Detect ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal (CVE-2024-1708) in Elastic Security
Detects exploitation of CVE-2024-1708, a path traversal vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect versions prior to 23.9.8. Attackers can traverse outside the intended directory to read, write, or execute arbitrary files on the host. This vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild and listed on CISA KEV. It is commonly chained with CVE-2024-1709 (authentication bypass) to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution.
MITRE ATT&CK
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m
[process where event.type == "start"
and process.name : ("ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe", "ScreenConnect.Service.exe", "ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe")]
[process where event.type == "start"
and process.parent.name : ("ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe", "ScreenConnect.Service.exe", "ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe")
and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "curl.exe", "net.exe", "whoami.exe", "ipconfig.exe")] EQL sequence detection for ScreenConnect service processes spawning command interpreters or reconnaissance tools within a 5-minute window, indicating path traversal exploitation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized IT support personnel executing administrative scripts remotely via ScreenConnect
- Automated patching workflows triggered through ScreenConnect sessions
- Security tooling that uses ScreenConnect for endpoint management
Other platforms for CVE-2024-1708
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Path Traversal File Read via ScreenConnect Web Interface
Expected signal: HTTP 200 or 500 response logged in IIS access logs with traversal sequence in URI; network traffic from test host to ScreenConnect port 8040.
- Test 2ScreenConnect Child Process Spawn Simulation (Sysmon)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 with Image: cmd.exe and ParentImage set to ScreenConnect service path (in actual exploitation scenario); Event ID 11 for file creation.
- Test 3Post-Exploitation Download Cradle via ScreenConnect Session
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (PowerShell spawned from ScreenConnect parent), Event ID 3 (network connection to LAB_C2_HOST), Event ID 7 (System.Net.WebClient DLL load).
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for CVE-2024-1708 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.