CVE-2025-43510

Apple Multiple Products Improper Locking Vulnerability (CVE-2025-43510)

Privilege Escalation Persistence Execution Last updated:

CVE-2025-43510 is an improper locking vulnerability (CWE-667) affecting multiple Apple products, including macOS, iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, visionOS, and watchOS. This flaw, added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, allows an attacker with local access to potentially exploit race conditions arising from improper mutex or lock management, leading to privilege escalation, memory corruption, or kernel-level code execution. Detection focuses on anomalous kernel panics, unexpected privilege escalations, exploitation of race conditions, and post-exploitation indicators on Apple endpoints.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

Affected Software

Vendor
Apple
Product
Multiple Products

Weakness (CWE)

CWE-667

Timeline

Disclosed
March 20, 2026

CVSS

7.8
High (7.0–8.9)

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Write-up coming soon

What is CVE-2025-43510 Apple Multiple Products Improper Locking Vulnerability (CVE-2025-43510)?

Apple Multiple Products Improper Locking Vulnerability (CVE-2025-43510) (CVE-2025-43510) maps to the Privilege Escalation and Persistence and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Apple Multiple Products Improper Locking Vulnerability (CVE-2025-43510), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Intune MDM, Azure Monitor. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Privilege Escalation Persistence Execution
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto 
union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents
| where DeviceOS startswith "Mac" or DeviceOS startswith "iOS" or DeviceOS startswith "iPadOS"
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where (
    (ActionType == "ProcessCrashed" and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("kernel_task", "launchd", "SpringBoard", "backboardd")) or
    (ActionType in ("ProcessCreated", "ProcessInjected") and AccountName != "root" and InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel in ("Low", "Medium") and ProcessIntegrityLevel == "System") or
    (FileName in~ ("osascript", "bash", "zsh", "python3") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("sudo", "setuid", "seteuid", "pthread_mutex", "dispatch_semaphore"))
)
| extend RiskScore = case(
    ActionType == "ProcessInjected", 90,
    ProcessIntegrityLevel == "System" and AccountName != "root", 85,
    ActionType == "ProcessCrashed" and InitiatingProcessFileName == "kernel_task", 75,
    50
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, DeviceOS, AccountName, ActionType, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessIntegrityLevel, RiskScore
| sort by RiskScore desc, Timestamp desc

Detects suspicious privilege escalation and process anomalies on Apple devices consistent with exploitation of CVE-2025-43510. Monitors for kernel crashes, unexpected privilege elevation from low-integrity processes to SYSTEM, and shell invocations with locking-related syscall patterns.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Microsoft Intune MDM Azure Monitor

Required Tables

DeviceProcessEvents DeviceEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate system update processes may trigger kernel_task crashes during patching
  • Developer tools (Xcode, LLDB) may spawn elevated processes during debugging sessions
  • MDM enrollment processes may briefly elevate privileges on managed Apple devices
  • Third-party security agents (EDR, AV) may perform injections that resemble exploit activity

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for Apple Multiple Products Improper Locking Vulnerability (CVE-2025-43510) (CVE-2025-43510) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource: 

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:

SigmaHQ rules for CVE-2025-43510 Sigma rules on detection.fyi

Platform-specific guides for CVE-2025-43510

Detect in Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Detect in Splunk (SPL) Detect in Elastic Security (Elastic) Detect in IBM QRadar (QRadar) Detect in Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Detect in Google Chronicle (YARA-L) Detect in CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
Last updated: 2026-06-19 Research depth: standard
References (9)

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Race Condition Privilege Escalation via pthread_mutex (macOS)

    Expected signal: EDR process creation event for gcc compiling /tmp/race_test.c, followed by execution of /tmp/race_test. System call `id` execution from child process. No kernel-level events expected in this benign simulation.

  2. Test 2LaunchDaemon Persistence Installation Post-Exploitation Simulation (macOS)

    Expected signal: File creation event for /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.test.cve202543510.plist (CrowdStrike CriticalFileAccessed or equivalent), launchctl process execution events, bash child process spawning from launchd after load.

  3. Test 3Kernel Locking Stress Test via dispatch_semaphore Abuse (macOS)

    Expected signal: Swift compiler process event (swiftc or swift), followed by execution of the compiled binary. Process command line should contain references to lock_abuse.swift. DispatchSemaphore usage may appear in dynamic analysis but not typically in static command-line telemetry.

