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THREAT-Exfiltration-LinuxCronScheduledExfil Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Scheduled Data Exfiltration via Linux Cron Jobs in Sumo Logic CSE

Adversaries who compromise Linux servers, containers, or cloud instances frequently use cron — the native Linux job scheduler — to establish recurring, low-and-slow data exfiltration rather than a single large transfer. A malicious crontab entry or drop file in /etc/cron.d/ can invoke curl, wget, scp, rsync, or nc at a fixed interval to stage and transmit archived data (tar/zip of /home, /var/www, database dump directories, or cloud instance metadata) to an external destination, blending with legitimate scheduled maintenance jobs. This pattern is common on internet-facing Linux servers, self-managed databases, and container hosts, and is frequently paired with cron-based persistence mechanisms. The existing T1029 baseline detection in this platform is written entirely against Windows/Microsoft Defender for Endpoint telemetry (DeviceNetworkEvents beaconing, Task Scheduler) and does not address the Linux cron equivalent, leaving a platform gap for organizations running Linux infrastructure.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Exfiltration

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
_sourceCategory=linux/auditd type=EXECVE
| parse "exe=\"*\"" as Exe nodrop
| parse "comm=\"*\"" as Comm nodrop
| parse "a0=\"*\"" as Arg0 nodrop
| where (Exe matches "*crontab*")
    or (Comm in ("cron", "crond", "anacron") and Exe matches "*curl*" or Exe matches "*wget*" or Exe matches "*scp*" or Exe matches "*rsync*" or Exe matches "*nc*" or Exe matches "*socat*")
    or (Comm in ("cron", "crond", "anacron") and (Exe matches "*tar*" or Exe matches "*zip*" or Exe matches "*gzip*"))
| eval Signal = if(Exe matches "*crontab*", "CrontabModified",
    if(Comm matches "cron*" and (Exe matches "*curl*" or Exe matches "*scp*" or Exe matches "*rsync*"), "CronSpawnedTransferTool", "CronArchiveStaging"))
| stats count as EventCount, values(Arg0) as Args by _sourceHost, Comm, Exe, Signal
| sort by EventCount desc
high severity medium confidence

Sumo Logic search parsing Linux auditd EXECVE records for crontab modifications and cron/crond/anacron spawning network transfer or archive tools, identifying the stage-then-transfer pattern used in cron-based scheduled exfiltration.

Data Sources

Sumo Logic Cloud SIEMLinux auditd (EXECVE records)

Required Tables

_sourceCategory=linux/auditd

False Positives & Tuning

  • Documented backup/replication cron jobs to a known backup server
  • Configuration management agents invoking curl/wget from cron

Other platforms for THREAT-Exfiltration-LinuxCronScheduledExfil


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 2 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Add Cron Job Spawning curl to External Host

    Expected signal: auditd EXECVE record for crontab with '-' (replace) argument. Subsequent auditd EXECVE record for curl spawned with comm=cron/crond as parent, invoking the httpbin.org POST.

  2. Test 2Cron-Triggered Archive and Stage of Home Directory

    Expected signal: auditd EXECVE record for tar with comm=cron/crond as parent, arguments including '/home' as the target path.

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