T1574.009 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Path Interception by Unquoted Path in Elastic Security

Adversaries exploit unquoted service executable paths that contain spaces. When a service path like C:\Program Files\My Service\service.exe is not quoted, Windows parses it by trying C:\Program.exe, then C:\Program Files\My.exe, then C:\Program Files\My Service\service.exe. An adversary with write access to C:\ or C:\Program Files\ can plant Program.exe or Program Files\My.exe to intercept service startup. This technique achieves privilege escalation because services typically run as SYSTEM. PowerSploit (Get-ServiceUnquoted), Empire, and winPEAS all include unquoted path discovery. It is particularly prevalent in third-party software installations that fail to properly quote service paths.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion
Technique
T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
Sub-technique
T1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted Path
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
registry where event.type in ("creation", "change")
  and registry.path : "*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath"
  and registry.data.strings : "* *"
  and not registry.data.strings : (""*"")
medium severity low confidence

Elastic EQL detection for Path Interception by Unquoted Path. Detects service registry entries with unquoted paths containing spaces — the pre-condition for unquoted path interception attacks. Monitors the Services registry hive for ImagePath/BinPath values that

Data Sources

Elastic Endpoint SecurityRegistry events

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.registry.*

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate software installers that update components in TEMP during multi-step installation
  • Enterprise deployment tools (SCCM, Intune) staging and modifying binaries in temp locations
  • Self-updating applications that modify their own components before execution
  • Antivirus software modifying installer binaries during scanning or remediation
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1574.009


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Create Vulnerable Service with Unquoted Path

    Expected signal: Security Event ID 7045 (System log): Service Installed event for UnquotedTestService. Sysmon Event ID 13 (Registry): HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UnquotedTestService\ImagePath set to unquoted value. Process creation for sc.exe.

  2. Test 2Enumerate Unquoted Service Paths (PowerSploit-Style)

    Expected signal: PowerShell process creation with WMI query to Win32_Service. Sysmon Event ID 19 (WMI Activity) may log the WMI query. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 records the enumeration script.

  3. Test 3Plant Interception Binary at C:\Program.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate): C:\Program.exe created at root of C: drive. High-priority alert — any EXE at C:\ root is anomalous. If any service with unquoted 'C:\Program Files' path starts, this binary would execute as SYSTEM.

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