Detect Synology DSM Improper Output Encoding RCE (CVE-2024-10441) in Elastic Security
Detects exploitation attempts and exposure of CVE-2024-10441, a critical (CVSS 9.8) improper encoding or escaping of output vulnerability (CWE-116) in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) and BeeStation OS. The flaw is in the system plugin daemon and allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code without authentication via unspecified vectors. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The detection logic targets the DSM web management service on TCP 5000/5001 and surfaces anomalous DSM web service access, suspicious synoscgi/CGI invocations, unexpected child processes spawned by DSM web-service accounts, and reconnaissance against DSM login/CGI endpoints.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
Elastic Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-8aff9c6cd4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2024-10441 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
sequence by source.ip with maxspan=10m
[network where destination.port in (5000, 5001) and url.path : ("*synoscgi*", "*/webapi/*", "*entry.cgi*", "*auth.cgi*")]
[network where destination.port in (5000, 5001) and (user_agent.original : ("*curl*", "*python-requests*", "*zgrab*", "*masscan*") or url.query : ("*%0a*", "*../*", "*etc/passwd*", "*cmd=*"))] Detects a recon-then-exploit sequence from a single source against Synology DSM WebAPI/synoscgi endpoints indicative of CVE-2024-10441 abuse.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized penetration testing or vulnerability scanning windows
- Synology native client applications generating sequential API traffic
- Internal automation that enumerates WebAPI methods for inventory
Other platforms for CVE-2024-10441
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Simulate CRLF/injection probe against DSM WebAPI endpoint
Expected signal: Firewall/proxy HTTP log entry to port 5001 with suspicious user-agent and encoded CRLF in the URL query.
- Test 2 Scripted enumeration of DSM login/auth endpoints
Expected signal: Multiple firewall/proxy records to port 5000 with a scanner user-agent against auth.cgi within a short window.
- Test 3 Path traversal probe against synoscgi
Expected signal: HTTP request log to port 5001 containing ../ traversal sequence and /etc/passwd reference.
References (5)
- https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_20
- https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_23
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10441
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-10441
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the destination host is a Synology DSM or BeeStation appliance and identify its exact DSM/BeeStation OS build; compare against fixed versions (DSM 7.2-64570-4, 7.2.1-69057-6, 7.2.2-72806-1, BeeStation OS 1.1-65374).
- Review the source IP reputation and determine whether the requests originate from a known scanner, an internal asset, or an untrusted external address; check whether the DSM management interface (5000/5001) is exposed to the internet.
- Pull the full request/response payloads for the flagged synoscgi/WebAPI calls and inspect for injection markers (CRLF, path traversal, command substitution) and any anomalous 2xx responses to crafted input.
Containment
- If the appliance is unpatched and internet-exposed, immediately restrict access to ports 5000/5001 via firewall/ACL and disable external access to QuickConnect/DDNS until patched.
- Apply the vendor fixed release (DSM 7.2.2-72806-1 or the relevant branch fix) and force-rotate all DSM admin and service account credentials in case of compromise.
Evidence Collection
- Export DSM system and connection logs (/var/log/synolog/, synoscgi and nginx access logs) and the firewall/proxy records covering the activity window.
- Capture a memory and disk image or at minimum a configuration/package snapshot of the appliance before remediation to preserve any implanted webshells or scheduled tasks.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if crafted requests returned successful (2xx) responses, if new DSM packages/scheduled tasks/admin users appeared, or if outbound connections from the appliance to unknown hosts are observed.
- !Escalate to management and notify per CISA BOD guidance if the appliance is confirmed compromised or if exploitation of this KEV-listed CVE against internet-facing assets is confirmed.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
DSM nginx and synoscgi access logs under /var/log/nginx/ and /var/log/synolog/ showing crafted requests - >
Newly created or modified files under the web root, /usr/syno/synoman/, and unexpected entries in crontab/scheduled tasks or installed .spk packages
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate Synology client apps and authorized scanners by source IP and user-agent, then exclude them. Tighten the injection regex to your environment's observed payloads and raise the Hits threshold if DSM appliances are heavily used internally. For environments without internet-exposed DSM, focus the rule on internal source IPs to catch lateral movement.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for high-volume or scripted enumeration of DSM synoscgi endpoints that may indicate automated exploitation of CVE-2024-10441.
// df00tech DF00-8aff9c6cd4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2024-10441 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
CommonSecurityLog | where DestinationPort in (5000,5001) | where RequestURL has "synoscgi" | summarize count() by SourceIP, RequestClientApplication | where count_ > 20 ``` df00tech DF00-8aff9c6cd4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2024-10441 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=network (dest_port=5000 OR dest_port=5001) uri_path="*synoscgi*" | stats count dc(uri_path) by src_ip http_user_agent | where count > 20 Atomic Red Team Tests
Sends a crafted request with encoded CRLF and command markers to a lab DSM synoscgi endpoint to generate detection telemetry.
Command
curl -k -s -A 'python-requests/2.31' 'https://dsm-lab.local:5001/webapi/entry.cgi?api=SYNO.API.Info&method=query%0acmd=id&version=1' -o /dev/null Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required; request is non-persistent' Expected Telemetry
Firewall/proxy HTTP log entry to port 5001 with suspicious user-agent and encoded CRLF in the URL query.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules flag the request as injection-style access to a DSM synoscgi endpoint.
Issues repeated scripted requests to the DSM auth.cgi endpoint to simulate reconnaissance preceding exploitation.
Command
for i in $(seq 1 10); do curl -k -s -A 'zgrab/0.x' 'https://dsm-lab.local:5000/webapi/auth.cgi?api=SYNO.API.Auth&method=login&version=3' -o /dev/null; done Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
Multiple firewall/proxy records to port 5000 with a scanner user-agent against auth.cgi within a short window.
Expected Detection
Aggregation rules trigger on Hits > 5 from a single source against DSM WebAPI endpoints.
Sends a path-traversal style request to the DSM web service to test for improper output encoding handling.
Command
curl -k -s -A 'masscan/1.3' 'https://dsm-lab.local:5001/webman/../../../etc/passwd' -o /dev/null Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
HTTP request log to port 5001 containing ../ traversal sequence and /etc/passwd reference.
Expected Detection
Detection rules match the path-traversal regex branch and raise an alert.