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CVE-2026-130771

Incus Backup/Image Metadata Path-Traversal via Special Files, Hard Links, or Symlinks (CVE-2026-130771)

Stealth Privilege Escalation Discovery Last updated:

Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-130771, a CWE-59 (link following) flaw in Incus before 7.6.0. Incus fails to reject special files (device nodes, FIFOs), hard links, or symlinks embedded in backup archives or image metadata. A restricted project user who imports a crafted backup or image can cause the Incus daemon (running as root on the host) to follow a link or special file during unpack, reading or overwriting arbitrary host files outside the project boundary. Because Incus does not log archive member types, detection focuses on host-level telemetry: image/backup import API calls from restricted projects, incusd (root) file writes/reads outside its normal storage directories, and creation of symlinks/hard links/device nodes under storage unpack paths. Tune to your Incus storage pool layout.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
November 18, 2026

CVSS

9.9
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H

What is CVE-2026-130771 Incus Backup/Image Metadata Path-Traversal via Special Files, Hard Links, or Symlinks (CVE-2026-130771)?

Incus Backup/Image Metadata Path-Traversal via Special Files, Hard Links, or Symlinks (CVE-2026-130771) (CVE-2026-130771) maps to the Stealth and Privilege Escalation and Discovery tactics — the adversary is trying to hide and conceal their actions, appearing as normal behavior in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Incus Backup/Image Metadata Path-Traversal via Special Files, Hard Links, or Symlinks (CVE-2026-130771), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Linux file monitoring. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Stealth Privilege Escalation Discovery
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-2d52595fdc · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130771 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let incusStorageRoots = dynamic(["/var/lib/incus/storage-pools/", "/var/lib/incus/backups/", "/var/lib/incus/images/"]);
let sensitiveHostPaths = dynamic(["/etc/", "/root/", "/var/lib/incus/server.crt", "/var/lib/incus/server.key", "/home/", "/boot/", "/usr/"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("incusd", "incus")
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "SymbolicLinkCreated", "HardLinkCreated")
| where (FolderPath has_any (sensitiveHostPaths) and not(FolderPath has_any (incusStorageRoots)))
     or (ActionType in ("SymbolicLinkCreated", "HardLinkCreated") and FolderPath has_any (incusStorageRoots))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Flags incusd/incus (running as root) writing or linking into sensitive host paths outside storage roots, or creating symlinks/hard links inside storage unpack directories, the observable footprint of link-following during backup/image unpack.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Linux file monitoring

Required Tables

DeviceFileEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate Incus storage migration or pool rebalancing that moves files between directories.
  • Administrative restore of a trusted backup that intentionally contains symlinks within a container rootfs.
  • Snapshot or image publish operations that create internal symlinks inside the storage pool.

Query fingerprint DF00-2d52595fdc · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Incus Backup/Image Metadata Path-Traversal via Special Files, Hard Links, or Symlinks (CVE-2026-130771) (CVE-2026-130771) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Backup archive containing a symlink escaping the project (lab)

    Expected signal: File-event telemetry shows a symlink member being unpacked by incusd under the storage pool; tar listing shows a symlink member.

  2. Test 2 Image metadata tarball with a special (device) file (lab)

    Expected signal: Creation of a character-device special file during unpack is recorded by auditd/osquery with process incusd.

  3. Test 3 Hard link to a root-owned host file in a backup (lab)

    Expected signal: Hard-link creation event with initiating process incusd is captured during unpack.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the Incus version on the host (`incus version` / package manager); versions before 7.6.0 are vulnerable to CVE-2026-130771.
  2. Correlate the alert with recent image or backup import API calls (`incus image import`, `incus import`, POST /1.0/images, POST /1.0/instances with a backup source) and identify the originating project and user.
  3. Determine whether the project is a restricted project (`incus project show <project>` → restricted=true); restricted project users are the threat model for this CVE.
  4. Inspect the flagged file path: if incusd created a symlink/hard link/device node inside the storage pool, or wrote to a sensitive host path (/etc, /root, server.key), treat as likely exploitation.

Containment

  1. Disable image/backup imports for untrusted projects (restrict project permissions or pause the affected project) until the daemon is patched.
  2. Isolate the affected host from the management network if host file overwrite is confirmed, and freeze the storage pool to preserve evidence.
  3. Rotate any host secrets that may have been read or overwritten (incus server.key/server.crt, SSH keys under /root/.ssh, credentials under /etc).

