Detect Compromise Infrastructure in IBM QRadar
This detection identifies indicators that adversaries may be leveraging compromised third-party infrastructure — including domains, servers, DNS services, or web services — to conduct operations against the organization. Because T1584 is a PRE-ATT&CK technique focused on adversary preparation, direct detection is not possible at the moment of compromise; instead, this detection identifies downstream indicators: network connections to infrastructure with characteristics consistent with hijacked or recently compromised assets (domains with mismatched registrar history, IPs flagged in threat intelligence, DNS resolutions to newly re-pointed hostnames, and C2 beaconing patterns associated with known compromised-infrastructure campaigns). Alerts from this detection warrant investigation into whether the communicating endpoint has been targeted via phishing, drive-by compromise, or C2 channels routed through legitimate third-party infrastructure.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Technique
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/
QRadar Detection Query
-- Part 1: Beaconing - high frequency connections to same dest IP from non-browser process
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(MIN(starttime), 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS first_seen,
DATEFORMAT(MAX(starttime), 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS last_seen,
sourceip,
destinationip,
destinationport,
COUNT(*) AS connection_count,
(MAX(starttime) - MIN(starttime)) / 3600000 AS duration_hours,
ROUND(COUNT(*) / NULLIF((MAX(starttime) - MIN(starttime)) / 3600000, 0), 2) AS beacon_rate,
'SuspiciousBeaconing' AS alert_type
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Sysmon')
AND starttime > NOW() - 604800000
AND destinationport IN (80, 443, 8080, 8443, 4443, 4444, 1080, 3128)
AND NOT (destinationip ILIKE '10.%' OR destinationip ILIKE '172.16.%' OR destinationip ILIKE '192.168.%' OR destinationip = '127.0.0.1')
AND username NOT ILIKE '%chrome%'
AND username NOT ILIKE '%firefox%'
GROUP BY sourceip, destinationip, destinationport
HAVING connection_count >= 20
AND duration_hours > 1
AND beacon_rate BETWEEN 0.5 AND 200.0
UNION ALL
-- Part 2: Dynamic DNS resolutions
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS first_seen,
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS last_seen,
sourceip,
destinationip,
destinationport,
COUNT(*) AS connection_count,
0 AS duration_hours,
0 AS beacon_rate,
'SuspiciousDynamicDNS' AS alert_type
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Sysmon')
AND starttime > NOW() - 604800000
AND (LOWER(URL) ILIKE '%duckdns.org%'
OR LOWER(URL) ILIKE '%no-ip.com%'
OR LOWER(URL) ILIKE '%hopto.org%'
OR LOWER(URL) ILIKE '%ddns.net%'
OR LOWER(URL) ILIKE '%zapto.org%'
OR LOWER(URL) ILIKE '%sytes.net%'
OR LOWER(URL) ILIKE '%myddns.me%'
OR LOWER(URL) ILIKE '%dynalias.com%')
GROUP BY starttime, sourceip, destinationip, destinationport
HAVING connection_count >= 1
UNION ALL
-- Part 3: Fast-flux / high unique destination IPs per source per hour
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(TRUNC(starttime, 'HH'), 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS first_seen,
DATEFORMAT(TRUNC(starttime, 'HH'), 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS last_seen,
sourceip,
'multiple' AS destinationip,
0 AS destinationport,
COUNT(*) AS connection_count,
1 AS duration_hours,
0 AS beacon_rate,
'PotentialFastFlux' AS alert_type
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Sysmon')
AND starttime > NOW() - 604800000
AND NOT (destinationip ILIKE '10.%' OR destinationip ILIKE '172.16.%' OR destinationip ILIKE '192.168.%')
GROUP BY sourceip, TRUNC(starttime, 'HH')
HAVING UNIQUECOUNT(destinationip) >= 5 AND connection_count >= 10
ORDER BY first_seen DESCDetects T1584 Compromise Infrastructure using three AQL queries unioned: (1) beaconing via high-frequency regular connections to the same destination IP from non-browser processes, (2) DNS resolutions or connections to known dynamic DNS providers abused for C2, and (3) fast-flux indicators via high unique destination IP counts per source per hour.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Automated software update mechanisms making frequent connections to CDN endpoints
- IT management tools (RMM software) that legitimately connect to cloud management infrastructure at high frequency
- Developers using dynamic DNS providers for legitimate home or lab infrastructure testing
Other platforms for T1584
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate C2 Beaconing to Compromised VPS Infrastructure
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection) from powershell.exe to TARGET_IP on port 8080, firing at regular 30-second intervals. DeviceNetworkEvents in Defender for Endpoint will show repeated ConnectionSuccess events from PowerShell to the destination IP.
- Test 2DNS Resolution to Dynamic DNS Provider Domain
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 22 (DNS Query) entries for each domain in the $suspiciousDomains list. The Image field will show powershell.exe or the parent process. QueryName will contain the duckdns.org / ddns.net / hopto.org domains.
- Test 3Simulate Fast-Flux Connection Pattern from Non-Browser Process
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection) events from powershell.exe to 10+ distinct destination IPs on port 80, all occurring within a short time window. DeviceNetworkEvents will show ConnectionAttempt or ConnectionSuccess entries for each target IP.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt1-exposing-one-of-chinas-cyber-espionage-units
- https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/the-domain-name-hijacking-threat-to-global-internet-security-21-1-2021-en
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2025/01/17/volttzite-targets-nato-member-using-nearest-neighbor-attack-via-compromised-infrastructure/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-258a
- https://sysdig.com/blog/proxyjacking-attackers-hijack-bandwidth/
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