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THREAT-Impact-EndpointResourceExhaustionDoS Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Endpoint Denial of Service via Process/Service Resource Exhaustion Flood in Sumo Logic CSE

Endpoint denial-of-service attacks against a single host (T1499) do not always require network floods — an adversary with local or remote code execution can render a system or a critical service unusable purely by exhausting local resources: spawning processes faster than the OS can reap them (a 'fork bomb' or self-replicating process tree), repeatedly invoking a resource-heavy service call, or exhausting available memory/handles until the OS resource-exhaustion detector or the application itself begins failing. This detection deliberately avoids continuous performance-counter polling (CPU%, memory% telemetry), which is expensive to collect and noisy to baseline. Instead it relies on cheap, event-driven signals that are already logged by default on most endpoints: (1) process-creation event volume from a single parent process crossing a hard threshold in a short window (the signature of a fork bomb or malicious loop, e.g. cmd.exe spawning itself repeatedly or a scripted `while(1){Start-Process}` loop), (2) native OS resource-exhaustion telemetry — Windows' Microsoft-Windows-Resource-Exhaustion-Detector ETW provider (Event IDs 2004/2005 for low virtual memory/commit) and Application-Hang events (Event ID 1002), and (3) the Linux OOM-killer's own log line, which fires only when the kernel actually reclaims memory by killing a process. All three are single-event or simple-count aggregations, not continuous metric collection.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Impact

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
_sourceCategory=*/Windows/Sysmon*
| where (%"EventID" = "1" or EventID = 1)
| parse field=_raw "ParentImage: *\r" as ParentImage nodrop
| parse field=_raw "ParentProcessId: *\r" as ParentProcessId nodrop
| timeslice 5m
| stats count as ChildCount by ParentImage, ParentProcessId, _timeslice
| where ChildCount >= 50
| eval Indicator = "ProcessCreationFloodFromSingleParent"
| sort - ChildCount
high severity medium confidence

Sumo Logic detection over Sysmon Event ID 1, bucketed into 5-minute timeslices, flagging any single parent process spawning 50 or more children — the fork-bomb/spawn-loop signature.

Data Sources

Windows Sysmon (Event ID 1 — Process Create)

Required Tables

_sourceCategory=*/Windows/Sysmon*

False Positives & Tuning

  • Build/test automation spawning many short-lived child processes

Other platforms for THREAT-Impact-EndpointResourceExhaustionDoS


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 2 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Process-Creation Flood (Windows)

    Expected signal: DeviceProcessEvents shows 50+ cmd.exe child processes from the same InitiatingProcessId within a 5-minute window.

  2. Test 2Simulate Process-Creation Flood (Linux)

    Expected signal: Process creation events show a single parent shell spawning 50+ short-lived child processes within a 5-minute window; on repeated/uncontrolled runs, kernel oom-killer log lines may appear.

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