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THREAT-Impact-DiskWipeUtilityExecution CrowdStrike LogScale · LogScale

Detect Disk Wipe — Destructive Disk-Clearing Utility Execution in CrowdStrike LogScale

Wiper attacks and the destructive final stage of some ransomware/extortion intrusions rely on a small, well-known set of disk-clearing tools and commands rather than custom code, because overwriting or reformatting a disk does not require sophistication — it requires only that the operator have sufficient privilege and be willing to accept the outcome. Common patterns: Sysinternals sdelete/sdelete64 invoked with the -p (passes), -z (zero free space), or -c (clean free space) flags to securely overwrite file or free-space content; cipher.exe /w: to wipe deallocated disk space (a native Windows binary requiring no download, favored specifically because it evades application-allowlisting that would block sdelete); diskpart.exe run non-interactively via a script file containing "clean" or "clean all" against a selected disk/volume; format.com or PowerShell's Clear-Disk/Remove-Partition/Initialize-Disk cmdlets invoked with -Confirm:$false against a data or boot volume; and on Linux, dd with if=/dev/zero or if=/dev/urandom targeting a block device, shred -vfz, or wipefs -a. WhisperGate and Shamoon-family wipers used variations of these same primitives (WhisperGate additionally corrupted the MBR directly). None of these tools/commands has a legitimate high-volume production use case against a system or data volume — they appear almost exclusively during authorized secure-decommissioning workflows or a destructive attack, making this a high-fidelity, low-noise detection surface when properly scoped away from asset-disposal processes.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Impact

LogScale Detection Query

CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
cql
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName = /(?i)(sdelete(64)?|cipher|diskpart|format)\.(exe|com)$/ OR FileName = /(?i)^(dd|shred|wipefs)$/
| case {
    FileName = /(?i)sdelete(64)?\.exe/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)(-p|-z|-c)\b/
      | WipeIndicator := "SdeleteSecureOverwrite" | RiskScore := 85 ;
    FileName = /(?i)cipher\.exe/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)\/w:/
      | WipeIndicator := "CipherFreeSpaceWipe_NativeBinary" | RiskScore := 85 ;
    FileName = /(?i)diskpart\.exe/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)\/s\b/
      | WipeIndicator := "DiskpartScriptedClean" | RiskScore := 100 ;
    FileName = /(?i)format\.com/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)(\/y|\/fs)/
      | WipeIndicator := "NonInteractiveFormat" | RiskScore := 100 ;
    FileName = /(?i)^dd$/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)of=\/dev\/(sd|nvme|vd)/
      | WipeIndicator := "DdBlockDeviceOverwrite" | RiskScore := 100 ;
    FileName = /(?i)^shred$/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)-(v)?fz/
      | WipeIndicator := "ShredSecureDelete" | RiskScore := 85 ;
    FileName = /(?i)^wipefs$/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)-a\b/
      | WipeIndicator := "WipefsSignatureWipe" | RiskScore := 85 ;
    * | drop()
  }
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, WipeIndicator], function=[count(as=EventCount), collect(CommandLine, limit=20), max(RiskScore, as=MaxRisk)])
| sort(MaxRisk, order=desc)
critical severity high confidence

CrowdStrike LogScale query detecting disk-wipe utility execution via Falcon ProcessRollup2 events, covering sdelete, cipher /w:, diskpart clean, format, and Linux dd/shred/wipefs, with risk-tiered classification.

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon PlatformFalcon ProcessRollup2 event stream

Required Tables

ProcessRollup2

False Positives & Tuning

  • Documented decommissioning workflows
  • Forensic imaging processes

Other platforms for THREAT-Impact-DiskWipeUtilityExecution


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate sdelete Secure Overwrite

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: sdelete64.exe process creation with '-p' flag in command line.

  2. Test 2Simulate Diskpart Scripted Clean

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: diskpart.exe process creation with '/s' flag referencing the script file.

  3. Test 3Simulate dd Block Device Overwrite (Linux)

    Expected signal: auditd EXECVE record for dd with of=/dev/loop9 and if=/dev/zero in the argument list.

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