  4. Test 4Non-Root to Root Privilege Escalation Simulation via SUID Binary (macOS)

    Expected signal: gcc compilation event in /tmp, chmod 4755 file permission change event (CrowdStrike FileAttributeChange), SUID binary execution showing effective UID 0, whoami and id child process executions returning 'root'.

Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Verify the affected Apple device OS version against Apple's security advisory pages (https://support.apple.com/en-us/125632 through 125639) to confirm whether the device is running a patched version; unpatched devices running macOS Sequoia <15.5, iOS <18.5, iPadOS <18.5, tvOS <18.5, visionOS <2.5, or watchOS <11.5 should be treated as compromised until proven otherwise.
  2. Collect the device's kernel panic logs via Console.app or `sudo log collect --last 24h` and review for references to locking primitives (pthread_mutex, os_unfair_lock, OSSpinLock, dispatch_semaphore) and any associated process names or memory addresses that indicate exploitation attempts.
  3. Review process execution history for the 24-hour window surrounding the alert: look for shell processes (bash, zsh, osascript) spawned by unusual parent processes, unexpected setuid/setgid operations, or processes running as root where the originating user was non-privileged.
  4. Check MDM enrollment status and compliance posture via Jamf Pro, Intune, or equivalent — confirm whether Apple Software Update was deployed successfully and identify devices with overdue patches.
  5. Correlate the alert timestamp with any concurrent lateral movement indicators: SMB/AFP shares accessed, new SSH authorized_keys, LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon persistence items created, or new user accounts added.

Containment

  1. Immediately isolate the affected device from the network via MDM-enforced network restriction or CrowdStrike network containment if exploitation is confirmed. For iOS/iPadOS, enable Lost Mode via MDM to prevent data exfiltration while preserving evidence.
  2. Revoke all active authentication tokens, certificates, and VPN credentials associated with the compromised device and any user accounts that were active during the suspected exploitation window. Force re-authentication through a clean, patched device before restoring access.
  3. Deploy the relevant Apple security update (macOS, iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, visionOS, or watchOS) via MDM forced update policy immediately. If the device cannot be updated remotely, quarantine it physically until it can be manually patched.
  4. Block the device's MAC address at the network perimeter and revoke its MDM enrollment certificate to prevent it from rejoining the enterprise network with a potentially compromised state.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture a full system snapshot using `sudo sysdiagnose -u` on macOS, which collects kernel logs, process lists, open files, network connections, and system diagnostics into a single archive. Preserve this archive to forensics storage before any remediation actions.
  2. Export CrowdStrike or SentinelOne EDR telemetry for the affected device covering the 72-hour window preceding detection: process tree, network connections, file writes, and registry/plist modifications. Pay particular attention to LaunchAgents in ~/Library/LaunchAgents/, /Library/LaunchAgents/, and /Library/LaunchDaemons/ for persistence mechanisms installed post-exploitation.
  3. Collect unified logs with: `log collect --device --start '2026-03-20 00:00:00' --output /tmp/device_logs.logarchive` and specifically filter for subsystem=com.apple.kernel and category=locks to identify the exact locking failure timeline.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to Incident Response if any evidence of data exfiltration is found: outbound connections to unknown IPs, unusual volumes of data transferred, or files staged in /tmp or ~/Downloads before alert time.
  • ! Escalate immediately if post-exploitation persistence is confirmed — newly created LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons, modified /etc/sudoers, added SSH keys, or installed profiles not pushed by MDM indicate a full compromise requiring forensic investigation.
  • ! Escalate to threat intelligence if more than three devices show similar exploitation patterns within a 24-hour window, which may indicate a targeted campaign leveraging CVE-2025-43510 against the organization.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > macOS kernel panic reports at /Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/ — examine for locking-related panics referencing pthread, os_unfair_lock, or dispatch_semaphore
  • > Unified Log entries from subsystem com.apple.kernel filtered by category 'locks' showing mutex contention or lock order violations
  • > LaunchAgent and LaunchDaemon plist files in /Library/LaunchDaemons/, /Library/LaunchAgents/, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ created after the exploitation window
  • > bash/zsh history files at ~/.bash_history and ~/.zsh_history for commands involving privilege escalation tools, locking API wrappers, or exploitation frameworks
  • > Endpoint Security Framework (ESF) audit logs capturing setuid/setgid events, process creations with elevated privileges, and file system access to /System/Library/Kernels/

