Detect CVE-2025-40551 — SolarWinds Web Help Desk Deserialization RCE in Google Chronicle
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-40551, a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in SolarWinds Web Help Desk. Successful exploitation allows unauthenticated or low-privileged attackers to achieve remote code execution on the WHD server. This CVE is listed in CISA KEV, indicating active exploitation in the wild.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution Persistence
YARA-L Detection Query
rule cve_2025_40551_whd_deserialization_rce {
meta:
author = "df00tech"
description = "Detects potential CVE-2025-40551 SolarWinds Web Help Desk deserialization RCE via suspicious child processes"
severity = "CRITICAL"
reference = "https://www.solarwinds.com/trust-center/security-advisories/cve-2025-40551"
events:
$parent.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
re.regex($parent.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(java|javaw|tomcat|whd)`) nocase
re.regex($parent.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|certutil\.exe|bitsadmin\.exe|whoami\.exe|curl\.exe|wget\.exe)`) nocase
condition:
$parent
}Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule to detect suspicious process spawning from SolarWinds Web Help Desk Java/Tomcat processes, indicative of CVE-2025-40551 deserialization exploitation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate administrative scripts executed through the WHD service account
- Security tools spawning under the Tomcat or Java process
- Automated deployment or update tooling invoking shell processes
- Developer environments running WHD locally with non-standard tooling
Other platforms for CVE-2025-40551
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate WHD Deserialization RCE — Whoami Execution
Expected signal: ProcessCreate event with ParentImage=java.exe and Image=whoami.exe; captured by Sysmon EventID 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
- Test 2Simulate WHD Deserialization RCE — PowerShell Reverse Shell Stub
Expected signal: ProcessCreate with ParentImage=java.exe, Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing '-NoProfile'; network telemetry if actual reverse shell payload used
- Test 3Simulate WHD Web Shell Drop via Java Process
Expected signal: FileCreate event for shell.jsp under WHD webapps directory, initiated by java.exe; Sysmon EventID 11 or DeviceFileEvents
- Test 4Simulate WHD Outbound C2 Callback from Java Process (Linux)
Expected signal: Network connection from java or curl process to external IP on non-standard port; captured by auditd, Falco, or network flow telemetry
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