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THREAT-Exfiltration-ICMPTunnel CrowdStrike LogScale · LogScale

Detect Data Exfiltration via ICMP Tunneling in CrowdStrike LogScale

Adversaries encode stolen data inside ICMP echo request/reply payloads to exfiltrate over a protocol that is frequently permitted outbound by firewalls even when all other egress is blocked. Public tools such as icmpsh, ptunnel, hans, and pingtunnel wrap a full bidirectional channel inside ICMP type 8/0 packets, and living-off-the-land variants simply abuse the built-in ping utility with oversized payloads (-l on Windows, -s on Linux/macOS) to smuggle data in repeated pings. This technique is a persistent detection gap because most EDR network telemetry (Microsoft Defender for Endpoint DeviceNetworkEvents, Sysmon Event ID 3, CrowdStrike NetworkConnectIP4) only instruments TCP/UDP connection setup and does not log ICMP traffic at all. Reliable detection therefore requires combining process-level visibility (ping.exe / ping binary invoked with abnormal packet-size or repeat-count flags, or unrecognized ICMP tunneling binaries) with network-layer telemetry from firewalls, NetFlow, or NDR/Zeek sensors that do record ICMP as a protocol.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Exfiltration

LogScale Detection Query

CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
cql
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName=/(?i)ping\.exe$/
| CommandLine=/(?i)(-l\s+\d{4,}|-t\b)/
| Signal := "OversizedOrContinuousPing"
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, CommandLine], function=[count(as=EventCount)])
| sort(EventCount, order=desc)

// Companion search for named ICMP tunneling tools:
// #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
// | FileName=/(?i)(icmpsh|ptunnel|hans|pingtunnel|icmptunnel)/
// | Signal := "KnownICMPTunnelTool"
// | table([ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine, Signal])
high severity medium confidence

CrowdStrike LogScale query over ProcessRollup2 endpoint telemetry detecting oversized (-l with 4+ digit byte count) or continuous (-t) ping.exe invocations. A companion search (commented) flags execution of named ICMP tunneling tools. Falcon's NetworkConnectIP4 event type does not capture ICMP traffic, so this detection is process-signal-only; pair with a firewall or NDR-fed LogScale repository for ICMP flow-volume confirmation.

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon Endpoint ProtectionCrowdStrike LogScaleFalcon ProcessRollup2 telemetry

Required Tables

ProcessRollup2

False Positives & Tuning

  • Network operations staff performing legitimate MTU/fragmentation validation
  • Monitoring agents using continuous ping mode for host availability

Other platforms for THREAT-Exfiltration-ICMPTunnel


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Oversized ICMP Payload via ping.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 / DeviceProcessEvents: ping.exe process creation with CommandLine containing '-l 1400 -n 20'. No corresponding DeviceNetworkEvents entry will be generated, since MDE does not log ICMP traffic.

  2. Test 2Continuous Ping Simulation

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 / DeviceProcessEvents: ping.exe with CommandLine containing '-t'.

  3. Test 3Large ICMP Payload via ping (Linux/macOS)

    Expected signal: Auditd EXECVE record for ping with arguments '-s 1400 -c 20 8.8.8.8'. Firewall/NDR sensors will show ICMP echo requests with 1400-byte payloads.

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