Which SIEM platforms have a T1590.005 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1590.005 (IP Addresses) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect IP Addresses (T1590.005)?

Detecting IP Addresses requires the following data sources: Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation, Command: Command Execution, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

What severity and confidence is the T1590.005 detection?

The T1590.005 detection is rated low severity with low confidence.

What are common false positives for T1590.005?

Common false positives for T1590.005 include: Security analysts and threat intelligence teams routinely query Shodan, Censys, ARIN, and RIPE to assess the organization's external attack surface — this is expected and should be allowlisted by user/device; Network engineers using nmap or masscan for authorized internal network discovery and asset inventory; Penetration testers performing authorized external assessments will use all of these tools and services legitimately.

T1590.005 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect IP Addresses in Elastic Security

Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. Adversaries gather this information via direct collection actions (active scanning, phishing for information) or through online data sets such as WHOIS, ARIN, RIPE, passive DNS repositories, and IP intelligence platforms like Shodan or Censys.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Reconnaissance
Technique: T1590 Gather Victim Network Information
Sub-technique: T1590.005 IP Addresses
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)

eql

any where
  (
    event.category == "network" and
    destination.domain in~ ("shodan.io", "censys.io", "ipinfo.io", "ipapi.co",
      "ip-api.com", "ipwhois.io", "bgp.he.net", "arin.net", "ripe.net",
      "apnic.net", "lacnic.net", "afrinic.net", "spyse.com", "fofa.info",
      "zoomeye.org", "dnsdumpster.com", "hackertarget.com", "viewdns.info",
      "ipvoid.com", "whatismyipaddress.com", "ip2location.com", "maxmind.com",
      "greynoise.io", "binaryedge.io", "onyphe.io")
  ) or
  (
    event.category == "process" and event.type == "start" and
    (
      process.name in~ ("nmap.exe", "nmap", "masscan.exe", "masscan",
        "zmap.exe", "zmap", "theharvester.exe", "theharvester",
        "amass.exe", "amass", "subfinder.exe", "subfinder",
        "spiderfoot.exe", "spiderfoot", "recon-ng") or
      process.command_line like~ "*shodan search*" or
      process.command_line like~ "*censys search*" or
      process.command_line like~ "*nmap -sn*" or
      process.command_line like~ "*nmap -p*" or
      process.command_line like~ "*masscan --rate*" or
      process.command_line like~ "*theharvester -d*" or
      process.command_line like~ "*amass enum*" or
      process.command_line like~ "*subfinder -d*"
    )
  )

medium severity medium confidence

Detects IP address intelligence gathering (T1590.005) via two branches: (1) outbound network connections from managed endpoints to known IP OSINT and intelligence platforms such as Shodan, Censys, ARIN, RIPE, and GreyNoise; (2) execution of active network reconnaissance tools including nmap, masscan, zmap, theHarvester, Amass, and Subfinder. Covers browser-based OSINT lookups, API calls to IP data services, and direct tool invocation from managed endpoints. Uses Elastic Common Schema (ECS) fields destination.domain and process.command_line across endpoint and network telemetry indices.

Data Sources

Elastic Agent Endpoint Security integration (process and network events)Elastic Agent Network Packet Capture or Zeek/Bro integrationWinlogbeat or Elastic Agent collecting Windows Sysmon EventCode 1 and 3Packetbeat for HTTP layer network metadata

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.network-*logs-endpoint.events.process-*logs-network_traffic.*logs-system.security-*

False Positives & Tuning

Security operations and threat intelligence analysts routinely query Shodan, Censys, GreyNoise, and ARIN for exposure assessments and IOC enrichment — allowlist by host.name or user.name for known SOC workstations and analyst accounts.
IT asset management platforms such as Qualys, Tenable Nessus, and Rapid7 InsightVM may call ip-api.com, ipinfo.io, or MaxMind GeoIP APIs to enrich discovered host records or determine geolocation — filter by the platform's service account or source host.
Legitimate penetration testing engagements or red team exercises running nmap, masscan, Amass, or Subfinder on managed endpoints will generate process.name matches — correlate against the security team's engagement calendar and suppress by host.name during authorised windows.
Development and QA pipelines running nmap as part of network connectivity validation or infrastructure smoke tests in CI/CD environments will produce process.type start events — filter by process.parent.name for known CI agent process names such as jenkins, gitlab-runner, or buildkite-agent.

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1590.005

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) IBM QRadar (QRadar) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1Shodan CLI IP Range Query
Expected signal: DNS query for shodan.io (Sysmon Event ID 22 on Windows / auditd on Linux). Outbound HTTPS connection to shodan.io:443 (Sysmon Event ID 3 / auditd network log). On Linux: auditd EXECVE record for pip and shodan commands. Proxy log entry with cs_host=shodan.io and cs_username if authenticated proxy is in use.
Test 2ARIN WHOIS IP Block Lookup via curl
Expected signal: DNS resolution of whois.arin.net (Sysmon Event ID 22 / DNS logs). Outbound HTTPS connection to whois.arin.net:443 (Sysmon Event ID 3 / firewall log). HTTP GET request visible in proxy logs with URI path /rest/ip/<target_ip>. On Windows: DeviceNetworkEvents record with RemoteUrl containing 'arin.net'.
Test 3nmap Ping Sweep of IP Range
Expected signal: Process creation event for nmap with command line containing '-sn' and the target IP range (Sysmon Event ID 1 / auditd EXECVE). File creation event for /tmp/df00tech-nmap-test.xml (Sysmon Event ID 11). ICMP packets visible in network capture or firewall logs (no TCP/UDP — this is ping-only). On Windows: DeviceProcessEvents with FileName='nmap.exe' and ProcessCommandLine containing '-sn'.
Test 4theHarvester IP and Subdomain Enumeration
Expected signal: Process creation for theHarvester with arguments '-d example.com -b dnsdumpster,bing' (Sysmon Event ID 1 / auditd). Outbound DNS queries and HTTPS connections to dnsdumpster.com and bing.com (Sysmon Event IDs 3, 22). File creation events for /tmp/df00tech-harvester-test.html and /tmp/df00tech-harvester-test.xml. Proxy logs showing connections to dnsdumpster.com with user-agent containing 'theHarvester' or Python requests.
Test 5BGP.he.net ASN IP Range Discovery
Expected signal: DNS query for bgp.he.net (Sysmon Event ID 22). Outbound HTTPS connection to bgp.he.net:443 (Sysmon Event ID 3 / firewall log). HTTP GET for /AS<number> visible in proxy logs with the target ASN in the URI path. DeviceNetworkEvents record with RemoteUrl containing 'bgp.he.net'.

Last updated: 2026-04-14 Research depth: deep

References (14)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1590.005 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Detect IP Addresses in Elastic Security

MITRE ATT&CK

Elastic Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1590.005

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Parent Technique

Related Sub-techniques

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Reconnaissance

Popular Detections

MITRE ATT&CK

Elastic Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1590.005

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Parent Technique

Related Sub-techniques

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Reconnaissance

Popular Detections

Get new detections in your inbox