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CVE-2026-130784 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Incus Restricted Client Authorization Bypass to Default Project (CVE-2026-130784) in Google Chronicle

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-130784, an authorization bypass (CWE-863) in Incus before 7.6.0. When a project leaves a features.* key disabled, requests for the matching resource type are redirected to the default project. The create and access entitlement checks were applied against the requested project rather than the default project the request actually resolved to. A client restricted to such a project could create, read, update, rename or delete networks, network ACLs, address sets, network zones, profiles, images, image aliases, custom storage volumes and storage buckets in the default project, and could reach inherited resources through a ?project= value it does not control. Creating a bridge network with a raw.dnsmasq directive disables the dnsmasq AppArmor confinement and can run arbitrary dnsmasq directives as root on the host. Detection focuses on Incus/LXD daemon audit and access logs showing restricted identities issuing API calls whose target project is default, or any project not in their allowed set.

Based on GHSA-5c64-j5m6-8433 Incus Security Advisory

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Privilege Escalation Lateral Movement

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
// df00tech DF00-7c9a4be34b · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
rule incus_cve_2026_130784_authz_bypass {
  meta:
    author = "argus"
    description = "Restricted Incus identity accessing default project resources (CVE-2026-130784)"
    severity = "CRITICAL"
  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "GENERIC_EVENT"
    (re.regex($e.principal.application, "(?i)incusd|lxd") or re.regex($e.metadata.product_name, "(?i)incus|lxd"))
    re.regex($e.metadata.description, "restricted=true")
    re.regex($e.metadata.description, "project=default|/1\.0/(instances|networks|storage-pools|profiles)")
  condition:
    $e
}
high severity medium confidence

Chronicle YARA-L rule matching Incus daemon events for restricted identities touching default-project API paths.

Data Sources

Linux SyslogIncus daemon logs

Required Tables

UDM events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Admin identities parsed with restricted flag
  • Authorized default-project service identities
  • Server-scoped endpoints lacking a project

Other platforms for CVE-2026-130784


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Restricted client lists default project networks

    Expected signal: Daemon log GET /1.0/networks with project=default and restricted=true

  2. Test 2 Restricted client creates network in default project

    Expected signal: Daemon log POST /1.0/networks with project=default and restricted=true

  3. Test 3 Restricted client modifies default profile

    Expected signal: Daemon log PATCH/PUT /1.0/profiles/default with project=default and restricted=true


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the Incus/LXD version on the affected host (`incus version` / `lxd version`) and confirm whether it is below 7.6.0.
  2. Extract the offending identity (certificate fingerprint) from the daemon log and determine its intended project confinement via `incus config trust list` and `incus auth identity list`.
  3. Confirm whether the identity actually created or read resources in the default project, versus a benign parse artifact, by correlating the API path and HTTP method against the project field.
  4. Enumerate resources in the default project (`incus network list --project default`, `incus storage volume list`, `incus profile list --project default`) created within the suspicious time window.

Containment

  1. Revoke the abusing certificate/identity immediately: `incus config trust remove <fingerprint>`, then rotate affected tokens.
  2. Upgrade Incus to 7.6.0 or later on all hosts; where immediate upgrade is impossible, set restricted.networks.access on restricted projects to limit network creation, or enable the matching features.* keys on projects used by restricted clients.
  3. Quarantine or delete unauthorized networks/volumes/profiles created in the default project after confirming they are not legitimate.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve the full Incus daemon log (journalctl -u incus / /var/log/incus/) covering the attack window and the trust/identity configuration export.
  2. Capture the configuration of any resources created by the restricted identity in the default project before deletion, including any bridge network carrying a raw.dnsmasq directive.
  3. Record the certificate fingerprints and source IPs of the client that performed the bypass.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if the restricted identity created a bridge network with a raw.dnsmasq directive, which can lead to root code execution on the host.
  • !Escalate if the abusing identity belongs to an external or low-trust client, or if multiple hosts show the same identity exploiting the bypass.
  • !Escalate to platform owners if networks, profiles or storage volumes in the default project were modified or deleted via the bypass.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Incus daemon logs (/var/log/incus/, journalctl -u incus) showing restricted identity and project=default correlation
  • >incus config trust list / identity list output capturing the offending fingerprint
  • >Network, profile and volume metadata (creation timestamp, created-by identity) in /var/lib/incus/

Tuning Guidance

Baseline which identities are legitimately unrestricted and which service accounts are permitted in the default project, then exclude those fingerprints. Ensure Incus is configured to log API calls with identity and project fields. If the daemon log format omits the project field for certain endpoints, treat absence-of-project on network/storage/profile paths as suspicious only when paired with restricted=true to limit noise.


Hunting Queries

Counts restricted-identity accesses to the default project per host to spot anomalous tenancy crossings.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-7c9a4be34b · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
Syslog | where SyslogMessage has_any ("incusd","lxd") | where SyslogMessage has "restricted=true" | extend proj=extract(@"project=([A-Za-z0-9_\-]+)",1,SyslogMessage) | summarize count() by proj, Computer | where proj == "default"
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-7c9a4be34b · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130784 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=linux (incusd OR lxd) restricted=true | rex field=_raw "project=(?<proj>[A-Za-z0-9_\-]+)" | search proj=default | stats count by host, proj

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Restricted client lists default project networks
linux

Restricted identity reads network resources in the default project it should not access, reproducing the CVE-2026-130784 bypass pattern in a lab.

Command

bash
incus remote add lab https://127.0.0.1:8443 --accept-certificate --token "$RESTRICTED_TOKEN"; incus network list --project default --target lab

Cleanup

bash
incus remote remove lab

Expected Telemetry

Daemon log GET /1.0/networks with project=default and restricted=true

Expected Detection

Detection matches restricted identity GET against /1.0/networks default project

Test 2 Restricted client creates network in default project
linux

Restricted identity creates a bridge network in the default project, demonstrating the create bypass.

Command

bash
incus network create bypass-test --project default --target lab

Cleanup

bash
incus network delete bypass-test --project default --target lab || true

Expected Telemetry

Daemon log POST /1.0/networks with project=default and restricted=true

Expected Detection

kql/spl rules fire on restricted identity POST to /1.0/networks in default project

Test 3 Restricted client modifies default profile
linux

Restricted identity edits the default profile in the default project, demonstrating write bypass.

Command

bash
incus profile set default limits.cpu 1 --project default --target lab

Cleanup

bash
incus profile unset default limits.cpu --project default --target lab || true

Expected Telemetry

Daemon log PATCH/PUT /1.0/profiles/default with project=default and restricted=true

Expected Detection

Detection fires on restricted identity write to /1.0/profiles in default project

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