Detect Obtain Capabilities in Sumo Logic CSE
This detection identifies adversary capability acquisition activity manifesting within the victim environment — specifically, the arrival, staging, and first execution of known offensive tools, exploit frameworks, and dual-use security utilities. While T1588 is a PRE-ATT&CK technique occurring outside the victim network, its downstream effects are observable: offensive tools landing in atypical directories (Temp, Downloads, user profile paths), processes executing with names or command-line arguments matching known offensive frameworks (Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, Rubeus, Sliver, Havoc, Impacket), downloads via living-off-the-land binaries (certutil, bitsadmin, curl), and network connections to known exploit distribution infrastructure. The detection correlates process creation events, file download artifacts, and network telemetry to surface high-risk capability introductions across Windows and Linux endpoints.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Technique
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory=*sysmon* OR _sourceCategory=*endpoint*
| json auto
| where EventCode = 1
| eval CommandLower = lower(CommandLine)
| eval ImageLower = lower(Image)
| where matches(ImageLower, "mimikatz|rubeus|bloodhound|sharphound|cobalt|meterpreter|crackmapexec|impacket")
or matches(CommandLower, "invoke-mimikatz|invoke-bloodhound|-encoded |-enc |bypass")
| eval ToolCategory = if(matches(ImageLower, "mimikatz"), "Credential Dumping",
if(matches(ImageLower, "bloodhound|sharphound"), "AD Reconnaissance",
if(matches(ImageLower, "cobalt|meterpreter"), "C2 Framework", "Offensive Tool")))
| eval RiskScore = if(ToolCategory = "Credential Dumping", 100,
if(ToolCategory = "C2 Framework", 95,
if(ToolCategory = "AD Reconnaissance", 85, 70)))
| stats count, values(CommandLine) AS Commands by _sourceHost, User, ToolCategory, RiskScore
| sort by RiskScore descSumo Logic detection for Obtain Capabilities. Detects potential capability acquisition activity across three branches: (1) execution of processes matching known offensive tool names or command-line patterns, (2) living-off-the-land binaries (cert
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized penetration testers running scheduled security assessments
- Red team exercises using commercial offensive security tooling
- Security researchers analyzing malware in isolated lab environments
- Network administrators using dual-use tools for authorized diagnostics
Other platforms for T1588
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1LOLBin Capability Download via CertUtil
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=1 with Image=certutil.exe, CommandLine containing '-urlcache' and '-split'; Sysmon EventCode=11 (FileCreate) for the downloaded file in %TEMP%; possible DNS query in EventCode=22 for the target hostname
- Test 2PowerShell Download Cradle to Staging Path
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=1 with Image=powershell.exe and CommandLine containing 'DownloadFile' and 'WebClient'; Sysmon EventCode=3 (NetworkConnect) to target IP; Sysmon EventCode=11 (FileCreate) in %TEMP%
- Test 3Offensive Tool Naming Pattern Execution from Temp
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=1 with Image path containing %TEMP%\mimikatz_test.exe; parent process is cmd.exe; CommandLine includes /all argument; Sysmon EventCode=11 for file copy to staging path
- Test 4BITS Transfer Capability Staging
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=1 with Image=bitsadmin.exe and CommandLine containing '/transfer' and target URL; Sysmon EventCode=11 for file creation in %TEMP%; Windows Event 16403 in Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational log recording the completed transfer job
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/
- https://www.citizenlab.ca/2021/07/nso-group-pegasus-spyware-2021/
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/09/comodo-hacker-i-hacked-diginotar-too/
- https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/nation-state-intelligence-buying-commercial-malware
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1588
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