Detect Develop Capabilities in IBM QRadar
This detection identifies indicators that adversaries have deployed custom-developed capabilities within the target environment. Because T1587 (Develop Capabilities) occurs outside the victim network during the adversary lifecycle, direct detection is impossible; instead, this rule focuses on second-order indicators: unsigned or self-signed executables executing from non-standard paths, low-prevalence binaries making network connections, and novel tooling patterns associated with bespoke malware frameworks. Groups such as Kimsuky, Moonstone Sleet, and Contagious Interview are known to develop custom tools—including malicious NPM packages, spearphishing toolkits, and custom implants—that exhibit these characteristics upon deployment. The detection correlates signature anomalies, environmental prevalence, and behavioral signals to surface likely custom-developed tools used in targeted intrusions.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Technique
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
sourceip,
username,
QIDNAME(qid) AS EventName,
"Process Name" AS ProcessName,
"Process Path" AS ProcessPath,
"File Hash" AS SHA256Hash,
"Signature Status" AS SignatureStatus,
destinationip,
destinationport,
logsourceid,
CATEGORYNAME(category) AS Category
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID(devicetype) IN (
SELECT id FROM logsourcetypes WHERE name LIKE '%Sysmon%' OR name LIKE '%Windows%'
)
AND (
(qid = 5145670 AND "Signed" = 'false') -- Sysmon EventCode 7 ImageLoad unsigned
OR
(qid = 5145664 -- Sysmon EventCode 1 ProcessCreate
AND (
"Process Path" ILIKE '%\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\%'
OR "Process Path" ILIKE '%\\Downloads\\%'
OR "Process Path" ILIKE '%\\ProgramData\\%'
OR "Process Path" ILIKE 'C:\\Temp\\%'
OR "Process Path" ILIKE 'C:\\Windows\\Temp\\%'
)
AND "Process Path" NOT ILIKE '%\\Windows\\System32\\%'
AND "Process Path" NOT ILIKE '%\\Program Files%'
)
)
AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
GROUP BY sourceip, username, ProcessPath, SHA256Hash, SignatureStatus
HAVING COUNT(DISTINCT sourceip) < 5
ORDER BY EventTime DESC
LIMIT 500Detects unsigned or invalidly-signed executables running from non-standard user-writable paths on Windows endpoints via Sysmon event codes 1 and 7 ingested into QRadar. Filters to low-prevalence binaries (fewer than 5 unique hosts) to surface likely custom-developed tools. Uses AQL aggregate grouping over a 24-hour lookback window.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate portable utilities executed from user download directories on low-user-count hosts
- Internal tooling deployed to a small subset of endpoints during staged rollouts
- Pentest or red team tooling executed from temp paths during authorised engagements
Other platforms for T1587
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Execute Self-Signed Binary from User-Writable Path (Windows)
Expected signal: DeviceProcessEvents: FileName=custom_capability_test.exe, ProcessSignatureStatus=SignedByUntrustedCertificate, FolderPath contains \AppData\Local\Temp. DeviceImageLoadEvents showing DLLs loaded with self-signed parent process.
- Test 2Deploy Malicious NPM Post-Install Script (Cross-Platform)
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode=1 (Linux auditd execve): process spawned with ParentImage=/usr/bin/node, Image=/bin/sh or /bin/id. audit.log entries showing execve syscall from node process with working directory in node_modules path.
- Test 3Compile and Execute Custom ELF Binary with Network Connection (Linux)
Expected signal: auditd: EXECVE record for /tmp/atomic_custom_tool with ppid matching shell. SOCKADDR audit record showing connect() call to 192.0.2.1:4444. Sysmon for Linux EventCode=3 (Network Connect) if deployed. /proc/<pid>/exe pointing to /tmp path.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt1-exposing-one-of-chinas-cyber-espionage-units
- https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/
- https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/05/28/moonstone-sleet-emerges-as-new-north-korean-threat-actor/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/contagious-interview-clickfix-reloaded-threat-actor-deploys-new-malware-via-fake-video-conferencing-apps/
- https://virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2019/10/kimsuky-apt-group/
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