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THREAT-Exfil-ScheduledBulkTransfer Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Scheduled Off-Hours Bulk Data Transfer in Google Chronicle

Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to occur only at specific times of day — typically off-hours, overnight, or during weekends — to blend the transfer with lower baseline traffic and reduce the likelihood of live monitoring or analyst review. This is frequently implemented via a scheduled task, cron job, or malware-internal timer that triggers a bulk upload once collected data has been staged. Detection focuses on identifying large outbound data transfers that occur outside of a host or user's established working-hours baseline, especially when correlated with a scheduled task or cron job creation shortly beforehand.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Exfiltration

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule threat_exfil_scheduled_bulk_transfer {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects a scheduled task or cron job creation followed by a large off-hours outbound transfer, indicating T1029 - Scheduled Transfer"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Exfiltration"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1029"
    severity = "MEDIUM"
    confidence = "MEDIUM"
    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029/"
    version = "1.0"
    created = "2026-07-15"

  events:
    $e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    AND $e1.target.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(schtasks\.exe|at\.exe|crontab)/
    AND $e1.target.process.command_line = /(?i)(create|-e)/

    $e2.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION"
    AND $e2.network.direction = "OUTBOUND"
    AND $e2.network.sent_bytes > 104857600

    $e1.principal.hostname = $e2.principal.hostname

  match:
    $e1.principal.hostname over 6h

  condition:
    $e1 and $e2
}
medium severity medium confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule correlating scheduled task/cron creation events with a subsequent large (>100MB) outbound network transfer on the same host within a 6-hour window, indicating T1029 - Scheduled Transfer.

Data Sources

Google Chronicle UDM (Unified Data Model)Chronicle Forwarder (Windows Sysmon, NetFlow)

Required Tables

UDM PROCESS_LAUNCH eventsUDM NETWORK_CONNECTION events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate scheduled backup or replication jobs
  • Global teams where off-hours corresponds to a normal working shift

Other platforms for THREAT-Exfil-ScheduledBulkTransfer


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 2 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Create Scheduled Task and Simulate Off-Hours Bulk Upload

    Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created) for 'df00tech-test-sync' with the encoded PowerShell command in the task action. Sysmon Event ID 1 for the powershell.exe process launched by the Task Scheduler engine (parent: svchost.exe / taskeng.exe). DeviceNetworkEvents/Sysmon Event ID 3 showing an outbound POST of ~120MB to the test endpoint.

  2. Test 2Cron-Based Scheduled Exfiltration on Linux

    Expected signal: Auditd or Sysmon-for-Linux process execution events for `crontab`, followed at the scheduled time by `dd` and `curl` process creation events with the destination URL in the command line. Cron execution log entry in `/var/log/cron` or `journalctl -u cron` at 23:59.

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