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CVE-2026-44267

Elo JavaScript Emitter Sandbox Escape via `.constructor` Access (CVE-2026-44267)

Execution Initial Access Last updated:

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-44267, a sandbox escape in the @enspirit/elo npm package (versions <= 1.0.0). Elo's JavaScript emitter does not filter `.constructor` member access on user-controlled expressions, allowing an attacker to reach `Function`/`process` and achieve arbitrary Node.js or browser code execution (CWE-94, CWE-693, CWE-1336). Detection focuses on dependency inventory of the vulnerable package, template/expression payloads containing `constructor` chains, and post-exploitation process/network behavior spawned from a Node.js runtime hosting Elo.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Public PoC

Affected Software

Vendor
npm
Product
@enspirit/elo
Versions
<= 1.0.0

Timeline

Disclosed
November 3, 2026

CVSS

9.8
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

What is CVE-2026-44267 Elo JavaScript Emitter Sandbox Escape via `.constructor` Access (CVE-2026-44267)?

Elo JavaScript Emitter Sandbox Escape via `.constructor` Access (CVE-2026-44267) (CVE-2026-44267) maps to the Execution and Initial Access tactics — the adversary is trying to run malicious code or instructions on a system in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Elo JavaScript Emitter Sandbox Escape via `.constructor` Access (CVE-2026-44267), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS Logs, App Service HTTP Logs, Syslog. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Execution Initial Access
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-b7b8bed07c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-44267 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Detect Elo expression payloads reaching .constructor (sandbox escape) in HTTP/app logs
let escapePatterns = dynamic(["constructor","process.mainModule","child_process","Function(","require("]);
union isfuzzy=true W3CIISLog, AppServiceHTTPLogs, Syslog
| extend Payload = coalesce(column_ifexists("csUriQuery", ""), column_ifexists("CsUriQuery",""), column_ifexists("SyslogMessage",""), column_ifexists("Message",""))
| where isnotempty(Payload)
| extend DecodedPayload = url_decode(Payload)
| where DecodedPayload has "constructor" and (DecodedPayload has_any ("process","child_process","require","Function","globalThis"))
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP = coalesce(column_ifexists("cIP",""), column_ifexists("CIp","")), Payload, DecodedPayload, _ResourceId = column_ifexists("_ResourceId","")
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Flags HTTP requests or application logs where an Elo expression/template payload references `.constructor` combined with Node.js escape primitives (process, child_process, require, Function), indicating an attempt to exploit the unfiltered member access.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

IIS Logs App Service HTTP Logs Syslog

Required Tables

W3CIISLog AppServiceHTTPLogs Syslog

False Positives

  • Legitimate application code or templates that intentionally reference `.constructor` for metaprogramming.
  • Security scanners and vulnerability-assessment tools probing the application.
  • Developer debugging traffic containing JavaScript source in request bodies.

Query fingerprint DF00-b7b8bed07c · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Elo JavaScript Emitter Sandbox Escape via `.constructor` Access (CVE-2026-44267) (CVE-2026-44267) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Elo constructor sandbox escape to code execution (Node)

    Expected signal: Node.js process start with an inline `-e` command line containing `constructor`.

  2. Test 2 Shell spawned via Elo-style constructor escape

    Expected signal: Node.js parent process spawning /bin/sh or id with child_process in the command line.

  3. Test 3 HTTP payload carrying constructor escape

    Expected signal: Web access log entry containing an encoded `.constructor` expression with `process`.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm whether the affected host or application bundles @enspirit/elo at version <= 1.0.0 by inspecting package-lock.json / node_modules / SBOM.
  2. Decode and examine the flagged payload to determine whether `.constructor` was chained to `Function`, `process`, or `require` reaching real code execution versus a benign reference.
  3. Correlate the request with the hosting Node.js process timeline to identify any child processes, outbound connections, or file writes spawned immediately after.

Containment

  1. Upgrade or remove @enspirit/elo to a fixed version above 1.0.0, or disable the emitter path that evaluates untrusted expressions.
  2. Isolate the affected host from the network if post-exploitation child processes or outbound C2 connections are confirmed.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the full raw request/payload, application logs, and the node process command line and environment.
  2. Collect process-creation telemetry (parent=node) and any files written or scripts fetched during the suspect window.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to IR if a shell or interpreter was spawned as a child of the Node.js process hosting Elo.
  • ! Escalate if outbound connections to unknown infrastructure or credential/secret access follow the suspect expression evaluation.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > Node.js process command line and child-process tree.
  • > Web/application access logs containing the `.constructor` payload.
  • > package-lock.json / node_modules showing @enspirit/elo <= 1.0.0.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate uses of `.constructor` in your application's templates and exclude known-good expression sources. Pair payload matches with process-creation telemetry (shell child of node) to raise confidence before alerting, and suppress traffic from authorized scanners by source IP.


Hunting Queries

Hunts application/syslog output for Elo expression evaluation reaching Node.js execution primitives.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-b7b8bed07c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-44267 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
Syslog | where SyslogMessage has "constructor" and SyslogMessage has_any ("child_process","process.mainModule","require(") | project TimeGenerated, Computer, SyslogMessage
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-b7b8bed07c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-44267 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* sourcetype=syslog constructor (child_process OR process.mainModule OR "require(") | table _time host _raw

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Elo constructor sandbox escape to code execution (Node)
linux

Simulates the Elo emitter evaluating an untrusted expression that uses `.constructor` to reach Function and execute code.

Command

bash
node -e "const p='x'; const r=({}).constructor.constructor('return process')(); console.log(r.version);"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Node.js process start with an inline `-e` command line containing `constructor`.

Expected Detection

Process/command-line detections and payload rules match the `.constructor.constructor` chain.

Test 2 Shell spawned via Elo-style constructor escape
linux

Uses the constructor chain to spawn a child shell, emulating post-exploitation command execution.

Command

bash
node -e "({}).constructor.constructor('return this.process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id');"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Node.js parent process spawning /bin/sh or id with child_process in the command line.

Expected Detection

EQL/CQL process-lineage rules flag a shell child of node.

Test 3 HTTP payload carrying constructor escape
linux

Sends an HTTP request whose parameter contains an Elo expression using `.constructor` and process primitives.

Command

bash
curl -s 'http://localhost:8080/render?expr=%7B%7B%28%29.constructor.constructor%28%22return+process%22%29%28%29%7D%7D' || true

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Web access log entry containing an encoded `.constructor` expression with `process`.

Expected Detection

Web-log payload rules (KQL/SPL/QRadar/Sumo/Chronicle) match the decoded constructor+process payload.

Related Detections

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