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THREAT-Impact-SecurityToolMassServiceStop CrowdStrike LogScale · LogScale

Detect Mass Stop/Disable of AV, EDR, and Backup Agent Services Preceding Destructive Activity in CrowdStrike LogScale

Before deploying an encryptor or wiper, ransomware operators and their affiliates routinely disable or kill every security and backup agent on a host in a tight burst, so that neither the endpoint protection stack nor the backup client can interfere with or later help recover from the destructive payload. This is executed with built-in, signed Windows tooling rather than custom malware: `sc.exe stop <svc>` / `sc.exe config <svc> start= disabled` (stop and permanently disable a service), `net stop <svc>` (the legacy equivalent, still widely scripted), PowerShell `Stop-Service`/`Set-Service -StartupType Disabled` (used when execution is via a PowerShell-based loader or C2 implant), and `taskkill /F /IM <process>.exe` (used to kill the service host process directly when the service control manager itself is protected or tamper-resistant). The distinguishing signal is not any single command — administrators routinely stop one service for maintenance — but the pattern of several distinct AV/EDR and backup-agent service names being targeted by one host/account within a short window, which has essentially no legitimate single-actor explanation outside of a coordinated uninstall or migration. Named targets recur across incident reports: Windows Defender (WinDefend, MsMpSvc, Sense/MDE, SecurityHealthService, WdNisSvc), CrowdStrike Falcon (CSFalconService, CSAgent), SentinelOne (SentinelAgent, SentinelServiceHost), VMware/Carbon Black (CbDefense, CbEvtMgr), Sophos (SAVService, SAVAdminService), Symantec/Broadcom (SepMasterService, ccSvcHst), McAfee/Trellix (McShield, mfemms, mfevtp), Trend Micro (TmCCSF, ntrtscan), BlackBerry Cylance (CylanceSvc), Malwarebytes (MBAMService), and backup agents including Veeam (VeeamBackupSvc, VeeamTransportSvc), Acronis (AcronisAgent), Veritas Backup Exec (BackupExecJobEngine, BackupExecAgentAccelerator), and the native Windows VSS/backup engine (wbengine, SDRSVC). Detection keys on the combination of a stop/disable/kill command syntax against this named-target list, clustered per host within a short window, rather than on any individual binary or service name in isolation.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Impact

LogScale Detection Query

CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
cql
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
(
  (FileName=/^sc\.exe$/i CommandLine=/(stop|config)/i) OR
  (FileName=/^net1?\.exe$/i CommandLine=/stop/i) OR
  (FileName=/^taskkill\.exe$/i CommandLine=/(\/f|\/im)/i) OR
  (FileName=/^powershell\.exe$/i CommandLine=/(Stop-Service|Set-Service)/i)
)
CommandLine=/(WinDefend|MsMpSvc|Sense|CSFalconService|SentinelAgent|CbDefense|SAVService|SepMasterService|McShield|TmCCSF|CylanceSvc|VeeamBackupSvc|AcronisAgent|BackupExec|wbengine|SDRSVC)/i
| StopMethod := case([
    FileName=/^sc\.exe$/i, "sc_stop_or_config";
    FileName=/^net1?\.exe$/i, "net_stop";
    FileName=/^taskkill\.exe$/i, "taskkill_force";
    true(), "posh_stop_or_set_service"
  ])
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName], function=[count(as=Events), collect(CommandLine, limit=20, as=Targets)])
| sort(Events, order=desc)
critical severity high confidence

CrowdStrike LogScale query over ProcessRollup2 events for sc.exe/net.exe/taskkill.exe/PowerShell commands targeting named AV/EDR and backup-agent services. Recommend a companion scheduled search requiring 3+ distinct Targets values within a 15-minute window to reproduce the MassStop burst scoring.

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon (ProcessRollup2)CrowdStrike LogScale

Required Tables

ProcessRollup2

False Positives & Tuning

  • Bulk patch/maintenance automation stopping several agents before an update
  • Planned migration or uninstall of one security product in favor of another
  • Backup software upgrade windows stopping the vendor's own agent services
  • Golden-image pipelines stripping pre-installed AV/EDR agents from a template

Other platforms for THREAT-Impact-SecurityToolMassServiceStop


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Stop and Disable Windows Defender via sc.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon/DeviceProcessEvents/Security 4688 process creation: FileName=sc.exe, two events with CommandLine containing 'stop WinDefend' and 'config WinDefend start= disabled' respectively.

  2. Test 2Mass Stop of AV/EDR and Backup Services via net stop

    Expected signal: Sysmon/DeviceProcessEvents/Security 4688 process creation: FileName=net.exe, three events with CommandLine containing 'stop SAVService', 'stop SepMasterService', and 'stop VeeamTransportSvc' respectively, within the same 15-minute window on one host.

  3. Test 3Kill CrowdStrike Falcon Service Host via taskkill

    Expected signal: Sysmon/DeviceProcessEvents/Security 4688 process creation: FileName=taskkill.exe, CommandLine contains '/F /IM CSFalconService.exe'.

  4. Test 4Disable Security Services via PowerShell Stop-Service/Set-Service

    Expected signal: Sysmon/DeviceProcessEvents/Security 4688 process creation: FileName=powershell.exe, two events with CommandLine containing 'Stop-Service' and 'Set-Service' respectively, ParentImage referencing powershell.exe/pwsh.exe.

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