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CVE-2024-10441 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Synology DSM Improper Output Encoding RCE (CVE-2024-10441) in Sumo Logic CSE

Detects exploitation attempts and exposure of CVE-2024-10441, a critical (CVSS 9.8) improper encoding or escaping of output vulnerability (CWE-116) in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) and BeeStation OS. The flaw is in the system plugin daemon and allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code without authentication via unspecified vectors. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The detection logic targets the DSM web management service on TCP 5000/5001 and surfaces anomalous DSM web service access, suspicious synoscgi/CGI invocations, unexpected child processes spawned by DSM web-service accounts, and reconnaissance against DSM login/CGI endpoints.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
// df00tech DF00-8aff9c6cd4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2024-10441 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
_sourceCategory=*firewall* OR _sourceCategory=*proxy*
| where (dest_port = 5000 or dest_port = 5001)
| where url matches /(?i)(synoscgi|\/webapi\/|entry\.cgi|auth\.cgi)/
| if (user_agent matches /(?i)(curl|python-requests|Go-http-client|zgrab|masscan|libwww)/ or url matches /(?i)(%0a|%0d|\.\.\/|etc\/passwd|cmd=|exec)/, 1, 0) as susp
| where susp = 1
| count as hits, values(url) as urls by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port
| where hits > 5
| sort by hits desc
critical severity medium confidence

Sumo Logic search for anomalous Synology DSM WebAPI/synoscgi access patterns on ports 5000/5001 consistent with CVE-2024-10441 exploitation.

Data Sources

Firewall LogsWeb Proxy Logs

Required Tables

firewallproxy

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized scanning of DSM appliances
  • Synology mobile/desktop client automated traffic
  • Health-check monitors against the management UI

Other platforms for CVE-2024-10441


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Simulate CRLF/injection probe against DSM WebAPI endpoint

    Expected signal: Firewall/proxy HTTP log entry to port 5001 with suspicious user-agent and encoded CRLF in the URL query.

  2. Test 2 Scripted enumeration of DSM login/auth endpoints

    Expected signal: Multiple firewall/proxy records to port 5000 with a scanner user-agent against auth.cgi within a short window.

  3. Test 3 Path traversal probe against synoscgi

    Expected signal: HTTP request log to port 5001 containing ../ traversal sequence and /etc/passwd reference.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the destination host is a Synology DSM or BeeStation appliance and identify its exact DSM/BeeStation OS build; compare against fixed versions (DSM 7.2-64570-4, 7.2.1-69057-6, 7.2.2-72806-1, BeeStation OS 1.1-65374).
  2. Review the source IP reputation and determine whether the requests originate from a known scanner, an internal asset, or an untrusted external address; check whether the DSM management interface (5000/5001) is exposed to the internet.
  3. Pull the full request/response payloads for the flagged synoscgi/WebAPI calls and inspect for injection markers (CRLF, path traversal, command substitution) and any anomalous 2xx responses to crafted input.

Containment

  1. If the appliance is unpatched and internet-exposed, immediately restrict access to ports 5000/5001 via firewall/ACL and disable external access to QuickConnect/DDNS until patched.
  2. Apply the vendor fixed release (DSM 7.2.2-72806-1 or the relevant branch fix) and force-rotate all DSM admin and service account credentials in case of compromise.

Evidence Collection

  1. Export DSM system and connection logs (/var/log/synolog/, synoscgi and nginx access logs) and the firewall/proxy records covering the activity window.
  2. Capture a memory and disk image or at minimum a configuration/package snapshot of the appliance before remediation to preserve any implanted webshells or scheduled tasks.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if crafted requests returned successful (2xx) responses, if new DSM packages/scheduled tasks/admin users appeared, or if outbound connections from the appliance to unknown hosts are observed.
  • !Escalate to management and notify per CISA BOD guidance if the appliance is confirmed compromised or if exploitation of this KEV-listed CVE against internet-facing assets is confirmed.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >DSM nginx and synoscgi access logs under /var/log/nginx/ and /var/log/synolog/ showing crafted requests
  • >Newly created or modified files under the web root, /usr/syno/synoman/, and unexpected entries in crontab/scheduled tasks or installed .spk packages

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate Synology client apps and authorized scanners by source IP and user-agent, then exclude them. Tighten the injection regex to your environment's observed payloads and raise the Hits threshold if DSM appliances are heavily used internally. For environments without internet-exposed DSM, focus the rule on internal source IPs to catch lateral movement.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for high-volume or scripted enumeration of DSM synoscgi endpoints that may indicate automated exploitation of CVE-2024-10441.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-8aff9c6cd4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2024-10441 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
CommonSecurityLog | where DestinationPort in (5000,5001) | where RequestURL has "synoscgi" | summarize count() by SourceIP, RequestClientApplication | where count_ > 20
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-8aff9c6cd4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2024-10441 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=network (dest_port=5000 OR dest_port=5001) uri_path="*synoscgi*" | stats count dc(uri_path) by src_ip http_user_agent | where count > 20

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulate CRLF/injection probe against DSM WebAPI endpoint
linux

Sends a crafted request with encoded CRLF and command markers to a lab DSM synoscgi endpoint to generate detection telemetry.

Command

bash
curl -k -s -A 'python-requests/2.31' 'https://dsm-lab.local:5001/webapi/entry.cgi?api=SYNO.API.Info&method=query%0acmd=id&version=1' -o /dev/null

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; request is non-persistent'

Expected Telemetry

Firewall/proxy HTTP log entry to port 5001 with suspicious user-agent and encoded CRLF in the URL query.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rules flag the request as injection-style access to a DSM synoscgi endpoint.

Test 2 Scripted enumeration of DSM login/auth endpoints
linux

Issues repeated scripted requests to the DSM auth.cgi endpoint to simulate reconnaissance preceding exploitation.

Command

bash
for i in $(seq 1 10); do curl -k -s -A 'zgrab/0.x' 'https://dsm-lab.local:5000/webapi/auth.cgi?api=SYNO.API.Auth&method=login&version=3' -o /dev/null; done

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Multiple firewall/proxy records to port 5000 with a scanner user-agent against auth.cgi within a short window.

Expected Detection

Aggregation rules trigger on Hits > 5 from a single source against DSM WebAPI endpoints.

Test 3 Path traversal probe against synoscgi
linux

Sends a path-traversal style request to the DSM web service to test for improper output encoding handling.

Command

bash
curl -k -s -A 'masscan/1.3' 'https://dsm-lab.local:5001/webman/../../../etc/passwd' -o /dev/null

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

HTTP request log to port 5001 containing ../ traversal sequence and /etc/passwd reference.

Expected Detection

Detection rules match the path-traversal regex branch and raise an alert.

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