Detect Incus Restricted Client Authorization Bypass to Default Project (CVE-2026-130784) in Elastic Security
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-130784, an authorization bypass (CWE-863) in Incus before 7.6.0. When a project leaves a features.* key disabled, requests for the matching resource type are redirected to the default project. The create and access entitlement checks were applied against the requested project rather than the default project the request actually resolved to. A client restricted to such a project could create, read, update, rename or delete networks, network ACLs, address sets, network zones, profiles, images, image aliases, custom storage volumes and storage buckets in the default project, and could reach inherited resources through a ?project= value it does not control. Creating a bridge network with a raw.dnsmasq directive disables the dnsmasq AppArmor confinement and can run arbitrary dnsmasq directives as root on the host. Detection focuses on Incus/LXD daemon audit and access logs showing restricted identities issuing API calls whose target project is default, or any project not in their allowed set.
MITRE ATT&CK
Elastic Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-7c9a4be34b · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
any where event.dataset in ("system.syslog", "incus.daemon") and
message : ("*incusd*", "*lxd*") and
message : "*restricted=true*" and
(message : "*project=default*" or message : "*/1.0/instances*" or message : "*/1.0/networks*" or message : "*/1.0/storage-pools*" or message : "*/1.0/profiles*") Elastic EQL match on syslog messages from the Incus daemon showing a restricted identity targeting default-project resources.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Admin identities with ambiguous restricted flag parsing
- Authorized service identities in the default project
- Non-project-scoped server endpoints
Other platforms for CVE-2026-130784
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Restricted client lists default project networks
Expected signal: Daemon log GET /1.0/networks with project=default and restricted=true
- Test 2 Restricted client creates network in default project
Expected signal: Daemon log POST /1.0/networks with project=default and restricted=true
- Test 3 Restricted client modifies default profile
Expected signal: Daemon log PATCH/PUT /1.0/profiles/default with project=default and restricted=true
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the Incus/LXD version on the affected host (`incus version` / `lxd version`) and confirm whether it is below 7.6.0.
- Extract the offending identity (certificate fingerprint) from the daemon log and determine its intended project confinement via `incus config trust list` and `incus auth identity list`.
- Confirm whether the identity actually created or read resources in the default project, versus a benign parse artifact, by correlating the API path and HTTP method against the project field.
- Enumerate resources in the default project (`incus network list --project default`, `incus storage volume list`, `incus profile list --project default`) created within the suspicious time window.
Containment
- Revoke the abusing certificate/identity immediately: `incus config trust remove <fingerprint>`, then rotate affected tokens.
- Upgrade Incus to 7.6.0 or later on all hosts; where immediate upgrade is impossible, set restricted.networks.access on restricted projects to limit network creation, or enable the matching features.* keys on projects used by restricted clients.
- Quarantine or delete unauthorized networks/volumes/profiles created in the default project after confirming they are not legitimate.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve the full Incus daemon log (journalctl -u incus / /var/log/incus/) covering the attack window and the trust/identity configuration export.
- Capture the configuration of any resources created by the restricted identity in the default project before deletion, including any bridge network carrying a raw.dnsmasq directive.
- Record the certificate fingerprints and source IPs of the client that performed the bypass.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if the restricted identity created a bridge network with a raw.dnsmasq directive, which can lead to root code execution on the host.
- !Escalate if the abusing identity belongs to an external or low-trust client, or if multiple hosts show the same identity exploiting the bypass.
- !Escalate to platform owners if networks, profiles or storage volumes in the default project were modified or deleted via the bypass.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Incus daemon logs (/var/log/incus/, journalctl -u incus) showing restricted identity and project=default correlation - >
incus config trust list / identity list output capturing the offending fingerprint - >
Network, profile and volume metadata (creation timestamp, created-by identity) in /var/lib/incus/
Tuning Guidance
Baseline which identities are legitimately unrestricted and which service accounts are permitted in the default project, then exclude those fingerprints. Ensure Incus is configured to log API calls with identity and project fields. If the daemon log format omits the project field for certain endpoints, treat absence-of-project on network/storage/profile paths as suspicious only when paired with restricted=true to limit noise.
Hunting Queries
Counts restricted-identity accesses to the default project per host to spot anomalous tenancy crossings.
// df00tech DF00-7c9a4be34b · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
Syslog | where SyslogMessage has_any ("incusd","lxd") | where SyslogMessage has "restricted=true" | extend proj=extract(@"project=([A-Za-z0-9_\-]+)",1,SyslogMessage) | summarize count() by proj, Computer | where proj == "default" ``` df00tech DF00-7c9a4be34b · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=linux (incusd OR lxd) restricted=true | rex field=_raw "project=(?<proj>[A-Za-z0-9_\-]+)" | search proj=default | stats count by host, proj Atomic Red Team Tests
Restricted identity reads network resources in the default project it should not access, reproducing the CVE-2026-130784 bypass pattern in a lab.
Command
incus remote add lab https://127.0.0.1:8443 --accept-certificate --token "$RESTRICTED_TOKEN"; incus network list --project default --target lab Cleanup
incus remote remove lab Expected Telemetry
Daemon log GET /1.0/networks with project=default and restricted=true
Expected Detection
Detection matches restricted identity GET against /1.0/networks default project
Restricted identity creates a bridge network in the default project, demonstrating the create bypass.
Command
incus network create bypass-test --project default --target lab Cleanup
incus network delete bypass-test --project default --target lab || true Expected Telemetry
Daemon log POST /1.0/networks with project=default and restricted=true
Expected Detection
kql/spl rules fire on restricted identity POST to /1.0/networks in default project
Restricted identity edits the default profile in the default project, demonstrating write bypass.
Command
incus profile set default limits.cpu 1 --project default --target lab Cleanup
incus profile unset default limits.cpu --project default --target lab || true Expected Telemetry
Daemon log PATCH/PUT /1.0/profiles/default with project=default and restricted=true
Expected Detection
Detection fires on restricted identity write to /1.0/profiles in default project