Perforce Puppet Enterprise Deserialization RCE (CVE-2026-115731)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-115731, a critical (CVSS 9.4) deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability (CWE-502/CWE-94) in Puppet, as used by Puppet Server, including Puppet Enterprise. A client that holds any CA-signed agent certificate can execute arbitrary code on the Puppet Server as its service user by submitting a report containing a crafted rich-data type via a PUT request. Where the certificate authority autosigns requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can obtain such a certificate. Listed in CISA KEV. This rule surfaces anomalous child processes spawned by Puppet/JRuby server processes, suspicious inbound requests to the report endpoint, and unexpected outbound connections from the Puppet infrastructure tier.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Perforce, puppet
- Product
- Puppet Enterprise, puppet, puppet_enterprise
- Versions
- >= 8.0.0, < 8.22.2, >= 9.0.0, < 9.1.3, >= 2023.8.0, < 2023.8.13, >= 2025.0.0, < 2025.12.1, 2026.0.0
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 3, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://portal.perforce.com/s/cve/a91Qi000003IaHpIAK/report-deserialization-code-execution
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115731
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-115731
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-115731 Perforce Puppet Enterprise Deserialization RCE (CVE-2026-115731)?
Perforce Puppet Enterprise Deserialization RCE (CVE-2026-115731) (CVE-2026-115731) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Perforce Puppet Enterprise Deserialization RCE (CVE-2026-115731), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
// df00tech DF00-b43090fb6c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115731 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let puppetParents = dynamic(["puppetserver","java","jruby","ruby","pe-puppetserver","puppetdb"]);
let suspiciousChildren = dynamic(["sh","bash","dash","python","python3","perl","nc","ncat","curl","wget","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","whoami","id"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (puppetParents) or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("puppetserver","puppetdb","jruby")
| where FileName in~ (suspiciousChildren)
| where not(ProcessCommandLine has_any ("puppet agent","puppet apply","facter"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc Flags shell, interpreter, or network-tool child processes spawned by the Puppet Enterprise server/JRuby/PuppetDB process tree, a strong signal of deserialization-driven code execution.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate Puppet module runs that shell out via exec resources on the primary
- Scheduled maintenance scripts executed under the pe-puppet account
- Administrator interactive troubleshooting on the Puppet server host
Query fingerprint DF00-b43090fb6c · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Perforce Puppet Enterprise Deserialization RCE (CVE-2026-115731) (CVE-2026-115731) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-115731
References (5)
- https://portal.perforce.com/s/cve/a91Qi000003IaHpIAK/report-deserialization-code-execution
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115731
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-115731
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Simulate Puppet server spawning a shell
Expected signal: Process-start event with parent process name puppetserver and child process bash/id/whoami.
- Test 2 Outbound connection from mock Puppet process
Expected signal: Network connection event initiated by a process named puppetdb to an external/unexpected host.
- Test 3 Simulated deserialization report PUT
Expected signal: Web/access log entry showing a PUT to a Puppet report endpoint with a serialized/base64 body.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the affected host is a Puppet Enterprise primary/compiler or PuppetDB node and record its version; compare against fixed builds (8.22.2, 9.1.3, 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1, and the patched 2026.x).
- Review the parent/child process lineage: validate whether the flagged child process (shell, interpreter, curl/wget) corresponds to a legitimate Puppet exec resource or to unexpected code execution under the Puppet service user.
- Inspect Puppet server access logs for PUT requests submitting reports around the alert time, looking for oversized or crafted rich-data request bodies.
- Pivot on the executing account and host to identify any follow-on persistence, credential access, or lateral movement.
Containment
- Isolate the affected Puppet primary/PuppetDB node from the network to prevent agent fan-out and lateral movement.
- Block external egress from the Puppet infrastructure tier and suspend affected services pending patching.
- Rotate the Puppet service account credentials, Puppet CA/agent certificates, and any secrets accessible from the node.
Evidence Collection
- Capture the full process tree, command lines, and loaded modules for the Puppet/JRuby/PuppetDB processes, plus memory if RCE is suspected.
- Preserve Puppet server, PuppetDB, and web access logs (/var/log/puppetlabs/) containing the malicious request body.
- Snapshot the host filesystem and collect any dropped files in /tmp, /var/tmp, or the service account home directory.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response immediately if a non-Puppet child process executed network or interpreter commands, confirming code execution.
- ! Escalate to CISO/legal if the Puppet primary manages regulated systems or if evidence of lateral movement to managed agents is found.
- ! Escalate if credential or certificate theft is confirmed, triggering enterprise-wide Puppet CA rotation.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Puppet server and PuppetDB logs under /var/log/puppetlabs/ showing anomalous report POST/PUT bodies - >
Unexpected child processes of java/puppetserver/puppetdb in EDR process telemetry - >
Dropped payload files in /tmp, /var/tmp, or the service account home; modified crontabs or systemd units
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate Puppet exec resources that shell out on your primary and compilers, then allowlist those specific command lines rather than disabling the rule. If agents frequently run facter or puppet apply locally, keep the existing exclusions. Tighten the suspicious-child list to your environment, and prioritize alerts where the child process initiates outbound network connections or runs reconnaissance binaries (whoami/id).
Hunting Queries
Hunts for unexpected outbound connections from Puppet Enterprise server processes, a sign of reverse shells or payload retrieval after exploitation.
// df00tech DF00-b43090fb6c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115731 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceNetworkEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java","puppetserver","puppetdb","ruby") | where RemoteIPType == "Public" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl | order by Timestamp desc ``` df00tech DF00-b43090fb6c · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115731 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=network (process_name="java" OR process_name="puppetserver" OR process_name="puppetdb") dest_category=external | stats count by host, process_name, dest_ip, dest_port Atomic Red Team Tests
Launches a shell as a child of a process named to mimic puppetserver to validate parent/child detection.
Command
cp /bin/sleep /tmp/puppetserver && /tmp/puppetserver 2 & sleep 1; bash -c 'id; whoami' Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/puppetserver Expected Telemetry
Process-start event with parent process name puppetserver and child process bash/id/whoami.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL/EQL process rules fire on the suspicious child process under the Puppet parent.
Spawns a curl request from a process named like the Puppet server JVM to validate egress hunting logic.
Command
cp /usr/bin/env /tmp/puppetdb && /tmp/puppetdb curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9999 || true Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/puppetdb Expected Telemetry
Network connection event initiated by a process named puppetdb to an external/unexpected host.
Expected Detection
Hunting query for outbound connections from Puppet processes returns the event.
Sends a crafted PUT with a base64-encoded blob to a local listener emulating the vulnerable Puppet report endpoint to exercise web-log triage.
Command
python3 -m http.server 8140 & sleep 1; curl -s -X PUT http://127.0.0.1:8140/puppet/v3/report -H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' --data 'rO0ABXNyABNQdXBwZXRQYXlsb2FkVGVzdA=='; kill %1 Cleanup
pkill -f 'http.server 8140' 2>/dev/null || true Expected Telemetry
Web/access log entry showing a PUT to a Puppet report endpoint with a serialized/base64 body.
Expected Detection
Triage review of Puppet server access logs identifies the anomalous serialized report body.
Related Detections
Tactic Hubs
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040