Detect Fleet SAML SSO Callback Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-130759) in Sumo Logic CSE
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-130759, an authentication bypass in Fleet (fleetdm) versions 4.71.0 up to but not including 4.88.2. The SAML SSO callback handler looks up sessions using unvalidated client-supplied data (CWE-347, improper verification of cryptographic signature), allowing an attacker to bypass authentication and assume another user's session by manipulating the SAML response or associated session-lookup identifiers presented to the /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback endpoint. Detection focuses on anomalous POSTs to the SSO callback, session establishment without a corresponding legitimate IdP assertion, and privileged actions immediately following suspicious callback traffic.
MITRE ATT&CK
Sumo Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-4b7639c68d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130759 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
_sourceCategory=*web* "/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback"
| parse "* * * \"*" as method, path, protocol nodrop
| where method = "POST"
| where path matches "*/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback*"
| count as callback_count, count_distinct(user_agent) as ua_count by src_ip
| where callback_count >= 3 or ua_count > 2
| sort by callback_count desc Surfaces source IPs with repeated or multi-agent POSTs to the Fleet SSO callback within the search window.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- NAT-shared corporate IP with many legitimate logins.
- Health-check or synthetic probes.
- User-driven SSO retries on IdP latency.
Other platforms for CVE-2026-130759
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Rapid SSO callback POST burst
Expected signal: Five POST requests to /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback from one source IP within seconds, visible in web/proxy logs.
- Test 2 SSO callback POST with forged/missing user agent
Expected signal: A POST to the callback endpoint with an empty or non-browser user agent.
- Test 3 SSO callback from unexpected source using varied user agents
Expected signal: Multiple callback POSTs from one host presenting three different user-agent strings.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the running Fleet version; if it is >=4.71.0 and <4.88.2 the instance is vulnerable and callbacks should be treated as high-risk until patched.
- Correlate the flagged source IP(s) and timestamps with Fleet application/audit logs to determine which user session(s) were established following the suspicious callback(s).
- Inspect the SAML responses associated with the callbacks for missing or invalid signatures, mismatched Audience/Issuer, or replayed assertion IDs.
- Determine whether any privileged Fleet actions (user creation, role elevation, live query execution, policy/MDM command issuance) occurred shortly after the callback from the same session.
Containment
- Upgrade Fleet to 4.88.2 or later immediately; this is the authoritative fix for the unvalidated session-lookup logic.
- Invalidate all active Fleet sessions and force re-authentication for all users to evict any attacker-held session.
- Temporarily restrict access to the /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback endpoint to trusted IdP egress ranges at the reverse proxy if patching cannot be immediate.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve web/reverse-proxy access logs covering the SSO callback endpoint for the full incident window.
- Export Fleet audit logs, session records, and the raw SAML assertions/responses tied to the suspicious sessions.
- Capture the Fleet server version banner and configuration (SSO/SAML settings) for the incident record.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if a session was established without a valid, correctly-signed IdP assertion.
- !Escalate if any privileged action (live query, MDM command, user/role change) was performed by a session traced to a suspicious callback.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Reverse-proxy/web access log entries for POST /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback with source IP, user agent and status. - >
Fleet session table entries and audit log records correlating session creation to callback events. - >
Raw SAML response/assertion payloads and their signature validation status.
Tuning Guidance
Establish a baseline of legitimate SSO callback volume per source IP, especially for users behind shared NAT egress. Allowlist known IdP egress ranges and synthetic-monitoring sources, then lower the callback_count threshold once noise from shared gateways is accounted for. Prioritize alerts where a callback is immediately followed by privileged Fleet API activity.
Hunting Queries
Baselines all SSO callback POST traffic by source, user agent and status to reveal outliers against normal IdP-driven login volume.
// df00tech DF00-4b7639c68d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130759 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" and csMethod == "POST" | summarize count() by tostring(cIP), csUserAgent, scStatus | order by count_ desc ``` df00tech DF00-4b7639c68d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130759 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" http_method=POST | stats count by src_ip, http_user_agent, status | sort - count Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates an attacker iterating session-lookup identifiers by issuing multiple rapid POSTs to the Fleet SSO callback endpoint.
Command
for i in $(seq 1 5); do curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST "https://fleet.lab.local/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" -d "SAMLResponse=TEST$i"; done Cleanup
echo 'No persistent artifacts; clear test request logs if desired.' Expected Telemetry
Five POST requests to /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback from one source IP within seconds, visible in web/proxy logs.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL callback-burst rule fires on callback_count >= 3 from a single client.
Sends a SSO callback POST lacking a browser user agent, mimicking a scripted forged-assertion attempt.
Command
curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST "https://fleet.lab.local/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" -A "" -d "SAMLResponse=FORGED" Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required.' Expected Telemetry
A POST to the callback endpoint with an empty or non-browser user agent.
Expected Detection
Detection flags anomalous/missing user-agent context on the SSO callback.
Issues callbacks with several distinct user agents from one host to trigger the multi-user-agent anomaly path.
Command
1..3 | ForEach-Object { Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://fleet.lab.local/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" -Method POST -Headers @{"User-Agent"="ua-$_"} -Body "SAMLResponse=TEST" -UseBasicParsing } Cleanup
Write-Output 'No persistent artifacts created.' Expected Telemetry
Multiple callback POSTs from one host presenting three different user-agent strings.
Expected Detection
Detection fires on ua_count > 2 for the source.