Oracle Text Component Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-114819)
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-114819, a critical (CVSS 9.9) vulnerability in the Oracle Text component of Oracle Database Server affecting versions 19.3-19.32, 21.3-21.24 and 23.4.0-23.26.3. Oracle Text provides full-text indexing and search (CONTEXT, CTXCAT, CTXRULE index types) driven by the CTXSYS schema and the CTX_DDL/CTX_DOC PL/SQL packages. The flaw is easily exploitable by a low-privileged attacker with Create Session privilege and network access via Oracle Net. Successful attacks can result in takeover of Oracle Text, and because the vulnerability involves a scope change it may significantly impact additional products. This detection surfaces anomalous invocation of CTXSYS-owned packages, creation/alteration of Text indexes and preferences by unexpected principals, suspicious CTX datastore/filter procedures referencing OS resources, and database audit records associated with privilege escalation through Oracle Text. Exploit status is currently theoretical (no public PoC); detection logic is behavioral and intended to catch abuse patterns pending vendor patch application.
Vulnerability Intelligence
TheoreticalTimeline
- Disclosed
- November 17, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- Low
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
What is CVE-2026-114819 Oracle Text Component Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-114819)?
Oracle Text Component Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-114819) (CVE-2026-114819) maps to the Initial Access and Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Oracle Text Component Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-114819), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Oracle Database Unified Audit, Oracle Net listener logs, OCI Audit. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
// df00tech DF00-e10a9a0870 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114819 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Oracle Database audit / unified audit forwarded via syslog or OCI connector
let ctxObjects = dynamic(["CTX_DDL","CTX_DOC","CTX_QUERY","CTX_REPORT","CTX_OUTPUT","CTX_THES","CTX_ADM","CTXSYS","DRVXMD","DRVDML"]);
OracleDatabaseAuditEvent_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| extend ActionName = tostring(Action_s), ObjectName = toupper(tostring(ObjectName_s)), ObjectSchema = toupper(tostring(ObjectOwner_s)), DbUser = toupper(tostring(DBUsername_s))
| where ObjectSchema == "CTXSYS" or ObjectName in (ctxObjects) or ActionName has_any ("CREATE INDEX","ALTER INDEX") and (SQLText_s has "CTXSYS.CONTEXT" or SQLText_s has "ctxsys.context")
| where DbUser !in ("CTXSYS","SYS","SYSTEM","DBSNMP")
| extend SuspiciousPref = iff(SQLText_s has_any ("CTX_DDL.CREATE_PREFERENCE","DATASTORE","FILE_DATASTORE","URL_DATASTORE","USER_DATASTORE","EXECUTE_FILTER"), true, false)
| summarize Events=count(), Actions=make_set(ActionName,20), Objects=make_set(ObjectName,20), SampleSQL=take_any(SQLText_s) by DbUser, ClientHost=tostring(UserHost_s), bin(TimeGenerated, 15m), SuspiciousPref
| where Events > 0
| sort by SuspiciousPref desc, Events desc Flags non-standard database principals invoking CTXSYS-owned Oracle Text packages or creating/altering CONTEXT indexes and datastore/filter preferences, which are the primary abuse surface for CVE-2026-114819.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate application schemas that build and maintain Oracle Text indexes as part of normal full-text search functionality
- Scheduled index synchronization jobs (CTX_DDL.SYNC_INDEX) run by application service accounts
- DBA maintenance windows rebuilding or optimizing Text indexes
Query fingerprint DF00-e10a9a0870 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Oracle Text Component Remote Exploitation (CVE-2026-114819) (CVE-2026-114819) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-114819
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Non-standard user invokes CTX_DDL package
Expected signal: Unified audit record with OBJECT_OWNER=CTXSYS, OBJECT_NAME=CTX_DDL and SQL_TEXT containing CREATE_PREFERENCE/FILE_DATASTORE for a non-CTXSYS user.
- Test 2 Create CONTEXT index as unexpected principal
Expected signal: Audit record with ACTION_NAME='CREATE INDEX' and SQL_TEXT referencing INDEXTYPE IS CTXSYS.CONTEXT.
- Test 3 Define USER_DATASTORE referencing a custom procedure
Expected signal: Audit records containing CTX_DDL.CREATE_PREFERENCE with USER_DATASTORE and SET_ATTRIBUTE PROCEDURE.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the Oracle Database version against the affected ranges (19.3-19.32, 21.3-21.24, 23.4.0-23.26.3); if patched by the November 2026 CPU, deprioritize to false positive.
- Identify the database principal and client host in the alert and determine whether that account is an authorized owner/maintainer of Oracle Text indexes.
- Review the full SQL_TEXT of the flagged audit records for CTX_DDL.CREATE_PREFERENCE, FILE_DATASTORE/URL_DATASTORE/USER_DATASTORE, or EXECUTE_FILTER usage that references OS paths, URLs, or custom procedures.
- Cross-reference the client host and session against expected application servers and DBA jump hosts using Oracle Net listener logs.
Containment
- Revoke EXECUTE on CTX_DDL/CTX_DOC and other CTXSYS packages from the suspect account and any unexpected grantees until investigation completes.
- Restrict Oracle Net access to the database listener via valid node checking (TCP.INVITED_NODES) or network ACLs to trusted application/DBA hosts.
