Detect Botnet in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks. Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet by redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale phishing or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Notable real-world operators include Volt Typhoon operating KV Botnet through compromised Cisco and NETGEAR SOHO routers, Sandworm's Cyclops Blink targeting SOHO network devices, HAFNIUM using compromised devices in covert proxy networks, and Axiom using large groups of compromised machines as proxy nodes.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Resource Development
- Technique
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- Sub-technique
- T1584.005 Botnet
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory=network/firewall OR _sourceCategory=network/paloalto OR _sourceCategory=network/cisco/asa OR _sourceCategory=network/zeek OR _sourceCategory=network/flow)
| where !isPrivateIP(dst_ip)
| where !(dst_ip matches "10.*" or dst_ip matches "172.1[6-9].*" or dst_ip matches "172.2[0-9].*"
or dst_ip matches "172.3[0-1].*" or dst_ip matches "192.168.*"
or dst_ip matches "127.*" or dst_ip matches "169.254.*")
| eval irc_port = if(dst_port in ("6660","6661","6662","6663","6664","6665","6666","6667","6668","6669","6697","1080","4444"), 1, 0)
| timeslice 1h
| stats count as connections, dc(_timeslice) as hourly_buckets, max(irc_port) as irc_port,
sum(bytes_sent) as total_bytes_sent, sum(bytes_rcvd) as total_bytes_rcvd,
min(_messageTime) as first_seen, max(_messageTime) as last_seen,
values(process_name) as processes
by hostname, src_ip, dst_ip, dst_port
| where connections >= 20 and hourly_buckets >= 3
| eval avg_per_hour = round(connections / hourly_buckets, 1)
| eval avg_bytes_per_conn = round((total_bytes_sent + total_bytes_rcvd) / connections, 0)
| eval beaconing_score = if(irc_port = 1, 3,
if(avg_per_hour > 10 and avg_bytes_per_conn < 500, 2,
if(connections > 200 and hourly_buckets >= 6, 2,
if(connections > 100, 1, 0))))
| where beaconing_score >= 1
| eval first_seen = formatDate(toLong(first_seen), "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
| eval last_seen = formatDate(toLong(last_seen), "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
| sort by -beaconing_score, -connections
| fields hostname, src_ip, dst_ip, dst_port, connections, hourly_buckets, avg_per_hour,
avg_bytes_per_conn, irc_port, beaconing_score, total_bytes_sent, total_bytes_rcvd,
processes, first_seen, last_seenSumo Logic search query detecting botnet node behavior from firewall and network flow log sources. Uses timeslice 1h to bucket events, then a single stats pass aggregates connections, counts distinct hourly buckets via dc(_timeslice), and collects max IRC port flag per (hostname, src_ip, dst_ip, dst_port) tuple. The post-aggregation beaconing score mirrors the KQL/SPL logic: IRC C2 port = 3, low-byte high-frequency = 2, high-volume = 1–2. Adjust _sourceCategory values to match your environment's log routing. Field names (dst_ip, src_ip, bytes_sent, process_name) may require mapping to your extraction rule output.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Scheduled backup agents such as Veeam, Backblaze, or Crashplan generating high-frequency connections to external cloud storage endpoints during nightly backup windows — identify by hostname pattern and time correlation with backup schedule
- Torrent or peer-to-peer file sharing software running on user workstations making high-frequency tracker and peer connections on non-standard port ranges — correlate process_name values against approved software inventory
- Load testing or chaos engineering tools such as Locust or k6 executing from internal hosts against external staging or production endpoints — cross-reference src_ip against CI/CD runner or QA host inventory during test windows
Other platforms for T1584.005
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Botnet Beaconing via PowerShell Loop
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'DownloadString' and a loop. Sysmon Event ID 3: 30 network connection attempts to 127.0.0.1:8080 over approximately 2.5 minutes. In DeviceNetworkEvents: ConnectionCount will accumulate for the powershell.exe process against the target IP. The connection will fail (no listener) but the attempt events still fire.
- Test 2IRC C2 Port Connection Attempt
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempt from powershell.exe to 127.0.0.1:6667. DestinationPort=6667 will be logged regardless of whether the connection succeeds. In DeviceNetworkEvents: ActionType will be 'ConnectionAttempt' or 'ConnectionFailed' with RemotePort=6667.
- Test 3High-Frequency Outbound Connection Burst (DDoS Simulation)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3: 150 network connection events from powershell.exe in rapid succession, each to 127.0.0.1 on different ports. The ConnectionCount in a 15-minute window will exceed 100, triggering the DDoS burst hunting query. UniquePorts will be high (random port selection), triggering ScanIndicator evaluation.
- Test 4DNS Query Burst to Simulated DGA Domains
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 22: 60 DNS query events from powershell.exe, each for a unique random-looking domain name. The vast majority will return NXDOMAIN (non-existent domain). DNS debug log (if enabled) will show the same pattern. DnsQueryResults field will contain NXDOMAIN indicators for each failed lookup.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005/
- https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html
- https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-sandworm-cyclops-blink
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/05/silk-typhoon-targeting-it-supply-chain/
- https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1584.005/T1584.005.md
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/aa24-038a-prc-state-sponsored-actors-compromise-us-critical-infrastructure_0.pdf
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