Microsoft Windows Video ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution (CVE-2008-0015)
Detects exploitation attempts targeting the Microsoft Windows Video ActiveX Control vulnerability (CVE-2008-0015), addressed in MS09-032. The msvidctl.dll ActiveX control contains a memory corruption flaw that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted web page. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and has been actively exploited in drive-by download campaigns.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Microsoft
- Product
- Windows
Timeline
- Disclosed
- February 17, 2026
CVSS
What is CVE-2008-0015 Microsoft Windows Video ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution (CVE-2008-0015)?
Microsoft Windows Video ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution (CVE-2008-0015) (CVE-2008-0015) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Microsoft Windows Video ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution (CVE-2008-0015), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Microsoft Sentinel DeviceProcessEvents, Microsoft Sentinel DeviceNetworkEvents. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("iexplore.exe", "mshtml.dll")
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("msvidctl", "CLSID", "{0955AC62-BF2E-4CBA-A2B9-A63F772D46CF}")
| extend suspiciousChild = iff(
InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("iexplore.exe") and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe"),
true, false
)
| where suspiciousChild == true
or ProcessCommandLine has "{0955AC62-BF2E-4CBA-A2B9-A63F772D46CF}"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by TimeGenerated desc Detects Internet Explorer spawning suspicious child processes or command lines referencing the vulnerable msvidctl.dll ActiveX CLSID, indicating potential CVE-2008-0015 exploitation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate media player or video software using the Windows Video ActiveX control in benign contexts
- Security researchers testing or scanning for the vulnerability in authorized lab environments
- Legacy enterprise applications that legitimately invoke msvidctl.dll via Internet Explorer
Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping
The detection logic for Microsoft Windows Video ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution (CVE-2008-0015) (CVE-2008-0015) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2008-0015
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Verify msvidctl ActiveX Kill Bit Absence
Expected signal: Registry query event (Sysmon EventID 13 or equivalent) accessing the ActiveX Compatibility key for the msvidctl CLSID.
- Test 2Simulate IE Spawning cmd.exe (Post-Exploitation Child Process)
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 1 showing cmd.exe spawned in close temporal proximity to an iexplore.exe process; may also generate network events if IE loads a page.
- Test 3Reference msvidctl CLSID in Command Line
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 1 with CommandLine containing the CLSID string {0955AC62-BF2E-4CBA-A2B9-A63F772D46CF}.
- Test 4Attempt to Remove msvidctl Kill Bit (Attacker Persistence Simulation)
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 12 (registry key deleted) or EventID 14 targeting the ActiveX Compatibility key for the msvidctl CLSID.
Unlock Pro Content
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