Detect CVE-2012-1854 - Microsoft VBA Insecure Library Loading (DLL Hijacking) in CrowdStrike LogScale
Detects exploitation of CVE-2012-1854, a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). Attackers can place a malicious DLL in a directory searched before the legitimate library path, causing Office applications loading VBA to execute attacker-controlled code. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
MITRE ATT&CK
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName=ImageLoad
| ImageFileName=/(?i)(vbe7|vba7|vbe6|vba6|msvbvm60|msvbvm50)\.dll$/
| ParentBaseFileName=/(WINWORD|EXCEL|POWERPNT|OUTLOOK|MSACCESS|MSPUB|VISIO)\.EXE/i
| ImageFileName=/(\\Users\\|\\AppData\\|\\Temp\\|\\Downloads\\|\\Desktop\\)/i
| groupBy([aid, ComputerName, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, ImageFileName, SHA256HashData], function=count())
| rename ComputerName as Hostname, UserName as User, ParentBaseFileName as OfficeProcess, ImageFileName as LoadedDLL
| sort count descCrowdStrike Falcon query detecting VBA DLL hijacking (CVE-2012-1854) via ImageLoad events where Office processes load VBA runtime DLLs from user-controlled directories.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Endpoint Detection and Response sensors injecting monitoring DLLs into Office processes
- Legitimate Office repair or update operations placing DLLs in temp directories
- AppV or application virtualization solutions redirecting DLL paths
- Non-standard enterprise Office deployments on shared drives
Other platforms for CVE-2012-1854
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1VBA DLL Hijack - Place Malicious DLL in Temp Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 7 showing WINWORD.EXE loading vbe7.dll from %TEMP% path; DeviceImageLoadEvents in MDE showing FolderPath containing \Temp\
- Test 2VBA DLL Hijack - Place Malicious DLL in Downloads Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon ImageLoad event with ImageLoaded path in \Downloads\; Windows Security log showing file creation event in Downloads directory followed by Office process DLL load
- Test 3VBA DLL Hijack - Simulate Document-Triggered DLL Load via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 7 with POWERPNT.EXE as initiating process and vba7.dll loaded from TEMP\vba_hijack_test path; process creation event showing PowerShell as parent of POWERPNT
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