Skip to content
CVE-2026-104846

Seroval fromJSON() Promise Thenable Assimilation Plugin Callable Invocation (CVE-2026-104846)

Initial Access Execution Last updated:

Detects presence and potential exploitation of CVE-2026-104846, a CWE-843 (Type Confusion) vulnerability in the npm package `seroval` versions >= 0.12.0 through <= 1.6.0. The flaw bypasses the earlier GHSA-mv8w-475r-vwqw / CVE-2026-59940 fix: when `fromJSON()` deserializes a fulfilled Promise node, native ECMAScript thenable assimilation can invoke a plugin-produced callable, so attacker-controlled serialized data can trigger code during deserialization. `seroval` is a serialization library used by SSR frameworks to stream server state to the client, so malicious serialized blobs reaching `fromJSON()`/`deserialize()` on a trust boundary are the primary risk. The issue is fixed in version 1.6.2. Detection focuses on inventory of vulnerable package versions in build/runtime telemetry and node process behaviour that may indicate exploitation, such as unexpected child processes spawned from the SSR/render process during deserialization.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

CVSS

9.8
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

What is CVE-2026-104846 Seroval fromJSON() Promise Thenable Assimilation Plugin Callable Invocation (CVE-2026-104846)?

Seroval fromJSON() Promise Thenable Assimilation Plugin Callable Invocation (CVE-2026-104846) (CVE-2026-104846) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Seroval fromJSON() Promise Thenable Assimilation Plugin Callable Invocation (CVE-2026-104846), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-7f7f5c9145 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104846 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Inventory: detect vulnerable seroval install/presence via package.json or node_modules activity
let affectedLow = "0.12.0";
let affectedHigh = "1.6.0";
DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath has "node_modules" and FolderPath has_cs "seroval"
| where FileName =~ "package.json"
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where FolderPath has "seroval"
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified")
) on DeviceId
| extend Pkg = FolderPath
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| union (
    // Runtime: node SSR process spawning a shell/child during request handling
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node", "node.exe")
    | where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "/bin/sh", "dash")
    | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("ssr", "render", "server", "entry-server")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
)

Finds hosts with the vulnerable seroval package in node_modules and correlates with suspicious child-process spawns from node SSR/render processes that may indicate deserialization-driven code execution.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint DeviceFileEvents DeviceProcessEvents

Required Tables

DeviceFileEvents DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate CI/build agents installing or updating seroval as a transitive dependency of a framework (Solid/Astro).
  • Developer workstations running local SSR dev servers that legitimately spawn shells for build tooling.
  • Security scanning or SBOM tools walking node_modules and reading package.json files.

Query fingerprint DF00-7f7f5c9145 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Seroval fromJSON() Promise Thenable Assimilation Plugin Callable Invocation (CVE-2026-104846) (CVE-2026-104846) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Install vulnerable seroval version

    Expected signal: FileCreate events for node_modules/seroval/package.json and npm child processes under node.

  2. Test 2 Simulate SSR process spawning shell during deserialization

    Expected signal: ProcessCreate: node parent with ssr-related command line spawning sh -c / id.

  3. Test 3 Windows node SSR spawns PowerShell

    Expected signal: ProcessCreate: node.exe parent with render command line spawning powershell.exe.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the affected host/application has seroval installed at a version within >= 0.12.0 and <= 1.6.0 by checking package.json / package-lock.json / node_modules/seroval/package.json.
  2. Determine whether `fromJSON()` or `deserialize()` is invoked on data crossing a trust boundary, such as SSR hydration payloads, user-supplied serialized state, or cross-service messages.
  3. Review node SSR/render process telemetry on the affected host for unexpected child-process spawns (shells, interpreters) temporally correlated with deserialization requests.
  4. Check whether any custom seroval plugins are registered, since the vulnerability requires plugin-produced callables to be reachable during Promise thenable assimilation.

