Skip to content
← Blog · · df00tech

Daptin IDOR in generic YJS collaboration endpoint lets any authenticated user read and write other users' file columns

breaking ghsa go CVE-2026-77369

What happened

A GitHub security advisory (GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793) discloses a broken access control vulnerability in daptin/daptin, a Go-based API/CMS platform. Daptin exposes a generic WebSocket route, GET /yjs/:documentName, used for real-time collaborative editing via YJS/CRDT sync. According to the advisory, this generic endpoint only checks that a session exists. It performs no per-resource authorization check. The :documentName parameter is parsed as typename.referenceId.columnName and used to fetch that row's actual content, serving it to the connecting client unconditionally.

Daptin also has a purpose-built sibling route (/live/:typename/:referenceId/:columnName/yjs) that does perform the correct row lookup and CanUpdate/CanRead permission checks. The advisory includes a PoC where a freshly self-registered, zero-privilege account opens a WebSocket session against the admin-only calendar table via the generic route (HTTP 101), while the same identifier correctly fails against the secured route. The reported CVSS is 9.6 with a public PoC, tracked as CVE-2026-77369.

Why it matters for defenders

Per the advisory, any authenticated user, including a newly self-registered account with no group memberships, can read the content of any file.*-typed column on any row of any table in a Daptin deployment. This includes tables that are admin-only by default (e.g. calendar) and rows that ordinary row-level permissions would otherwise block. Because YJS sync is bidirectional, the same low-privileged session can also push edits, which legitimate collaborators may later pull back into the document through the correctly secured route. That gives both a confidentiality and an integrity path. Any Daptin deployment with open self-registration (the stated default) and at least one file.* column is exploitable without special privilege.

What defenders should watch for or do now

  • Inventory any Daptin instances in your environment and check whether self-registration/open signup is enabled.
  • Review network/WebSocket logs for upgrade requests to /yjs/:documentName from low-privileged or newly created accounts, particularly against tables not normally accessed by that user.
  • Watch for documentName values following the typename.referenceId.columnName pattern targeting sensitive or admin-only tables (e.g. calendar) in access logs.
  • Compare authorization behavior between the generic /yjs/:documentName route and the secured /live/... route if you operate or can inspect a Daptin instance. A 101 Switching Protocols response on the generic route for a resource a user should not access is a strong indicator.
  • As a mitigation until a patched release is available, consider restricting or disabling the generic /yjs/:documentName route at a reverse proxy/gateway layer, or restrict access to trusted/internal users only.

Developing intel

This is net-new, same-day intel from a GitHub Security Advisory. The vulnerability is reportedly fixed on Daptin's default branch (commit a1a3c48f, with a supporting fix in artpar/ydb v0.4.1), but the advisory states no patched Daptin release has been published yet. Treat this as unresolved for production deployments until a release is confirmed. Details may evolve as the vendor publishes a release. See the original advisory for the full technical write-up and PoC: https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793.

Get new detections in your inbox

New ATT&CK coverage plus CISA KEV / CVE detection rules, roughly weekly. No spam, unsubscribe anytime.