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the imported backup archive or image tarball and enumerate its members with type info (`tar -tvf` / `bsdtar -tvf`) to confirm presence of symlinks, hard links, or special files.
  2. Collect auditd/osquery file-event logs for incusd around the import timestamp, plus the Incus daemon log (`journalctl -u incus`).
  3. Snapshot the affected host filesystem metadata (timestamps/inodes) for sensitive paths to document any overwrite.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to IR if incusd is confirmed to have read or overwritten a file outside the storage pool (host compromise).
  • ! Escalate if the import originated from a restricted/untrusted project user or an unexpected API token, indicating deliberate exploitation.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > The imported backup/image archive containing special files, hard links, or symlinks.
  • > Incus daemon log entries (journalctl -u incus) around the import.
  • > auditd/osquery records of incusd file operations outside the storage pool.
  • > Modified-time/inode changes on sensitive host files (/etc, /root, incus server.key).

Tuning Guidance

Baseline your Incus storage pool layout (default /var/lib/incus/storage-pools, but ZFS/btrfs/dir backends differ) and whitelist legitimate internal symlinks created during normal snapshot/publish operations. Focus high-confidence alerting on incusd writes/links that resolve OUTSIDE the storage pool and on device-node creation, which is never expected during normal unpack. Correlate with import API audit events to reduce noise.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for Incus daemon creating links/special files or touching sensitive host paths, aggregated by host.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-2d52595fdc · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130771 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("incusd","incus") | where ActionType in ("SymbolicLinkCreated","HardLinkCreated") or FolderPath startswith "/etc/" or FolderPath startswith "/root/" | summarize count() by DeviceName, FolderPath, ActionType, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-2d52595fdc · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130771 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=linux_osquery (process_name=incusd OR process_name=incus) (file_type="symbolic link" OR file_type="special" OR file_path="/etc/*" OR file_path="/root/*") | stats count by host, file_path, file_type

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Backup archive containing a symlink escaping the project (lab)
linux

Builds a tar backup whose member is a symlink pointing at a host file, simulating a crafted Incus backup. Lab-only; do not run against production Incus.

Command

bash
mkdir -p /tmp/cve130771/backup && cd /tmp/cve130771/backup && ln -s /etc/shadow leak_link && tar -cvf /tmp/cve130771/malicious-backup.tar --format=gnu leak_link && echo 'Now: incus import /tmp/cve130771/malicious-backup.tar in a restricted project (vuln <7.6.0)'

Cleanup

bash
rm -rf /tmp/cve130771

Expected Telemetry

File-event telemetry shows a symlink member being unpacked by incusd under the storage pool; tar listing shows a symlink member.

Expected Detection

The symlink-in-storage branch of the queries fires when incusd unpacks the archive.

Test 2 Image metadata tarball with a special (device) file (lab)
linux

Creates an image-style tarball containing a character device node, simulating a special file in image metadata that Incus fails to reject.

Command

bash
mkdir -p /tmp/cve130771/img && cd /tmp/cve130771/img && mknod dev_node c 1 3 2>/dev/null || sudo mknod dev_node c 1 3 && tar -cvf /tmp/cve130771/malicious-image.tar dev_node && echo 'Import as image metadata into Incus <7.6.0 to test'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/cve130771/img/dev_node /tmp/cve130771/malicious-image.tar; rmdir /tmp/cve130771/img 2>/dev/null; rm -rf /tmp/cve130771

Expected Telemetry

Creation of a character-device special file during unpack is recorded by auditd/osquery with process incusd.

Expected Detection

The device/special-file branch of the queries fires on special-file creation under the storage pool.

Test 3 Hard link to a root-owned host file in a backup (lab)
linux

Builds a tar backup containing a hard link to a sensitive root-owned file, simulating hard-link following during Incus restore.

Command

bash
mkdir -p /tmp/cve130771/hl && cd /tmp/cve130771/hl && cp /etc/hostname realfile && ln realfile hardlink_to_real && tar -cvf /tmp/cve130771/malicious-hl.tar --hard-dereference=no realfile hardlink_to_real && echo 'Import into Incus <7.6.0 restricted project to test hard-link handling'

Cleanup

bash
rm -rf /tmp/cve130771

Expected Telemetry

Hard-link creation event with initiating process incusd is captured during unpack.

Expected Detection

The hard-link branch of the queries fires on HardLinkCreated/hardlink actions within the storage pool.

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