CVE-2025-40551

CVE-2025-40551 — SolarWinds Web Help Desk Deserialization RCE

Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-40551, a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in SolarWinds Web Help Desk. Successful exploitation allows unauthenticated or low-privileged attackers to achieve remote code execution on the WHD server. This CVE is listed in CISA KEV, indicating active exploitation in the wild.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

Affected Software

Vendor
SolarWinds
Product
Web Help Desk

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
February 3, 2026

CVSS

Unscored
Write-up coming soon

What is CVE-2025-40551 CVE-2025-40551 — SolarWinds Web Help Desk Deserialization RCE?

CVE-2025-40551 — SolarWinds Web Help Desk Deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-40551) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Persistence tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2025-40551 — SolarWinds Web Help Desk Deserialization RCE, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Windows Security Event Log, Sysmon. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Persistence
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
let WHDProcesses = dynamic(["java", "javaw", "tomcat", "whd"]);
let SuspiciousChildren = dynamic(["cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe", "whoami.exe", "curl.exe", "wget.exe"]);
union DeviceProcessEvents, SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (WHDProcesses) and FileName in~ (SuspiciousChildren))
   or (EventID == 4688 and ParentProcessName has_any (WHDProcesses) and NewProcessName has_any (SuspiciousChildren))
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| extend Alert = "Possible CVE-2025-40551 SolarWinds WHD Deserialization RCE - Suspicious Child Process"

Detects suspicious child processes spawned from SolarWinds Web Help Desk Java/Tomcat processes, which may indicate successful deserialization exploitation leading to RCE.

critical severity high confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Windows Security Event Log Sysmon

Required Tables

DeviceProcessEvents SecurityEvent

False Positives

  • Legitimate administrative Java processes spawning cmd.exe for maintenance tasks
  • Automated patching or update scripts launched by WHD service account
  • Security tooling or EDR agents running under the Tomcat/WHD process tree
  • Scheduled diagnostics or health check scripts invoked by the WHD service

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for CVE-2025-40551 — SolarWinds Web Help Desk Deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-40551) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate WHD Deserialization RCE — Whoami Execution

    Expected signal: ProcessCreate event with ParentImage=java.exe and Image=whoami.exe; captured by Sysmon EventID 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents

  2. Test 2Simulate WHD Deserialization RCE — PowerShell Reverse Shell Stub

    Expected signal: ProcessCreate with ParentImage=java.exe, Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing '-NoProfile'; network telemetry if actual reverse shell payload used

  3. Test 3Simulate WHD Web Shell Drop via Java Process

    Expected signal: FileCreate event for shell.jsp under WHD webapps directory, initiated by java.exe; Sysmon EventID 11 or DeviceFileEvents

  4. Test 4Simulate WHD Outbound C2 Callback from Java Process (Linux)

    Expected signal: Network connection from java or curl process to external IP on non-standard port; captured by auditd, Falco, or network flow telemetry

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Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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