- Apply the Oracle November 2026 Critical Patch Update addressing the Oracle Text component as the authoritative remediation.
Evidence Collection
- Export the relevant UNIFIED_AUDIT_TRAIL / DBA_AUDIT_TRAIL records for the suspect session, including SQL_TEXT, OS_USERNAME, USERHOST and TIMESTAMP.
- Capture the current DBA_CONTEXT_PREFERENCES, CTX_USER_PREFERENCES and DBA_CONTEXT_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES to preserve any attacker-created datastore/filter definitions.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to IR if a non-application account created a FILE_DATASTORE/USER_DATASTORE or EXECUTE_FILTER preference referencing OS commands or files, indicating attempted code/file access via Oracle Text.
- ! Escalate if the activity correlates with new privileged grants, unexpected DBA role membership, or outbound connections from the database host.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
UNIFIED_AUDIT_TRAIL / DBA_AUDIT_TRAIL entries referencing CTXSYS objects and CTX_DDL/CTX_DOC packages - >
DBA_CONTEXT_PREFERENCES, CTX_USER_PREFERENCES and DBA_CONTEXT_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES rows defining attacker datastore/filter preferences - >
Oracle Net listener.log entries showing the originating client host and program
Tuning Guidance
Baseline which application schemas and service accounts legitimately own and maintain Oracle Text (CONTEXT) indexes, then add them to the exclusion list so only unexpected principals alert. Separate routine CTX_DDL.SYNC_INDEX/OPTIMIZE_INDEX traffic (high-volume, benign) from preference creation and index DDL (lower-volume, higher-risk) and raise severity primarily on datastore/filter preference creation referencing OS paths or URLs.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for creation of Oracle Text datastore/filter preferences that can reference OS resources or custom procedures, a key abuse primitive for this vulnerability.
// df00tech DF00-e10a9a0870 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114819 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
OracleDatabaseAuditEvent_CL | where SQLText_s has_any ("FILE_DATASTORE","URL_DATASTORE","USER_DATASTORE","EXECUTE_FILTER") | project TimeGenerated, DBUsername_s, UserHost_s, SQLText_s ``` df00tech DF00-e10a9a0870 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114819 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=oracle sourcetype=oracle:audit:unified ("FILE_DATASTORE" OR "URL_DATASTORE" OR "USER_DATASTORE" OR "EXECUTE_FILTER") | table _time dbusername userhost sql_text Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates a low-privileged account enumerating/invoking Oracle Text DDL packages to generate the audit telemetry this rule keys on.
Command
sqlplus app_user/'App#Passw0rd'@//localhost:1521/ORCLPDB1 <<'SQL'
BEGIN
CTX_DDL.CREATE_PREFERENCE('test_ds','FILE_DATASTORE');
END;
/
SQL Cleanup
sqlplus app_user/'App#Passw0rd'@//localhost:1521/ORCLPDB1 <<'SQL'
BEGIN CTX_DDL.DROP_PREFERENCE('test_ds'); END;
/
SQL Expected Telemetry
Unified audit record with OBJECT_OWNER=CTXSYS, OBJECT_NAME=CTX_DDL and SQL_TEXT containing CREATE_PREFERENCE/FILE_DATASTORE for a non-CTXSYS user.
Expected Detection
Rule fires with suspicious_pref=1 for the app_user principal.
Creates an Oracle Text CONTEXT index from a non-standard account to trigger CREATE INDEX ... CTXSYS.CONTEXT auditing.
Command
sqlplus app_user/'App#Passw0rd'@//localhost:1521/ORCLPDB1 <<'SQL'
CREATE TABLE t_docs (id NUMBER PRIMARY KEY, body CLOB);
INSERT INTO t_docs VALUES (1, 'oracle text test');
COMMIT;
CREATE INDEX idx_docs ON t_docs(body) INDEXTYPE IS CTXSYS.CONTEXT;
SQL Cleanup
sqlplus app_user/'App#Passw0rd'@//localhost:1521/ORCLPDB1 <<'SQL'
DROP INDEX idx_docs; DROP TABLE t_docs PURGE;
SQL Expected Telemetry
Audit record with ACTION_NAME='CREATE INDEX' and SQL_TEXT referencing INDEXTYPE IS CTXSYS.CONTEXT.
Expected Detection
Rule fires on CTXSYS.CONTEXT index creation by app_user.
Creates a USER_DATASTORE preference bound to a PL/SQL procedure, the pattern used to drive attacker-controlled code paths through Oracle Text indexing.
Command
sqlplus app_user/'App#Passw0rd'@//localhost:1521/ORCLPDB1 <<'SQL'
BEGIN
CTX_DDL.CREATE_PREFERENCE('my_uds','USER_DATASTORE');
CTX_DDL.SET_ATTRIBUTE('my_uds','PROCEDURE','APP_USER.MY_PROC');
END;
/
SQL Cleanup
sqlplus app_user/'App#Passw0rd'@//localhost:1521/ORCLPDB1 <<'SQL'
BEGIN CTX_DDL.DROP_PREFERENCE('my_uds'); END;
/
SQL Expected Telemetry
Audit records containing CTX_DDL.CREATE_PREFERENCE with USER_DATASTORE and SET_ATTRIBUTE PROCEDURE.
Expected Detection
Rule fires with suspicious_pref=1 on the USER_DATASTORE preference creation.
Related Detections
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040