Detect Microsoft Windows Video ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution (CVE-2008-0015) in Elastic Security
Detects exploitation attempts targeting the Microsoft Windows Video ActiveX Control vulnerability (CVE-2008-0015), addressed in MS09-032. The msvidctl.dll ActiveX control contains a memory corruption flaw that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web page. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and has been actively exploited in drive-by download campaigns.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.name with maxspan=30s
[process where process.name : "iexplore.exe" and event.type == "start"]
[process where process.parent.name : "iexplore.exe"
and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe")]EQL sequence detection correlating Internet Explorer process start with suspicious child process spawning within 30 seconds, consistent with drive-by exploitation of CVE-2008-0015.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Automated enterprise testing frameworks that launch IE and subsequently run scripts
- Helpdesk or IT automation tools that use IE as a subprocess launcher
- Legacy intranet portals that legitimately spawn helper processes from IE
Other platforms for CVE-2008-0015
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Verify msvidctl ActiveX Kill Bit Absence
Expected signal: Registry query event (Sysmon EventID 13 or equivalent) accessing the ActiveX Compatibility key for the msvidctl CLSID.
- Test 2Simulate IE Spawning cmd.exe (Post-Exploitation Child Process)
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 1 showing cmd.exe spawned in close temporal proximity to an iexplore.exe process; may also generate network events if IE loads a page.
- Test 3Reference msvidctl CLSID in Command Line
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 1 with CommandLine containing the CLSID string {0955AC62-BF2E-4CBA-A2B9-A63F772D46CF}.
- Test 4Attempt to Remove msvidctl Kill Bit (Attacker Persistence Simulation)
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 12 (registry key deleted) or EventID 14 targeting the ActiveX Compatibility key for the msvidctl CLSID.
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