CVE-2024-1708 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal (CVE-2024-1708) in Google Chronicle

Detects exploitation of CVE-2024-1708, a path traversal vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect versions prior to 23.9.8. Attackers can traverse outside the intended directory to read, write, or execute arbitrary files on the host. This vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild and listed on CISA KEV. It is commonly chained with CVE-2024-1709 (authentication bypass) to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Defense Evasion Lateral Movement

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule connectwise_screenconnect_path_traversal_cve_2024_1708 {
  meta:
    author = "df00tech"
    description = "Detects CVE-2024-1708 ScreenConnect path traversal exploitation via suspicious child process spawning"
    severity = "CRITICAL"
    priority = "HIGH"
    reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1708"

  events:
    $parent.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $parent.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)screenconnect/
    $child.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $child.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|certutil\.exe|curl\.exe|bitsadmin\.exe)/
    $child.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path = $parent.principal.process.file.full_path
    $parent.metadata.collected_timestamp.seconds = $child.metadata.collected_timestamp.seconds

  match:
    $child.principal.hostname over 5m

  condition:
    $parent and $child
}
critical severity high confidence

Chronicle YARA-L rule detecting ScreenConnect spawning suspicious child processes as a result of path traversal exploitation (CVE-2024-1708).

Data Sources

Google Chronicle UDMEndpoint Detection Events

Required Tables

process_launch

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate administrative remote support sessions running maintenance scripts
  • Authorized security tools deployed via ScreenConnect
  • Help desk automation invoking standard utilities through ScreenConnect sessions

Other platforms for CVE-2024-1708


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Path Traversal File Read via ScreenConnect Web Interface

    Expected signal: HTTP 200 or 500 response logged in IIS access logs with traversal sequence in URI; network traffic from test host to ScreenConnect port 8040.

  2. Test 2ScreenConnect Child Process Spawn Simulation (Sysmon)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 with Image: cmd.exe and ParentImage set to ScreenConnect service path (in actual exploitation scenario); Event ID 11 for file creation.

  3. Test 3Post-Exploitation Download Cradle via ScreenConnect Session

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (PowerShell spawned from ScreenConnect parent), Event ID 3 (network connection to LAB_C2_HOST), Event ID 7 (System.Net.WebClient DLL load).

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for CVE-2024-1708 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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