Tuning Guidance

This detection will generate higher false positive rates in environments with active macOS software development, virtualization workloads, or MDM enrollment operations. Tune by: (1) Allowlisting known CI/CD build agent hostnames and developer workstations where setuid/privilege escalation is expected; (2) Excluding Apple-signed processes (verify via code signature) from locking API pattern matches; (3) Raising the detection threshold to require both a locking API match AND a privilege escalation event within a 5-minute window before alerting; (4) Suppressing kernel crash alerts on devices that recently applied Apple software updates, as update-related reboots can cause transient kernel events. Once the fleet is fully patched, disable or archive this rule as residual risk drops to near-zero for CVE-2025-43510 specifically.

Hunting Queries

Hunt for repeated non-root-to-root privilege escalation patterns on macOS endpoints over 30 days, which may indicate active exploitation of CVE-2025-43510 or related kernel vulnerabilities across the fleet.

Hunting — KQL
kql 
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceOS startswith "Mac"
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("bash", "zsh", "sh", "python3", "osascript")
| where AccountName != "root"
| where ProcessIntegrityLevel == "System" or tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).effectiveUserId) == "0"
| summarize count(), make_set(ProcessCommandLine), make_set(FileName) by AccountName, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where count_ > 3
| sort by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl 
index=mac_edr sourcetype IN ("crowdstrike:events:sensor", "jamf:pro", "sentinelone:activity")
| where match(os_family, "(?i)mac")
| where match(event_type, "(?i)(setuid|privilege|root_escalation)")
| where user != "root" AND user != "_daemon"
| bin _time span=1h
| stats count as escalation_count, dc(host) as unique_hosts, values(cmdline) as commands by user, _time
| where escalation_count > 2 OR unique_hosts > 1
| sort - escalation_count

Hunt for Apple devices experiencing repeated kernel crashes that may indicate active exploitation probing of CVE-2025-43510's locking flaw, which can cause kernel instability during race condition triggering.

Hunting — KQL
kql 
DeviceEvents
| where DeviceOS startswith "Mac"
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType == "ProcessCrashed"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("kernel_task", "launchd")
| summarize crash_count=count(), make_set(ReportId) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp, 1d)
| where crash_count >= 2
| sort by crash_count desc
Hunting — SPL
spl 
index=mac_edr OR index=apple_logs
| where match(event_type, "(?i)(kernel_panic|kernel_crash|panic_log)")
| where match(proc_name, "(?i)(kernel_task|launchd|kernel)")
| bin _time span=1d
| stats count as panic_count, values(panic_reason) as reasons by host, _time
| where panic_count >= 2
| sort - panic_count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulate Race Condition Privilege Escalation via pthread_mutex (macOS)
macos

Simulates the class of race condition enabled by improper locking flaws (CWE-667) by spawning concurrent threads that compete for a shared resource using a deliberately mismanaged mutex, then attempting privilege escalation via a setuid binary. Lab use only.

Command

bash 
cat > /tmp/race_test.c << 'EOF'
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static int shared_counter = 0;
void *thread_func(void *arg) {
    for (int i = 0; i < 100000; i++) {
        shared_counter++;
    }
    return NULL;
}
int main() {
    pthread_t t1, t2;
    pthread_create(&t1, NULL, thread_func, NULL);
    pthread_create(&t2, NULL, thread_func, NULL);
    pthread_join(t1, NULL);
    pthread_join(t2, NULL);
    printf("Counter: %d (expected 200000 — divergence indicates race)\n", shared_counter);
    system("id");
    return 0;
}
EOF
gcc -o /tmp/race_test /tmp/race_test.c -lpthread && /tmp/race_test

Cleanup

bash 
rm -f /tmp/race_test.c /tmp/race_test

Expected Telemetry

EDR process creation event for gcc compiling /tmp/race_test.c, followed by execution of /tmp/race_test. System call `id` execution from child process. No kernel-level events expected in this benign simulation.

Expected Detection

Sumo Logic and Splunk rules should match on process spawning from /tmp with subsequent system() call. CrowdStrike may flag /tmp binary execution. Full exploitation simulation requires vulnerable kernel — this tests detection of the build-and-run pattern only.

