Grav CMS Per-Page Permission Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-130733)
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2026-130733, an authorization bypass in Grav CMS (2.0.0 before 2.2.18). A user with the publisher role and page write access can overwrite a page that per-page permissions deny them. The overwrite replaces the page content and its entire frontmatter, including the permissions block, which then gives access to the protected subtree. The flaw (CWE-140) comes from two storage bugs reached through a front-end Flex pages form: a FolderStorage key delimiter collision caused by the *** marker in folder names, and PageStorage folder reconstruction that skips the collision check for folders with an unusual prefix width. It requires the Flex Objects plugin and a site that uses per-page permissions. Detection focuses on authenticated Grav admin page-save and page-move POST requests that may land on a page the acting user should not control.
Vulnerability Intelligence
TheoreticalWeakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 18, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-130733 Grav CMS Per-Page Permission Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-130733)?
Grav CMS Per-Page Permission Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-130733) (CVE-2026-130733) maps to the Privilege Escalation and Persistence tactics — the adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Grav CMS Per-Page Permission Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-130733), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS Web Server Logs, Reverse Proxy Logs. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Privilege Escalation Persistence
// df00tech DF00-fd28b9c59d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130733 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let adminPaths = dynamic(["/admin/pages", "/admin/pages/save", "/admin/pages/move"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has "/admin/pages" and csMethod == "POST"
| where csUriStem matches regex @"(%2e|%2f|%252e|\.\.|/\.{1,2}/)" or csUriQuery matches regex @"(%2e|%252e|\.\.)"
| extend NormalizedPath = tolower(url_decode(csUriStem))
| where NormalizedPath has "/admin/pages"
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csUsername, csMethod, csUriStem, csUriQuery, scStatus, csUserAgent
| summarize Attempts=count(), DistinctPaths=dcount(csUriStem) by cIP, csUsername, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where Attempts > 1 Flags authenticated POST requests to Grav Admin page endpoints containing encoded path-traversal or dot-segment characters.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate administrators restructuring page trees with nested slugs containing dots.
- Security scanners or DAST tools authenticated against the admin panel in a test environment.
- Multilingual sites where encoded path separators appear in legitimate localized slugs.
Query fingerprint DF00-fd28b9c59d · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Grav CMS Per-Page Permission Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-130733) (CVE-2026-130733) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-130733
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Grav admin page save with encoded traversal
Expected signal: Web access log entry for POST /admin/pages/..%252f..%252frestricted/save by an authenticated publisher session.
- Test 2 Grav page move across permission boundary
Expected signal: POST to /admin/pages/move with a route value containing '../'.
- Test 3 Baseline legitimate page save (negative test)
Expected signal: POST /admin/pages/blog/save with no traversal characters.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the running Grav version via the admin dashboard or `bin/grav --version`; versions 2.0.0 through 2.2.17 are affected by CVE-2026-130733.
- Identify the authenticated user tied to the flagged POST and verify their assigned role (publisher vs. admin) and the per-page permissions on the targeted page(s).
- Check whether the save was made through a front-end Flex pages form and whether the source or target folder name uses the *** marker or an unusual numeric prefix width (for example 1.name, 005.name or 00.name), which are the patterns that bypass the collision check.
- Compare the modified page's git or filesystem mtime and content against the last known-good revision to determine whether an unauthorized overwrite actually occurred.
Containment
- Upgrade Grav to 2.2.18 or later, which fixes the storage path handling and authorizes saves against the destination page.
- Temporarily downgrade or suspend the implicated publisher account and revoke its session tokens.
- If immediate patching is not possible, restrict `/admin/pages` write access at the reverse proxy to trusted admin source IPs, or disable the Flex Objects plugin.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve web server and Grav access logs covering the request window, including full decoded URIs and request bodies.
- Snapshot the `user/pages` directory and the site git repository to capture altered page frontmatter and content for forensic comparison.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if an unauthorized page overwrite is confirmed on a production or externally published page.
- ! Escalate if the bypass was used to inject Twig or PHP via page content, or to modify security-relevant pages (login, redirects, access rules).
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Modified page files under `user/pages/**/*.md` with unexpected author or mtime, and page folders named with the *** marker or an unusual prefix width. - >
Grav Admin audit entries and web access logs showing POSTs to /admin/pages. - >
Git history diffs if the Grav site content is version-controlled.
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate admin and publisher page-edit traffic, especially sites using dotted route slugs or multilingual paths, then exclude known-good users and slugs. Prioritize alerts where the acting account is a non-admin role and the request status is 2xx (indicating a successful write).
Hunting Queries
Hunts for Grav admin page POSTs across the retention window for later correlation with overwritten pages.
// df00tech DF00-fd28b9c59d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130733 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "/admin/pages" and csMethod == "POST" | extend dec=url_decode(csUriStem) | where dec has ".." or csUriStem has "%252e" | project TimeGenerated, csUsername, cIP, csUriStem, scStatus ``` df00tech DF00-fd28b9c59d · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130733 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web sourcetype="grav:access" uri_path="/admin/pages*" method=POST | eval d=urldecode(uri_path) | where match(d,"\.\.") OR match(uri_path,"%252e") | table _time user src_ip uri_path status Atomic Red Team Tests
Lab-only check that an authenticated publisher page-save POST is logged and matched by the rule.
Command
curl -s -b "grav-site-admin=$SESSION" -X POST 'http://localhost:8000/admin/pages/..%252f..%252frestricted/save' --data 'data[content]=owned&task=save' Cleanup
git -C ./user/pages checkout -- . 2>/dev/null || true Expected Telemetry
Web access log entry for POST /admin/pages/..%252f..%252frestricted/save by an authenticated publisher session.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules match on the encoded traversal segment in a /admin/pages POST.
Lab-only POST to the page-move endpoint for telemetry generation.
Command
curl -s -b "grav-site-admin=$SESSION" -X POST 'http://localhost:8000/admin/pages/move' --data 'data[route]=/../protected&task=move' Cleanup
git -C ./user/pages checkout -- . 2>/dev/null || true Expected Telemetry
POST to /admin/pages/move with a route value containing '../'.
Expected Detection
Detection fires on dot-segment pattern in admin page POST body/URI.
Performs a normal in-scope page save to confirm the rule does not alert on legitimate publisher activity.
Command
curl -s -b "grav-site-admin=$SESSION" -X POST 'http://localhost:8000/admin/pages/blog/save' --data 'data[content]=hello&task=save' Cleanup
git -C ./user/pages checkout -- . 2>/dev/null || true Expected Telemetry
POST /admin/pages/blog/save with no traversal characters.
Expected Detection
No alert, confirms low false-positive rate on normal edits.
Related Detections
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Privilege Escalation
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040