Detect CVE-2012-1854 - Microsoft VBA Insecure Library Loading (DLL Hijacking) in Sumo Logic CSE
Detects exploitation of CVE-2012-1854, a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). Attackers can place a malicious DLL in a directory searched before the legitimate library path, causing Office applications loading VBA to execute attacker-controlled code. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
MITRE ATT&CK
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory=windows/sysmon EventCode=7
| where ProcessImage matches /(?i)(WINWORD|EXCEL|POWERPNT|OUTLOOK|MSACCESS|MSPUB|VISIO)\.EXE$/
| where ImageLoaded matches /(?i)(vbe7|vba7|vbe6|vba6|msvbvm60|msvbvm50)\.dll$/
| where ImageLoaded matches /(?i)\\(Users|AppData|Temp|Downloads|Desktop)\\/
| fields _messageTime, Computer, User, ProcessImage, ImageLoaded, Hashes
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic query detecting suspicious VBA DLL loads by Office applications from user-accessible directories, indicative of CVE-2012-1854 DLL hijacking.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Software testing pipelines deploying Office libraries to custom paths
- Roaming profile users whose AppData resolves to network shares
- Third-party Office add-ins installing VBA runtime libraries in non-standard locations
- Virtualized Office deployments with redirected DLL paths
Other platforms for CVE-2012-1854
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1VBA DLL Hijack - Place Malicious DLL in Temp Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 7 showing WINWORD.EXE loading vbe7.dll from %TEMP% path; DeviceImageLoadEvents in MDE showing FolderPath containing \Temp\
- Test 2VBA DLL Hijack - Place Malicious DLL in Downloads Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon ImageLoad event with ImageLoaded path in \Downloads\; Windows Security log showing file creation event in Downloads directory followed by Office process DLL load
- Test 3VBA DLL Hijack - Simulate Document-Triggered DLL Load via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 7 with POWERPNT.EXE as initiating process and vba7.dll loaded from TEMP\vba_hijack_test path; process creation event showing PowerShell as parent of POWERPNT
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