Containment

  1. Upgrade seroval to 1.6.2 or later (which contains patch commit f1ffcc96d259f9b5b3d71feb262b58240c90e7b7) across all affected build and runtime artifacts.
  2. Until patched, ensure `fromJSON()`/`deserialize()` is never called on untrusted input and disable or audit any custom plugins that produce callable values.
  3. If active exploitation is suspected, isolate the affected SSR/application host from the network and rotate any secrets accessible to the node process.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml and node_modules/seroval/package.json to record the exact installed version.
  2. Preserve node process command lines, child-process trees, and application/SSR logs around the suspected deserialization window.
  3. Collect the raw serialized payloads submitted to the application if request-body logging is available, for payload analysis.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if a node SSR/render process spawned an unexpected shell, interpreter, or network connection correlated with a deserialization request.
  • ! Escalate if the vulnerable seroval version is confirmed in a production internet-facing service that deserializes untrusted input.
  • ! Escalate if evidence of secret access, lateral movement, or outbound C2 from the node process is identified.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > node_modules/seroval/package.json version field
  • > package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml entries pinning seroval
  • > node process child-process tree and command-line history
  • > Application/SSR request logs containing serialized payloads

Tuning Guidance

Start in inventory-only mode to scope which hosts carry vulnerable seroval before enabling the runtime exec-correlation logic. Baseline legitimate node-spawns-shell behaviour on build/CI and dev-server hosts and exclude those host groups or command-line patterns. Narrow the ParentCommandLine filters to the specific SSR entrypoints your applications use (for example entry-server.js) to reduce noise, and raise confidence to high only where both inventory and runtime-exec conditions match on the same host.


Hunting Queries

Inventory all hosts carrying the seroval package to scope exposure to CVE-2026-104846.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-7f7f5c9145 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104846 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where FolderPath has_cs "node_modules" and FolderPath has "seroval" and FileName =~ "package.json" | project DeviceName, FolderPath, Timestamp
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-7f7f5c9145 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104846 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
search index=endpoint sourcetype="Sysmon:FileCreate" TargetFilename="*node_modules*seroval*package.json" | stats values(host) by TargetFilename

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Install vulnerable seroval version
linux

Install a seroval version within the affected range to generate inventory telemetry for detection validation.

Command

bash
mkdir -p /tmp/seroval-test && cd /tmp/seroval-test && npm init -y >/dev/null 2>&1 && npm install [email protected] >/dev/null 2>&1 && cat node_modules/seroval/package.json | grep '"version"'

Cleanup

bash
rm -rf /tmp/seroval-test

Expected Telemetry

FileCreate events for node_modules/seroval/package.json and npm child processes under node.

Expected Detection

Inventory branch of the detection flags the vulnerable seroval package.json.

Test 2 Simulate SSR process spawning shell during deserialization
linux

Emulate a node SSR process spawning a shell child, mimicking deserialization-driven code execution.

Command

bash
cd /tmp && node -e "process.argv[1]='entry-server-ssr'; require('child_process').execSync('id > /tmp/seroval_poc.txt');" ; cat /tmp/seroval_poc.txt

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/seroval_poc.txt

Expected Telemetry

ProcessCreate: node parent with ssr-related command line spawning sh -c / id.

Expected Detection

Runtime exec-correlation branch flags node SSR process spawning a shell child.

Test 3 Windows node SSR spawns PowerShell
windows

Emulate a node SSR/render process on Windows spawning PowerShell, representing exploitation fallout.

Command

powershell
node -e "process.argv[1]='render-server'; require('child_process').execSync('powershell.exe -Command whoami');"

Cleanup

powershell
echo 'no persistent artifacts to clean'

Expected Telemetry

ProcessCreate: node.exe parent with render command line spawning powershell.exe.

Expected Detection

Runtime exec-correlation branch flags the node-to-powershell spawn.

Related Detections

Blog posts about this detection

Browse by tactic

Full ATT&CK matrix Search all detections