IBM API Connect Path Traversal RCE (CVE-2026-17147)
Detects exploitation attempts against IBM API Connect path traversal vulnerability CVE-2026-17147 (CWE-22, CVSS 9.9). Affected versions 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 allow a remote authenticated attacker to traverse directories, write/read arbitrary files and execute arbitrary code, performing unauthorized actions on the API management plane. Detection focuses on traversal sequences in authenticated HTTP requests to API Connect management/provider endpoints and anomalous file writes/process launches by the API Connect service account.
Vulnerability Intelligence
TheoreticalAffected Software
- Vendor
- ibm
- Product
- api_connect
- Versions
- >= 10.0.8.0, < 10.0.8.13, >= 12.1.0.0, < 12.1.1.3
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 7, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-17147 IBM API Connect Path Traversal RCE (CVE-2026-17147)?
IBM API Connect Path Traversal RCE (CVE-2026-17147) (CVE-2026-17147) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for IBM API Connect Path Traversal RCE (CVE-2026-17147), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Sentinel, IIS Logs, Web Proxy. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
// df00tech DF00-559b36cf56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17147 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let traversal = dynamic(["../","..%2f","%2e%2e%2f","..%5c","%2e%2e/","....//","%252e%252e%252f"]);
let apcPaths = dynamic(["/api/","/consumer-api/","/cloud/","/analytics/","/v1/","/provider/"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (apcPaths)
| extend decoded = tolower(strcat(csUriStem, "?", coalesce(csUriQuery, "")))
| where decoded has_any (traversal)
| where scStatus in (200, 201, 500, 207)
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csMethod, csUriStem, csUriQuery, scStatus, csUserName, sSiteName, _ResourceId
| order by TimeGenerated desc IIS/reverse-proxy logs showing path-traversal sequences against IBM API Connect management and provider API routes by an authenticated user.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Security scanners (Qualys, Tenable, Burp) probing the API Connect host during authorized assessments
- Legitimate API payloads that URL-encode path-like parameters (e.g. file names with dots)
- Backup or migration tooling issuing relative paths through the management API
Query fingerprint DF00-559b36cf56 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for IBM API Connect Path Traversal RCE (CVE-2026-17147) (CVE-2026-17147) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-17147
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Basic path traversal against API Connect API route
Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry with traversal sequence in URI toward /api/ route and an authenticated user.
- Test 2 URL-encoded traversal sequence
Expected signal: Access log with %2e%2e%2f encoded sequence against /consumer-api/.
- Test 3 Double-encoded traversal variant
Expected signal: Web log entry containing %252e%252e%252f against /provider/ route.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the target host runs IBM API Connect at an affected version (10.0.8.0-10.0.8.12 or 12.1.0.0-12.1.1.2) and has not been patched to 10.0.8.13 / 12.1.1.3.
- Review the full request/response for the flagged event: decode the URL, identify the targeted file path after traversal, and note whether the response code indicates success (200/201/207).
- Correlate the authenticated username and source IP against normal API Connect administrative/provider usage and recent sign-in activity to determine if credentials were abused.
- Check for follow-on activity from the same session: unexpected file writes, config changes, or new process execution by the API Connect service account.
Containment
- Block the offending source IP at the reverse proxy / WAF and revoke or reset the authenticated account's credentials and API tokens used in the request.
- Apply the IBM fix (upgrade to 10.0.8.13 or 12.1.1.3) or isolate the appliance from untrusted networks if patching cannot be immediate.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve web/reverse-proxy access logs, API Connect management logs, and the raw HTTP requests/responses for the affected timeframe.
- Capture a forensic copy of files written or modified under the API Connect installation and any new/modified scheduled tasks or service binaries.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if a traversal request returned success and evidence of arbitrary file write or process execution by the service account is found.
- ! Escalate to management and IBM support if the management plane shows unauthorized configuration changes, created accounts, or lateral movement from the appliance.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Reverse-proxy and IIS/Apache access logs containing encoded traversal sequences - >
API Connect management and datapower/gateway logs showing file access or config changes - >
Newly created or modified files under the API Connect install path and service-account process execution records
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate scanner source IPs and authorized assessment windows and exclude them. Tighten the URI allow-list to the exact API Connect management/provider route prefixes in your deployment. If the proxy normalizes URLs before logging, apply the detection at the edge device that sees raw requests to avoid missing double-encoded payloads.
Hunting Queries
Surface clusters of traversal attempts per source/user against API Connect over time to distinguish scanning from targeted exploitation.
// df00tech DF00-559b36cf56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17147 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "/api/" | extend d = tolower(strcat(csUriStem, csUriQuery)) | where d matches regex @"(\.\.(%2f|/|%5c)|%2e%2e)" | summarize count() by cIP, csUserName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) ``` df00tech DF00-559b36cf56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17147 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype=iis OR sourcetype=httpd:access) uri_path="*/api/*" | eval d=lower(uri_path.uri_query) | where match(d,"\.\.(%2f|/|%5c)|%2e%2e") | stats count by src_ip, user Atomic Red Team Tests
Send an authenticated request containing a relative traversal sequence to a management API path in a lab appliance.
Command
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "https://apic-lab.local/api/cloud/../../../../etc/passwd" Cleanup
echo 'No persistent change; clear test request from load balancer logs if required.' Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy log entry with traversal sequence in URI toward /api/ route and an authenticated user.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules match on traversal pattern within API Connect path.
Issue a request using percent-encoded traversal to test decoding coverage.
Command
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "https://apic-lab.local/consumer-api/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd" Cleanup
echo 'No persistent change.' Expected Telemetry
Access log with %2e%2e%2f encoded sequence against /consumer-api/.
Expected Detection
Detection rules match encoded traversal variants.
Send a double-encoded traversal payload to validate detection of evasion attempts.
Command
powershell -c "Invoke-WebRequest -SkipCertificateCheck -Headers @{Authorization='Bearer '+$env:TOKEN} -Uri 'https://apic-lab.local/provider/%252e%252e%252fwin.ini'" Cleanup
Remove-Variable TOKEN -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Expected Telemetry
Web log entry containing %252e%252e%252f against /provider/ route.
Expected Detection
Detection rules match %252e%252e%252f double-encoded pattern.
Related Detections
Tactic Hubs
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040