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THREAT-Impact-FinancialLedgerTampering Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Financial Ledger and Transaction Record Tampering via Direct Database Manipulation in Google Chronicle

An insider with legitimate database credentials, or an attacker who has obtained them, can bypass an application's business logic entirely and manipulate financial data at the source: connecting directly to the ledger, invoice, or transaction database with an interactive client (SQL Server Management Studio, Azure Data Studio, DBeaver, psql, mysql CLI) instead of through the application's service account, then issuing UPDATE or DELETE statements against tables such as general_ledger, invoices, journal_entries, gl_entries, ap_transactions, or account_balances. This is functionally identical to APT38's DYEPACK tool altering SWIFT transaction records to conceal fraudulent transfers, and to the classic 'ghost employee' or 'check kiting' fraud pattern where a trusted insider edits posted transactions after the fact rather than through a reversing journal entry (which would leave the expected audit trail). Three behaviors distinguish malicious tampering from legitimate maintenance: (1) the write originates from an ad-hoc/interactive client tool or an identity other than the application's own connection pool account — legitimate corrections almost always flow back through the application, which posts compensating entries rather than editing history in place; (2) the activity clusters off-hours or on weekends, when fewer people are watching and reconciliation staff are not online; and (3) the write is preceded by disabling the database's own audit trail for that table or database — SQL Server 'ALTER SERVER AUDIT ... WITH (STATE = OFF)', temporal-table system-versioning disablement, change-tracking disablement, or a DISABLE TRIGGER on an audit trigger — which is a strong signal since audit trails exist specifically to survive this kind of tampering and disabling one immediately before writing to financial tables has essentially no legitimate business justification. This detection watches SQL platform audit logs (Azure SQL Auditing / SQL Server Audit, or equivalent extended-events output) for the write pattern, the audit-disablement pattern, and the two-step sequence where disablement precedes writes within a short window.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Impact

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule financial_ledger_tampering {
  meta:
    author = "df00tech Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects direct UPDATE/DELETE tampering with financial ledger, invoice, or transaction tables, optionally preceded by audit-trail disablement"
    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001/"
    severity = "HIGH"
    priority = "HIGH"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Impact"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1565.001"
    false_positives = "Approved DBA maintenance, overnight batch reconciliation jobs, schema-migration audit toggling"
    version = "1.0"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT"
    $e.metadata.product_name = "Azure SQL Auditing"
    (
      re.regex($e.metadata.product_event_type, `(?i)(UPDATE|DELETE)`) and
      re.regex($e.target.resource.name, `(?i)(ledger|invoice|transaction|payment|journal_entr|gl_entr|account_balance)`)
    )
    $principal = $e.principal.user.userid
    $database = $e.target.resource.attribute.labels["database_name"]

  match:
    $principal, $database over 15m

  condition:
    $e
}
high severity medium confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule matching USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT UDM events from Azure SQL Auditing, filtering to UPDATE/DELETE actions against financial-sounding target resource names, grouped by principal and database over a 15-minute window. Recommend a companion rule watching for AUDIT_CHANGE_GROUP-equivalent UDM events on the same principal/database so analysts can manually correlate audit-disablement-then-write sequences during triage, since YARA-L single-rule sequencing across disparate event subtypes is best handled with a downstream correlation rule.

Data Sources

Google Chronicle SIEMChronicle UDM (Unified Data Model)Azure SQL Auditing (via Chronicle feed)

Required Tables

UDM Events (USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT)

False Positives & Tuning

  • Approved DBA maintenance or data-correction work during a documented change window
  • Overnight batch reconciliation jobs from an ETL/reporting identity
  • Schema-migration work temporarily disabling audit specifications

Other platforms for THREAT-Impact-FinancialLedgerTampering


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Disable SQL Server Audit Then Update Ledger Table

    Expected signal: SQL Server Audit / Azure SQL Auditing records: an AUDIT_CHANGE_GROUP event for test_ledger_audit_spec followed within minutes by an UPDATE action_name event against object_name dbo.general_ledger, both attributed to the same server_principal_name with application_name 'sqlcmd'.

  2. Test 2Off-Hours Bulk Update of Invoice Table via Interactive Client

    Expected signal: SQL Server Audit / Azure SQL Auditing records: 10 UPDATE action_name events against object_name dbo.invoices within a single 15-minute window, application_name 'Azure Data Studio', succeeded = true.

  3. Test 3Direct Deletion of Journal Entry Rows via psql

    Expected signal: Database audit log (pgaudit or equivalent forwarded into the SQLSecurityAuditEvents-equivalent schema): DELETE action_name events against object_name journal_entries, application_name 'psql', server_principal_name dbadmin, succeeded = true.

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Related Detections

Tactic Hub

Detection Variants (1)

Different telemetry and tradecraft for the same technique — pick the one that matches the data you collect.