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CVE-2026-130759 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Fleet SAML SSO Callback Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-130759) in IBM QRadar

Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-130759, an authentication bypass in Fleet (fleetdm) versions 4.71.0 up to but not including 4.88.2. The SAML SSO callback handler looks up sessions using unvalidated client-supplied data (CWE-347, improper verification of cryptographic signature), allowing an attacker to bypass authentication and assume another user's session by manipulating the SAML response or associated session-lookup identifiers presented to the /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback endpoint. Detection focuses on anomalous POSTs to the SSO callback, session establishment without a corresponding legitimate IdP assertion, and privileged actions immediately following suspicious callback traffic.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Privilege Escalation Credential Access

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql
-- df00tech DF00-4b7639c68d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130759 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
SELECT sourceip, COUNT(*) AS callback_count, UNIQUECOUNT("UserAgent") AS ua_count FROM events WHERE "URL" ILIKE '%/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback%' AND "Method" = 'POST' GROUP BY sourceip HAVING callback_count >= 3 OR ua_count > 2 LAST 10 MINUTES
high severity medium confidence

Flags source IPs issuing repeated POSTs to the Fleet SSO callback endpoint or using multiple user agents within a short window.

Data Sources

Web Server LogsReverse Proxy LogsIIS Logs

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Shared egress IP for a user population.
  • Monitoring probes against the SSO endpoint.
  • Legitimate repeated SSO attempts after failures.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-130759


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Rapid SSO callback POST burst

    Expected signal: Five POST requests to /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback from one source IP within seconds, visible in web/proxy logs.

  2. Test 2 SSO callback POST with forged/missing user agent

    Expected signal: A POST to the callback endpoint with an empty or non-browser user agent.

  3. Test 3 SSO callback from unexpected source using varied user agents

    Expected signal: Multiple callback POSTs from one host presenting three different user-agent strings.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the running Fleet version; if it is >=4.71.0 and <4.88.2 the instance is vulnerable and callbacks should be treated as high-risk until patched.
  2. Correlate the flagged source IP(s) and timestamps with Fleet application/audit logs to determine which user session(s) were established following the suspicious callback(s).
  3. Inspect the SAML responses associated with the callbacks for missing or invalid signatures, mismatched Audience/Issuer, or replayed assertion IDs.
  4. Determine whether any privileged Fleet actions (user creation, role elevation, live query execution, policy/MDM command issuance) occurred shortly after the callback from the same session.

Containment

  1. Upgrade Fleet to 4.88.2 or later immediately; this is the authoritative fix for the unvalidated session-lookup logic.
  2. Invalidate all active Fleet sessions and force re-authentication for all users to evict any attacker-held session.
  3. Temporarily restrict access to the /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback endpoint to trusted IdP egress ranges at the reverse proxy if patching cannot be immediate.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web/reverse-proxy access logs covering the SSO callback endpoint for the full incident window.
  2. Export Fleet audit logs, session records, and the raw SAML assertions/responses tied to the suspicious sessions.
  3. Capture the Fleet server version banner and configuration (SSO/SAML settings) for the incident record.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if a session was established without a valid, correctly-signed IdP assertion.
  • !Escalate if any privileged action (live query, MDM command, user/role change) was performed by a session traced to a suspicious callback.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Reverse-proxy/web access log entries for POST /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback with source IP, user agent and status.
  • >Fleet session table entries and audit log records correlating session creation to callback events.
  • >Raw SAML response/assertion payloads and their signature validation status.

Tuning Guidance

Establish a baseline of legitimate SSO callback volume per source IP, especially for users behind shared NAT egress. Allowlist known IdP egress ranges and synthetic-monitoring sources, then lower the callback_count threshold once noise from shared gateways is accounted for. Prioritize alerts where a callback is immediately followed by privileged Fleet API activity.


Hunting Queries

Baselines all SSO callback POST traffic by source, user agent and status to reveal outliers against normal IdP-driven login volume.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-4b7639c68d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130759 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" and csMethod == "POST" | summarize count() by tostring(cIP), csUserAgent, scStatus | order by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-4b7639c68d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130759 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" http_method=POST | stats count by src_ip, http_user_agent, status | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Rapid SSO callback POST burst
linux

Simulates an attacker iterating session-lookup identifiers by issuing multiple rapid POSTs to the Fleet SSO callback endpoint.

Command

bash
for i in $(seq 1 5); do curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST "https://fleet.lab.local/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" -d "SAMLResponse=TEST$i"; done

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No persistent artifacts; clear test request logs if desired.'

Expected Telemetry

Five POST requests to /api/v1/fleet/sso/callback from one source IP within seconds, visible in web/proxy logs.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL callback-burst rule fires on callback_count >= 3 from a single client.

Test 2 SSO callback POST with forged/missing user agent
linux

Sends a SSO callback POST lacking a browser user agent, mimicking a scripted forged-assertion attempt.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST "https://fleet.lab.local/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" -A "" -d "SAMLResponse=FORGED"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required.'

Expected Telemetry

A POST to the callback endpoint with an empty or non-browser user agent.

Expected Detection

Detection flags anomalous/missing user-agent context on the SSO callback.

Test 3 SSO callback from unexpected source using varied user agents
windows

Issues callbacks with several distinct user agents from one host to trigger the multi-user-agent anomaly path.

Command

powershell
1..3 | ForEach-Object { Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://fleet.lab.local/api/v1/fleet/sso/callback" -Method POST -Headers @{"User-Agent"="ua-$_"} -Body "SAMLResponse=TEST" -UseBasicParsing }

Cleanup

powershell
Write-Output 'No persistent artifacts created.'

Expected Telemetry

Multiple callback POSTs from one host presenting three different user-agent strings.

Expected Detection

Detection fires on ua_count > 2 for the source.

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