed within 30 seconds by an outbound network connection or suspicious file drop — consistent with Nx Console backdoor execution (CVE-2026-48027).
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Developers running nx serve or nx build commands that open external browser tabs or dev servers
- Extension-managed Node processes downloading packages from npm registry
- Legitimate outbound connections to Nx Cloud APIs during workspace sync
- CI-mode local builds that write build artifacts to temp directories
Other platforms for CVE-2026-48027
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Nx Console Extension Host Spawning Reverse Shell (Windows)
Expected signal: DeviceProcessEvents: powershell.exe spawned with parent chain including node.exe or code.exe; DeviceNetworkEvents: TCP connect attempt to 127.0.0.1:9999
- Test 2Simulate Nx Console Extension Credential File Exfiltration (Linux/macOS)
Expected signal: Process creation event: bash spawned with cat and curl in command line; Network event: HTTP POST to 127.0.0.1:8181 from bash process; File access events on .npmrc and .gitconfig
- Test 3Drop and Execute Malicious Script from Temp Directory (macOS)
Expected signal: Process events: node.exe spawning sh executing a script from /tmp; File creation events for /tmp/nx_test_payload.sh and /tmp/nx_beacon.txt with initiating process node
- Test 4Nx Console VSIX Backdoor Package Installation Simulation
Expected signal: File system events showing creation of extension directory and package.json under .vscode/extensions; if extension activated, bash process spawned from VS Code extension host
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