Detect Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure in Google Chronicle
This detection identifies adversary attempts to modify cloud compute infrastructure components — including creating, deleting, or reverting virtual machines, snapshots, and compute configurations — to bypass access controls, evade detection, or erase forensic evidence. The KQL query monitors Azure Activity logs for anomalous compute operations such as snapshot creation from running instances, instance deletion outside approved maintenance windows, and configuration changes to security-relevant VM properties. The SPL query targets AWS CloudTrail events for equivalent actions across EC2, EBS, and related compute services. High-privilege cloud principals performing bulk or unusual compute operations are the primary focus, particularly when those operations originate from unfamiliar IP addresses or occur outside normal change windows.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule T1578_cloud_infra_modification {
meta:
author = "Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects suspicious cloud infrastructure modifications"
severity = "high"
confidence = "medium"
mitre_attack = "T1578"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "USER_RESOURCE_ACCESS"
re.regex($e.metadata.product_event_type, `(?i)(snapshot|virtualMachine|instance|compute|create|delete|modify)`)
not re.regex($e.principal.user.email_addresses, `(?i)(backup|automation|serviceaccount)`)
condition:
$e
}Google Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 detection for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure. Monitors Azure Activity logs for anomalous compute infrastructure modifications by a single principal. Scores operations by risk (DELETE/CAPTURE/GENERALIZE=3pts, EXTENSION_CHANGE=2pts, CREATE/MODIFY=1
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized cloud administrators performing scheduled backup snapshot creation
- Automated disaster recovery solutions creating routine cloud instance snapshots
- DevOps CI/CD pipelines creating and deleting compute instances during deployments
- Authorized cloud migration projects moving instances between regions
Other platforms for T1578
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1AWS - Create and Share EC2 Snapshot Cross-Account
Expected signal: AWS CloudTrail events: CreateSnapshot (ec2.amazonaws.com), ModifySnapshotAttribute with createVolumePermission add — both visible in CloudTrail within 5-15 minutes
- Test 2Azure - Create VM Snapshot and Capture VM Image
Expected signal: AzureActivity log entries: Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/write (Succeeded), Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/capture/action (Started/Succeeded) — visible in Azure Monitor within 2-5 minutes
- Test 3AWS - Terminate Running EC2 Instance (Evidence Destruction)
Expected signal: AWS CloudTrail events: RunInstances (ec2.amazonaws.com) followed by TerminateInstances — both visible within 5-15 minutes. Instance state change to 'shutting-down' then 'terminated' visible in EC2 describe-instances.
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports/m-trends-2020
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/monitor-with-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/essentials/activity-log
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/005/
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