Test 2 LaunchDaemon Persistence Installation Post-Exploitation Simulation (macOS)
macos

Simulates post-exploitation persistence that would follow successful CVE-2025-43510 exploitation, where an attacker installs a LaunchDaemon to maintain root-level persistence. Requires sudo in lab environment.

Command

bash 
sudo bash -c 'cat > /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.test.cve202543510.plist << EOF
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0"><dict>
<key>Label</key><string>com.test.cve202543510</string>
<key>ProgramArguments</key><array><string>/bin/bash</string><string>-c</string><string>echo pwned > /tmp/cve202543510_marker.txt</string></array>
<key>RunAtLoad</key><true/>
</dict></plist>
EOF
launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.test.cve202543510.plist
launchctl list | grep cve202543510'

Cleanup

bash 
sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.test.cve202543510.plist && sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.test.cve202543510.plist && rm -f /tmp/cve202543510_marker.txt

Expected Telemetry

File creation event for /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.test.cve202543510.plist (CrowdStrike CriticalFileAccessed or equivalent), launchctl process execution events, bash child process spawning from launchd after load.

Expected Detection

KQL query on DeviceFileEvents for plist creation in /Library/LaunchDaemons/ by non-system processes. Chronicle YARA-L PROCESS_LAUNCH event from launchd spawning bash with echo command. All seven platform queries should capture the launchctl and bash execution chain.

Test 3 Kernel Locking Stress Test via dispatch_semaphore Abuse (macOS)
macos

Tests detection telemetry generation by running a Swift program that abuses dispatch_semaphore in patterns consistent with race condition exploitation probing. Validates that locking API usage appears in EDR command-line telemetry.

Command

bash 
cat > /tmp/lock_abuse.swift << 'EOF'
import Foundation
let sema = DispatchSemaphore(value: 1)
let group = DispatchGroup()
for i in 0..<10 {
    DispatchQueue.global().async(group: group) {
        sema.wait()
        print("Thread \(i) in critical section, user: \(NSUserName())")
        Thread.sleep(forTimeInterval: 0.01)
        sema.signal()
    }
}
group.wait()
print("Locking stress test complete")
EOF
swift /tmp/lock_abuse.swift

Cleanup

bash 
rm -f /tmp/lock_abuse.swift

Expected Telemetry

Swift compiler process event (swiftc or swift), followed by execution of the compiled binary. Process command line should contain references to lock_abuse.swift. DispatchSemaphore usage may appear in dynamic analysis but not typically in static command-line telemetry.

Expected Detection

SPL and Sumo Logic regex patterns matching 'dispatch_semaphore' in command-line arguments if Swift source path is included in invocation. CrowdStrike process graph should show swift → process chain. Validates that EDR captures the swift interpreter process with the suspicious source file path.

Test 4 Non-Root to Root Privilege Escalation Simulation via SUID Binary (macOS)
macos

Simulates the privilege escalation outcome of CVE-2025-43510 exploitation by using a lab-created SUID binary to transition from a non-privileged user to root, mimicking what an attacker achieves after exploiting the kernel locking flaw.

Command

bash 
sudo bash -c 'cat > /tmp/suid_test.c << EOF
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main() {
    setuid(0);
    seteuid(0);
    printf("Effective UID: %d\\n", geteuid());
    system("whoami && id");
    return 0;
}
EOF
gcc -o /tmp/suid_bin /tmp/suid_test.c
chmod 4755 /tmp/suid_bin'
/tmp/suid_bin

Cleanup

bash 
sudo rm -f /tmp/suid_test.c /tmp/suid_bin

Expected Telemetry

gcc compilation event in /tmp, chmod 4755 file permission change event (CrowdStrike FileAttributeChange), SUID binary execution showing effective UID 0, whoami and id child process executions returning 'root'.

Expected Detection

KQL query matching ProcessIntegrityLevel == System with AccountName != root. QRadar AQL matching effective user ID 0 with non-root username. All platform queries targeting setuid events and non-root-to-root transitions should fire on this simulation.

Related Detections

Tactic Hubs

TA0004Privilege EscalationTA0003PersistenceTA0002Execution

Related Techniques

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationT1055Process InjectionT1548.001Setuid and SetgidT1543.004Launch Daemon

Same Tactic: Privilege Escalation

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