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THREAT-ICMP-C2Exfiltration Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Data Exfiltration via ICMP Covert Channel in Elastic Security

Tools such as icmpsh, ptunnel, icmptunnel, Nishang's Invoke-PowerShellIcmp, and Cobalt Strike's ICMP beacon exfiltrate collected data by embedding it in the payload of ICMP Echo Request (Type 8) packets and relying on an adversary-controlled listener to reassemble it from Echo Reply traffic. ICMP is exceptionally effective as an exfiltration channel because it is a network-layer control protocol that most firewalls and proxies pass without content inspection or logging, and it requires no application-layer handshake, DNS resolution, or TLS certificate that could be fingerprinted. PLATINUM has been documented using ICMP as a communication and file-transfer channel specifically because it evades traditional network intrusion detection that focuses on TCP/UDP application traffic. Critically, this technique also evades most process-centric EDR network telemetry: Sysmon's Network Connection event (Event ID 3) and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint's DeviceNetworkEvents only monitor TCP/UDP socket activity and do not record raw ICMP traffic at all, so detection here requires visibility from genuinely ICMP-capable network-layer sensors — NGFW/firewall session logs, Zeek/Bro network-tap conn.log, or flow collectors (NetFlow/IPFIX/QFlow). This differs from the generic T1041 base record (which centers on HTTP/DNS beaconing patterns) in that ICMP tunnels are identifiable by a distinct network-layer fingerprint: abnormal session/packet volume to a single destination, oversized payload-per-session inconsistent with diagnostic ping, and sustained session duration outside of standard troubleshooting use.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Exfiltration

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
network where event.category == "network" and network.transport == "icmp" and destination.bytes >= 100
high severity medium confidence

Elastic EQL filter for candidate ICMP tunneling sessions using ECS network fields sourced from Packetbeat's flow module, which observes raw packet-capture traffic and genuinely records ICMP (unlike Elastic Endpoint's process-centric network events, which — like Sysmon — do not capture ICMP). EQL has no aggregation functions, so this rule surfaces individual oversized-payload candidate flows; pair it with a companion Kibana Threshold rule bucketing on source.ip and destination.ip with a count aggregation (>=200) and a duration aggregation (>=10m) to reproduce the full volumetric scoring model used in the kql/spl versions of this detection.

Data Sources

Packetbeat flow module (network tap or span port)Elastic Security Threshold rule (companion aggregation, required for full parity)

Required Tables

packetbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

  • Network operations and monitoring teams running legitimate sustained ICMP availability checks (smokeping, PRTG)
  • Path MTU discovery and network troubleshooting using oversized ping payloads
  • Authorized vulnerability scanning or network mapping generating high-volume ICMP sweeps

Other platforms for THREAT-ICMP-C2Exfiltration


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 2 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulated ICMP Tunneling via Oversized Ping Payload Burst

    Expected signal: CommonSecurityLog (or Zeek conn.log): ~60 permitted ICMP session records between the test host's source IP and 198.51.100.10, each with SentBytes/orig_ip_bytes reflecting the 128-byte payload (well above the 56-byte default), spanning roughly 12 seconds. Sysmon/MDE will NOT show this traffic — that is expected and confirms the endpoint-blind-spot this detection is designed to cover.

  2. Test 2Sustained Single-Destination ICMP Session Simulation

    Expected signal: CommonSecurityLog (or Zeek conn.log): 400 permitted ICMP session records from the test host to 198.51.100.10 spanning approximately 3-4 minutes, with SessionCount and DurationMinutes both elevated relative to normal diagnostic traffic patterns.

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