Microsoft Office PowerPoint Code Injection (CVE-2009-0556)
Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2009-0556, a code injection vulnerability in Microsoft Office PowerPoint. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability via crafted PowerPoint files to execute arbitrary code in the context of the logged-in user. This CVE is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Microsoft
- Product
- Office
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- January 7, 2026
CVSS
What is CVE-2009-0556 Microsoft Office PowerPoint Code Injection (CVE-2009-0556)?
Microsoft Office PowerPoint Code Injection (CVE-2009-0556) (CVE-2009-0556) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Microsoft Office PowerPoint Code Injection (CVE-2009-0556), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Sentinel. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
let suspiciousPptExtensions = dynamic(['.ppt', '.pptx', '.pps', '.ppsx', '.pot', '.potx']);
let lookback = 48h;
union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powerpnt.exe'
or (ActionType == 'FileCreated' and FileName has_any (suspiciousPptExtensions))
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ('winword.exe', 'excel.exe', 'outlook.exe', 'powerpnt.exe')
or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powerpnt.exe' and FileName has_any (suspiciousPptExtensions) and FolderPath has_any ('\\Temp\\', '\\AppData\\', '\\Downloads\\'))
| extend suspicionReason = case(
InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powerpnt.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('cmd.exe', 'powershell', 'wscript', 'cscript', 'mshta'), 'PowerPoint spawning shell',
FolderPath has_any ('\\Temp\\', '\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\'), 'Suspicious temp path',
true(), 'General anomaly'
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, suspicionReason Detects PowerPoint spawning suspicious child processes or creating files in temp paths, consistent with CVE-2009-0556 exploitation via crafted .ppt files.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate macros in PowerPoint files that launch scripts for business automation
- IT deployment tools that use PowerPoint templates with scripting hooks
- Security training or red team exercises running simulated phishing payloads
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for Microsoft Office PowerPoint Code Injection (CVE-2009-0556) (CVE-2009-0556) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2009-0556
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1PowerPoint Spawning cmd.exe (Simulated CVE-2009-0556 Payload Execution)
Expected signal: Process creation event: parent=POWERPNT.EXE, child=cmd.exe with arguments '/c whoami'
- Test 2PowerPoint Spawning PowerShell with Encoded Command
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Image=powershell.exe, ParentImage=powerpnt.exe, CommandLine contains -EncodedCommand
- Test 3Crafted PPT File Drop to Temp Directory
Expected signal: File creation event: FileName=exploit_test.ppt, FolderPath contains \Temp\
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for CVE-2009-0556 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.