Detect ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal (CVE-2024-1708) in Google Chronicle
Detects exploitation of CVE-2024-1708, a path traversal vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect versions prior to 23.9.8. Attackers can traverse outside the intended directory to read, write, or execute arbitrary files on the host. This vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild and listed on CISA KEV. It is commonly chained with CVE-2024-1709 (authentication bypass) to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution.
MITRE ATT&CK
YARA-L Detection Query
rule connectwise_screenconnect_path_traversal_cve_2024_1708 {
meta:
author = "df00tech"
description = "Detects CVE-2024-1708 ScreenConnect path traversal exploitation via suspicious child process spawning"
severity = "CRITICAL"
priority = "HIGH"
reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1708"
events:
$parent.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
$parent.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)screenconnect/
$child.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
$child.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|certutil\.exe|curl\.exe|bitsadmin\.exe)/
$child.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path = $parent.principal.process.file.full_path
$parent.metadata.collected_timestamp.seconds = $child.metadata.collected_timestamp.seconds
match:
$child.principal.hostname over 5m
condition:
$parent and $child
} Chronicle YARA-L rule detecting ScreenConnect spawning suspicious child processes as a result of path traversal exploitation (CVE-2024-1708).
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate administrative remote support sessions running maintenance scripts
- Authorized security tools deployed via ScreenConnect
- Help desk automation invoking standard utilities through ScreenConnect sessions
Other platforms for CVE-2024-1708
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Path Traversal File Read via ScreenConnect Web Interface
Expected signal: HTTP 200 or 500 response logged in IIS access logs with traversal sequence in URI; network traffic from test host to ScreenConnect port 8040.
- Test 2ScreenConnect Child Process Spawn Simulation (Sysmon)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 with Image: cmd.exe and ParentImage set to ScreenConnect service path (in actual exploitation scenario); Event ID 11 for file creation.
- Test 3Post-Exploitation Download Cradle via ScreenConnect Session
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (PowerShell spawned from ScreenConnect parent), Event ID 3 (network connection to LAB_C2_HOST), Event ID 7 (System.Net.WebClient DLL load).
Unlock Pro Content
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